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Abstract 
This thesis positions itself within the scholarly debate around videogame violence. 
However, other than focussing on the effects of game violence which dominates 
much of this debate, this thesis focuses on the formal characteristics of the game 
and asks: how does violence in single-player videogames work? This means that 
this thesis explores the different rules, style elements, and narrative components 
that make up and surround violent encounters in games and that structure our in-
game behaviours and our perceptions of these violent actions.  
When seeking an approach to study these formal components, currently available 
‘formalisms’ in game studies are found to be lacking. Ludology’s focus on rule 
systems in detriment of the game’s semantic layer does not allow for an adequate 
analysis of game violence since game violence is largely shaped by audiovisual 
cues. Furthermore, proceduralism’s focus on finding meaning becomes problematic 
since it does not account for the ludic function that components making up the game 
violence may (also) have. For a balanced analysis of rules, stylistic and narrative 
components, this thesis therefore borrows from, adapts, and expands on a 
neoformalist approach to films, and proposes a neoformalist approach to games as 
an alternative to both ludology and proceduralism. With a focus on the way that 
different devices function to structure a player’s response, this approach does not 
only prove helpful for an equal consideration of different formal game components 
but also helps to consider the player’s inherent role in actualising the perceptual, 
cognitive, emotional and behavioural effects. In fact, this approach functions as a 
poetics of game violence that takes player responses as departure points and asks 
which combination of devices are at work in cueing these responses.  
In exploring a range of different single-player videogames with a neoformalist 
approach to games, this thesis first shows how different components surrounding 
game violence can be there for ludic reasons (facilitating configurative behaviour), 
compositional reasons (creating narrative), realistic reasons (appealing to notions 
of the real world), transtextual reasons (appealing to knowledge of other works), 
and artistic reasons (contributing to the game’s abstract shape). Furthermore this 
thesis explores how these different reasons suggest different play responses by 
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elaborating on the role of the player as both agent and spectator. The player as 
spectator is then triggered to evaluate the aesthetic or realistic quality of the 
violence, its relationship to other works, or the way the violence affects the 
wellbeing of an in-game character. The player as agent, on the other hand, is cued 
to focus on those elements that are facilitating the progress towards the game’s goal 
thereby also cognitively evaluating and emotionally responding to the violence in 
the context of game progress. These very different perceptual, cognitive and 
emotional focus points can thus have a significant impact on the experience of game 
violence.  
The neoformalist approach proposed in this thesis allows for some generalizable 
claims about the way players are cued to experience in-game violence by analysing 
the workings of the formal components that make up and contextualize that 
violence. This also means that asking how violence in videogames works is asking 
how violence works in relationship with the player. In response to the question of 
this thesis we can state that every violent encounter in single-player games works 
differently according to the different combinations of formal components that 
function together to cue certain play responses. Acknowledging this is important 
when one is trying to understand the experience of game violence and subsequently 
any potential after-effects. As this thesis suggests, such an analysis should start with 
a focus on the formal components of the violence to account for the many variations 
of that violence which will eventually help to specify any further player studies.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 Introduction  
How does violence in single-player videogames work? At first glance, this question 
appears to address an exhausted research area or at least one that contains 
insurmountable differences among researchers. But this question is not about the 
potential negative effects of violent videogame play (e.g. social learning, 
desensitization), nor about the potential positive ones (e.g. catharsis, increased 
visuo-spatial cognition). This question is also not concerned with the development 
technicalities of how ‘violent videogames’ are made, or with the demographics of 
those who play them. Instead this question addresses an essential and often 
overlooked key component in the study of violent games: the game system itself.  
More specifically, the question is concerned with how the various components in 
the game system, and the system as a whole, work in cueing and constraining our 
perceptions and performances of the in-game violence. The focus thus lies on the 
various formal characteristics of violence in single-player games such as the 
sounds, images, rules, point of view, point of action1, or optical effects. Asking how 
violence in single-player games works means asking how all these characteristics 
are organized to contextualize or emphasize aspects of the game violence which 
could significantly steer how we respond behaviourally, perceptually, emotionally 
and cognitively during play. Studying these formal characteristics of a game system 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
1 By point of action I mean the point from which the player is able to interact with the game system. 
A more thorough exploration of point of action follows in chapter 4.   
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helps us understand in what way the game may force or allow for certain in-game 
violence to be performed by the player and encourage or discourage a certain 
perception of that violence. For instance, the game’s rules may force the player to 
pull the in-game gun trigger or allow him to walk away. The narrative of a game 
may contextualize certain violence by justifying or condemning it. The game may 
slow down to emphasize certain violent moments and pass by other ones quickly. 
The game may put the player into the shoes of the perpetrator of the violence, 
presenting a first-person view and point of action. Or the game may encourage a 
more detached relationship to the violence, presenting a top-down point of view 
and a point and click interface.  
A focus on the formal characteristics of violence in single-player games does of 
course lead to questions about the role of the player. Although the structures of 
multiplayer games are inherently more dependent on social exchange, even single-
player games allow players to actively participate in the construction of the game 
violence. Asking how violence in videogames works therefore leads to other 
epistemological and methodological questions: how can we know and study the 
formal characteristics of game violence when that violence is constructed in a 
negotiation between player and system? In other words, what role does the play 
activity have in bringing the violence to the screen and how can we claim 
intersubjective access to that violence without ignoring an active role for the player?  
These questions do not only concern our motor performances of the violence but 
also our perceptions of that violence (which is of course inherently linked up to the 
motor performance of violent actions). If we assume that our knowledge derived 
from our prior experiences influences our perceptions and performances of the 
game violence, we may again wonder how we can study that violence. Or, put 
differently, how can we study the formal components of game violence when our 
performances and perceptions of the violence can differ according to the 
background knowledge that players bring to the game?  
Finally, studying the formal components of game violence also leads to ontological 
questions about what in-game violence is. Or better yet, since I do not intend to 
make any essentialist claims in this thesis, what do I mean when discussing in-game 
violence? How does in-game violence differ from real world violence? Is single-
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player game violence the same as multiplayer game violence? And should we 
distinguish between different types of violence such as sexual violence and physical 
violence, or realistically looking violence and cartoony looking violence?  
In short, the question about how violence in single-player videogames works, 
should lie at the core of much research into game violence yet it is strangely enough 
not often addressed. The system’s formal characteristics function as the main 
motivators for play and psychological effect researchers consider these 
characteristics as the main cause of potential after-effects. Furthermore, the 
question directs attention to the function and freedom of players and their 
background knowledge in performing the violence in games. All in all, it seems 
about time to address the question.     
 Looking for an approach: Ludology and Proceduralism 
Asking how violence in single-player videogames works is also a question that 
seems far too broad to be answered within one thesis. In fact, it seems a question 
that resists an answer altogether since violence in games comes in a variety of 
shapes and sizes, and, even with ruling out the social aspects of multiplayer games, 
one could still argue that the interactive nature of games, makes many specific 
moments of game violence performable in a (limited) number of ways. However, 
in this case (if not in any case), the broadness of a question should not discourage 
research into the topic of interest. Instead, a broad question can function as a 
departure point for research as long as that research is framed by an approach that 
restrains the research topic to a manageable set of focus points which in turn break 
the research question down into more specific sub-questions. Such an approach 
should facilitate what Bordwell (1996) calls ‘middle level research’ which claims 
to say something conceptually compelling about something manageable without 
commitment to overly broad theoretical assumptions about culture or the 
relationship between subjects and objects in general.  
Since the question of this thesis is concerned with the formal components of game 
violence, we need an approach that focuses our attention on the game rather than 
on individual play experiences. In other words, we require a formalism. However, 
in game studies formalisms have gotten somewhat of a bad reputation. In his 
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blogpost from 2015, Juul even outlines a history of eight anti-formalisms arguing 
that formalism as a term is now carrying so much bad historical baggage that it is 
not really conducive to discussions anymore (2015). According to these arguments, 
formalisms prevent experimentation and exploration by erecting stifling definitions 
of games. Formalisms look at game rules to the detriment of story, or meaning. 
Formalisms assume that meanings are determined by the game system rather than 
constructed by players. And finally formalisms focus on game design thereby 
excluding a consideration of players and player experiences (Juul, 2015). While 
some of these arguments highlight certain problems with formalist approaches in 
game studies to date (see my discussion of ludology and proceduralism below), it 
seems to me that much of the anti-formalist sentiment is grounded in a difference 
of interest between games and play experiences rather than in any real 
disagreements about the characteristics of games or the way that players play them. 
As I will argue more thoroughly below, the formalist scholars in game studies do 
not ascribe a wholly determining role to games but simply aim to find a way to 
study the game’s formal components through their analytical play experiences. 
While those approaches may not tell us much about the way that real players 
experience games, they do give us an effective way of looking at games themselves. 
In spite of the anti-formalist sentiment expressed by these player-oriented scholars, 
I would therefore argue that the search for an approach should still focus on 
formalisms.   
Such a search should of course begin within the field of game studies. At first 
glance, it seems that game studies offers two potentially fruitful approaches: 
ludology and proceduralism, both of which focus attention on the system rather 
than on idiosyncratic play performances. However, so far, no one has sought to 
apply these two formal approaches for a study of game violence.2 The reason for 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
2 One notable exception is Malliet (2007a, 2007b) who has indeed attempted to apply the principles 
of ludology to the study of violence in games. However, as I will discuss more thoroughly below, 
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this, I suspect, does not lie in an unwillingness to study violence in games or even 
a lack of interest in the subject at hand. Instead, I believe that proceduralists and 
ludologists have not applied their approaches to a study of game violence because 
their core arguments complicate a balanced analysis of the different components of 
game violence.   
Ludology’s principle idea, according to authors like Aarseth (2001, 2004a, 2004b), 
Frasca (2003), Eskelinen (2001, 2004), and Juul (2001), is that games should first 
and foremost be studied as games, which requires a focus on the essential features 
of games. This leaves ludology with the ontological question about what these 
essential features are. Following Aarseth’s (1997) concept of the ‘cybertext,’ which 
he defines as ‘texts that involve calculation in their production of scriptons’ (strings 
of signs), ludologists claim that the rule system is the single distinctive feature of 
games since it is the rule system that generates signs through calculation. By 
considering the rule system as the underlying algorithm managing the game’s 
audiovisual representations, that rule system automatically becomes more 
important than the output it manages. Ludologists thus see this rule system as the 
essential feature shared by all games which distinguishes them from films and 
literature, which do not generate signs through calculation but should instead be 
considered as fixed strings of signs. 
Although ludology’s claims are justifiable and valuable, a problem arises once these 
ontological claims are turned into a critical toolkit for the study of game violence. 
After all, by focussing on the ‘manipulation rules’ (Frasca, 2003), ludologists are 
considerably less interested in what the manipulations represent. According to the 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
Malliet’s work is more concerned with exploring the usefulness of some ludological ideas for effect 
research, and tries to adapt the ludological principles into the social sciences methodology of content 
analysis. Although his work is highly valuable and original it is less a ludological approach to 
violence in games and more an appropriation of some of ludology’s principles (as well as other 
principles) for the construction of a methodology of content analysis.    
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more lenient point of view, the representation is ‘secondary’ to a more important 
rule-based structure (Konzack, 2002, p. 95) or the most ‘coincidental’ to games 
(Aarseth, 2004a, p. 48). According to a more hard-line ludologist like Eskelinen 
(2001) however, any approach that emphasizes representational characteristics, 
such as the way that the audiovisual elements are organized into a narrative 
structure, are ‘just a waste of time and energy’. To put it in Murray’s terms:  
To be a games scholar of this school [ludology] you must have what 
American poet Wallace Stevens called “a mind of winter”; you must be able 
to look at highly emotive, narrative, semiotically charged objects and see 
only their abstract game function (2005). 
If we, for instance, were to follow Eskelinen’s four basic analysis categories which 
he terms causal, temporal, spatial, and functional ‘manipulatable relations’, and 
analyse a scene in Battlefield 3 (EA DICE, 2011)  in which the player has to take 
out a sniper with rocket launcher, our analysis would be concerned with how the 
rule systems limits the player’s spatial movement to left and right movement on a 
horizontal plane, because moving back, or up is punished by a termination of the 
game session (death by sniper), and moving downward or forward is limited 
through collision with a solid object (wall and rooftop floor). Furthermore, our 
analysis could point out that the player can drag out this scene as long as he/she 
wishes while remaining in a covered position, but once the player has picked up the 
rocket launcher, thereby manipulating his character’s functionality in the game, the 
game forces the player to perform a specific set of actions within a specific 
timespan.  
While such an analysis highlights some points of interest, it remains very much a 
description of game mechanisms rather than a thorough analysis of a violent 
shooting scene. By focusing attention on the game as a machine for generating signs 
rather than the signs themselves, ludology is limited in what it can do analytically. 
Perhaps that therefore, Aarseth himself also uses ludology’s principles mostly to 
create typologies of games (Aarseth, Solveig Marie, & Lise, 2003; Dahlskog, 
Kamstrup, & Aarseth, 2009), or cybertexts (Aarseth, 1997), rather than for an 
analysis of specific games or game elements.  
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Analysing a shooting scene like the one above also requires a focus on the game’s 
representational output. Without a focus on the representation, we are missing out 
on the fact that the game offers a specific motivation for killing the sniper since this 
sniper has brutally shot one of the player’s team members only moments before. 
Furthermore, the mechanisms that limit the player’s movement do not do much else 
than set the boundaries for play actions. It is only when those limited movements 
are framed as taking cover for a highly dangerous sniper that those mechanisms 
start to take on other functions as well such as triggering feelings of suspense in the 
player.  
The reason for ludology’s essentialist view is understandable. As an early approach 
in game studies, ludology has largely been concerned with differentiating the 
discipline of game studies from other paradigms (mostly narratology3). In his 
editorial of the opening issue of the journal gamestudies.org Aarseth articulates his 
institutional motivations clearly:  
Games are not a kind of cinema, or literature, but colonizing attempts from 
both these fields have already happened, and no doubt will happen again. 
And again, until computer game studies emerges as a clearly self-sustained 
academic field (2001).  
Juul, another ludologist, even developed a game called Liberation to have players 
experience what it is like to be a game theorist and, in his terms, ‘defend games 
from the imperialism of a thousand theories’.4 As a player you take on the role of a 
game scholar in a spaceship, and it is your task to shoot down narratology, 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
3 Even though ludology’s main argument is set against analyses of games as narratives, it often 
extents into an argument against the game’s semantic elements altogether. In arguing against 
narratives mechanisms in games, Eskelinen (2001) also includes statements against dramatic or 
cinematic mechanisms, and, as argued already, Aarseth (2004a) sees the semiotic system (not the 
narrative structure) as the most coincidental to games.  
4 See http://www.jesperjuul.net/gameliberation/.  
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psychology, film theory, or pathology which come at you with texts like ‘theoretical 
imperialism’ or ‘subject object’. 
In her meta-analysis of game studies as a rising discipline, Copier (2003) observes 
the boundaries that ludologists construct in creating an autonomous discipline. She 
confirms that this work conflates ontological claims with institutional motivations. 
As she puts it:  
the construction of boundaries between game studies and other 
disciplines/fields combines two sets of arguments: content and definition of 
the object (games are games), institutional (wanting to have a discipline of 
one’s own and resistance to other disciplines taking over) (Copier, 2003, p. 
408).  
In this respect, ludology has certainly proved its worth. It has served a highly 
valuable institutional purpose in establishing game studies as a strong independent 
field of research, as well as an ontological purpose in defining games as unique 
cultural artefacts. However, as an analytical approach to violence in games, 
ludology falls short precisely because of its ontological and institutional aims. In 
search of the functional differences between games and other media to establish 
game studies as an independent discipline, ludology has focused on the rule system 
as the core fundamental component of the game. But for a study of violence in 
games, that rule system is just that: one component. To be able to say anything 
about how violence in single-player games works, the whole system needs to be 
analysed and not just the system’s core component. Aside from the rule system, 
videogames also have narrative and stylistic components, even if those components 
take on different forms and functions than in other media (as I will discuss 
elaborately in chapter 4). If we assume that all those components are at work in 
structuring the game’s violence, all of them need to be analysed. 
An approach that does put more focus on the semantic layer of games but still tries 
to account for their ‘rule-based nature’ is proceduralism. Proceduralism, as Bogost  
(2006, 2007) outlines it on the basis of Murray’s (1997) claims that games have a 
procedural nature, does not aim to construct an ontological domain for games set 
apart from other media nor is it institutionally motivated. This means it does not 
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have the same contempt for the narrative or representational possibilities of games 
that ludology has. Proceduralism does, however, still retain ludology’s claim for 
games as machines for the generation of sign combinations. In proceduralist terms 
this means a focus on the game’s ‘expressive capacity afforded by the rules of 
execution’ (Bogost, 2007, p. 5). Proceduralism accepts ludology’s claims about a 
game’s unique functioning, and analyses the ways in which this functioning can be 
manipulated to express ideas in narrative or some other representational form. In 
his work Unit Operations, Bogost puts it as follows:  
Instead of focusing on how games work, I suggest that we turn to what they 
do – how they inform, change, or otherwise participate in human activity 
(...). Such a comparative videogame criticism would focus principally on 
the expressive capacity of games (2006, p. 53).   
This focus on games as tools for expressing ideas has made proceduralism an 
influential approach among game designers who aim to communicate specific 
messages through their games.5 And, as Sicart (2011) has noted, this focus has 
boosted the cultural validity of games by emphasizing them as meaningful artefacts.  
However, it is exactly this focus on games as expressive tools, which complicates 
a balanced analysis of game violence. Because proceduralism is more interested in 
the game’s expression of meaning6 rather than the functioning of a game’s devices, 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
5 See for instance Brenda Braithwaite’s game design project ‘The Mechanic is the Message’ 
(https://mechanicmessage.wordpress.com/) or many of Mike Treanor’s (news)games 
(http://mtreanor.com/games/).  
6 As I will explain more thoroughly in section 3.2.1, I take meaning to be ‘the system of cues for 
denotation and connotation’ (K. Thompson, 1988, p. 12). This means that meanings constitute the 
semantic layer of the game where things refer either directly or indirectly to aspects of the real 
world or more abstract ideas. 
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the main critical activity for a proceduralist is ‘reading’ or ‘interpreting’ the game 
to discover its meaning(s) (see for instance Treanor, Schweizer, Bogost, & Mateas, 
2011 for a ‘proceduralist reading’). For a proceduralist like Bogost, a game is built 
up out of ‘units of pre-existing meaning [that] form new structures of meaning’ 
(2006, p. 50). But while proceduralists assume that all of the game’s ‘units’ are 
there to express meaning, in many games, and certainly in the single-player 
entertainment games that form the object of study in this thesis, a lot of the elements 
may also (or even only) have different functions. Elements may play a role in 
familiarizing the player with the controls; elements may be there to encourage a 
certain strategy; or elements may provide the player with a game goal that lies 
outside of the game’s semantic layer like a high score. By focusing on meaning, 
proceduralists turn a blind eye to game components that do not contribute meaning 
to the game’s overall form, or components that also have other functions. In their 
procedural analysis of Burger Time (Data East, 1982) for instance, Treanor and 
Mateas dismiss certain game components because, as they put it, they are ‘merely 
supporting the ludic metaphor, and thus can be rendered as invisible to the 
interpreter (emphasis added) (2011, p. 5).’ In this case, function becomes 
subordinate to finding meaning, and components that have other functions than 
conveying meaning are considered as invisible to the player.  
For a study of violence in games such a focus becomes highly problematic. Games 
have a plethora of different devices, most of which have different functions. Cueing 
interpretation can be one of those functions but is certainly not the only one. For 
example, a game mechanism that allows the player to loot empty suitcases, houses, 
or dead bodies can be considered for the meanings it triggers. In our current time, 
looting refers to behaviour associated with warfare, riots or natural disasters that is 
specifically condemned for its immorality. However, in a game, such a mechanism 
also has a strategic function because it allows the player to collect valuables, which 
in turn allows him to acquire new weapons, or character attributes that make him 
more effective in achieving the game’s final goal. In this case there is even a clear 
dissonance between the positive strategic function of the looting mechanism, and 
the negative meanings that it conveys. By subordinating function to meaning, a 
proceduralist may conclude that the game is positively inclined towards the 
immoral activity of looting because instead of being presented as a punishable 
-11- 
action, looting gains the player an advantage towards achieving the game’s goal. In 
other words, the proceduralist tries to resolve the dissonance between strategic 
function and semantic meaning by collapsing function into meaning. However, with 
such an analysis, the proceduralist denies one of the mechanism’s purposes for 
being there: its strategic function.  
Studying how violence in games works, requires a focus on functions over 
meanings. Or to put differently, it requires a poetics that is interested in how 
elements function to cue our responses more broadly, rather than a hermeneutics 
that is interested in what they mean (Culler, 1997, p. 84). This does not mean that 
we should follow ludologists by focussing more on the way game elements function 
in the abstract rule system and turn away from reading the game’s semantic layer 
all together. Instead, studying how violence in videogames works requires an open 
mind to all the different functions that game devices may have, which includes 
meaning construction as well as more abstract strategy building. For example, does 
a dimly lit narrow corridor function to induce fear of violence to come, or does it 
function as a strategic advantage for a player’s stealth activity? Does a change in 
music tempo function to trigger more frantic violent behaviour, or does it help to 
prepare the player for a high action sequence? Does a first person perspective bring 
us closer to the violent actions, or does it reduce the player’s frame of vision to an 
unnaturally limited scope that produces strategic challenges but also ease and 
swiftness of movement?        
Sometimes these functions may cue contradicting experiences such as in the looting 
example here. However, rather than subordinating the other functions to the game’s 
meanings, we should take all functions at face value and decide upon the dominant 
function on a case by case basis. Sometimes we may not find one dominant function 
but several, perhaps even several conflicting functions. In such a case we should 
not try to reduce the multitude of functions to one dominant but instead highlight 
the apparent dissonance. Only by doing that can we learn to understand the way 
that violence in games works.    
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 Finding an approach: Neoformalism 
By outlining how ludology and proceduralism fail to provide a balanced focus on 
the different representational and rule-based components of game violence as well 
as the different functions that these components can have in cueing our play 
responses, it becomes clear we need a different approach. We need an approach that 
does not assume games to be artefacts for the communication of meanings but 
instead focuses on function, without reducing function to the rule-based 
mechanisms. In other words, we need a new formalism in game studies. 
With no such approach currently available, I choose to start afresh and seek aid 
outside of the discipline. For a study of single-player game violence the most 
obvious field to turn to is film studies. After all, despite ludology’s painstaking 
attempts at highlighting the medium specific differences between films and 
videogames, these two media still share a lot of the same audiovisual traits and 
violence has been a staple of both. Over the past few decades, a new formalism 
based on Russian formalism (see chapter 2), has been fairly mainstream in film 
studies. This neoformalism, introduced and developed by Thompson and (to a lesser 
extent) Bordwell (Bordwell, 1989b, 1989c; Bordwell & Thompson, 2004; K. 
Thompson, 1981, 1988), focuses on the film as a system, and tries to analyse how 
the different elements in the film system function in the overall form. So far, 
however, neoformalism has seen little to no application in videogame studies. 
Although the works by film scholars such as King and Krzywinska (2002b, 2006a, 
2006b) and Wolf (2001a) are situated within the neoformalist paradigm and borrow 
terminology from that approach to focus their analyses towards formal game 
elements, neoformalism remains an unmentioned and unexplored backdrop for 
cherry picking ideas rather than a critically evaluated guiding approach to games. 
The reasons for this are likely to lie with the fact that the field of game studies has 
been largely dominated by its own system oriented approaches or formalisms, one 
of which in particular (i.e. ludology) has made zealous attempts to protect the 
relatively new academic discipline from ‘colonizing attempts’ from other fields 
(Aarseth, 2001). However, now that game studies has evolved from an exclusive 
discipline into a more open inclusive interdisciplinary field, the time seems right to 
explore the usefulness of neoformalism as an approach to game violence. 
-13- 
The reasons for exploring neoformalism as a new approach, rather than applying 
and altering already existing approaches like proceduralism or ludology, are 
threefold. First of all, if we were to expand the ludological approach so it would 
offer an equal focus on a game’s rules as well as its narrative and stylistic 
components, we would hollow out the approach altogether. As argued, ludology 
defines itself in opposition to narratology (and semantics in general) by 
continuously emphasizing games as rule-based systems. This, I would argue, is 
ludology’s foundational principle. If we were to remove that principle, then the 
approach really leaves very little basis for analysis, all the more so because, as I 
also stated earlier, ludology remains mostly an approach with ontological and 
institutional purposes.  
Neoformalism, on the other hand, already seems to be based on the idea that all 
elements are equal in their potential to structure the experience of a work. While 
these elements obviously do not include rules, it seems more feasible to add rules 
as one of the equally important elements for neoformalists, rather than to break 
down ludology’s basic principle and start over. This way, neoformalism has the 
potential to allow for an analysis of a much wider range of formal elements of the 
game violence.  
Secondly, replacing proceduralism’s focus on meaning with a focus on function 
messes with proceduralism’s foundations. Proceduralism is based on 
‘communicative assumptions’ according to which the game is considered to convey 
meaning through its processes. Thanks to this assumption, proceduralists have 
outlined an analysis scheme that helps them critically ‘read’ a game (Treanor et al., 
2011). However, this analysis scheme loses its foundations if the basic assumption 
of the approach changes. Furthermore, replacing the focus on meaning with a focus 
on function means that the analysis scheme serves to answer a question that is no 
longer asked.   
Also here, neoformalism appears to offer more fertile grounds for an analysis. 
Neoformalism explicitly ‘jettisons a communications model of art’ (K. Thompson, 
1988, p. 7) and sees meaning (cues for denotation and connotation) as only one of 
the formal components that an artist uses to build a work (K. Thompson, 1988, p. 
12). In this sense, neoformalism has established itself as a poetics, interested in how 
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formal elements are functioning to trigger our responses more broadly beyond just 
interpretation. While neoformalism does not focus on how elements function to cue 
goal-directed play behaviour, it seems that, at least in principle, its focus on function 
would allow for such additions.  
A third reason for exploring a neoformalist approach for a study of game violence, 
rather than altering ludology or proceduralism is that those latter two approaches 
appear to have broader aims which are not conducive for an analysis of a single 
game object or a component of that object. With its ontological aims, ludology 
appears to claim itself as a general theory of games in that it tries to explain the 
nature and function of all games. And proceduralism appears to have even bigger 
aspirations by aiming to explain games as only particular manifestations of 
processes that exist across media, emotions, genes, cultural symbols or subjective 
experiences in general (see Bogost, 2006, pp. 5–6). With these broader aims, it is 
easy to lose track of the particularities of the games and game sequences under 
investigation.  
Neoformalism on the other hand, as Thompson (1988) and Bordwell (1989b) have 
both explicitly argued, is not a general theory of films nor a grand theory explaining 
films as only a part of a theory of ideology or the ‘human subject’ (Bordwell, 1989b, 
p. 379). Instead, neoformalism is a humbler approach; it gives us a set of 
assumptions broad enough to make some generalizable claims about films, but it is 
flexible enough to allow for constant change to fit the film under investigation. Here 
again, we should carefully study those assumptions and adapt and expand where 
necessary. However, the heuristic aims of the approach make at least an exploration 
of those assumptions worthwhile. If adapted well it might indeed give us an 
approach capable of responding to the game or game sequence under investigation.  
Of course, I realize that by looking into film theory for the analysis of videogames 
I am treading on thin ice. Aarseth warns explicitly about these kinds of 
transdisciplinary expeditions and says: 
To see computer games as merely the newest self-reinvention of 
Hollywood, as some do, is to disregard those socio-aesthetic aspects and 
also to force outdated paradigms onto a new cultural object (2001). 
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Although Aarseth’s hyperbolic rhetoric is politically motivated, his warning should 
not be taken lightly. Videogames are not films and any attempt at pushing them into 
a predetermined framework oblivious to videogames’ medium specific qualities is 
destined to fail. A neoformalist approach to film will therefore undoubtedly require 
fundamental modifications before it can work as an appropriate analytical 
framework for games. Neoformalism does not mention rules as a formal device, 
and, perhaps more fundamentally, neoformalism is built on a specific idea of 
aesthetic perception that does not appear to be at the core of the gameplay 
experience. However, rather than shooting down neoformalism with a battle cruiser 
to protect game studies from empirical imperialism, as Juul has us do in his game 
Liberation, I suggest we board an exploration vessel and tread lightly and critically. 
Of course, any attempt at adapting an existing approach to a new medium risks 
hollowing out the approach altogether. However, based on the first impressions, the 
audiovisual similarities between videogames and films, and the flexible and 
heuristic nature of the approach, make it plausible that neoformalism can help to 
construct an interesting and appropriate approach for a study of game violence.  
Like any systems approach, the new formalism I explore in this thesis is of course 
limited in its scope. The focus lies on the game’s rule-based, narrative and stylistic 
devices but does not take into account the way that individual players will work 
with those devices in slightly different ways resulting in slightly different play 
experiences. Different players may come to the game with different backgrounds, 
different skill sets, and different motivations. On top of that, the interactive nature 
of videogames allows players to make changes to the formal devices presented to 
the player at a specific moment, which in turn will lead to even more diverse play 
experiences. Finally, players can go against the grain in their play performances, 
breaking or bending the rules or creating their own (Consalvo, 2007).7  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
7 It is worth flagging here, as I will also argue more elaborately in chapter 5, that breaking or bending 
the rules or ‘creating’ one’s own will often still not happen outside of the (outer) limits imposed by 
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For a study of game violence, it may be viewed as problematic that individual 
gameplay sessions are not accounted for in the neoformalist approach presented in 
this thesis. However, such critique is first and foremost concerned with a different 
object of study. While some players may indeed come with very different playing 
strategies and understandings of the game, studying those play experiences tells us 
more about the players than about the formal components of game violence and the 
way they encourage certain actions and understandings over other ones. When the 
interest lies in the functioning of these formal components, as it does in this thesis, 
then different play experiences become a methodological challenge rather than 
objects of analytical interest. As long as we can agree on the existence of a game 
system that cues more and less appropriate play performances, then we just need to 
figure out a way around the inappropriate ones in order to focus on that system.  
As I will argue more thoroughly in chapter 5, one way to focus on the formal 
components of game violence is to adopt a so called cooperative playing strategy. 
This analytical strategy stands in a longer philosophical tradition where the 
recipient of a text is considered as a theoretical construct rather than an actual 
person. In literature studies for instance, Iser thoroughly explored the concept of 
the implied reader as the predispositions laid down by the text in order for the text 
to exercise its effect (1978, p. 34). And in film studies, the neoformalists indeed see 
the viewer as the background knowledge implied by the film’s cues which is 
necessary for the film’s effects to occur (K. Thompson, 1988, p. 29). Just like these 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
the game system. As Leino (2010) has argued convincingly, cheat codes are coded into the game 
and also ‘emergent’ strategies such as rocket-jumping in Quake (id Software, 1996) simply show 
that the limits of the game system were not where we once thought they were. We may of course 
imagine our own additional restricting rules, such as only firing our gun while in slow-motion jump 
in Max Payne 3 (Rockstar Studios, 2012). However, the question in many of these cases still 
remains, does this tell us something about the game and what the game encourages or rather about 
individual play behaviours?         
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constructs, also the cooperative player helps to focus on those formal components 
of the game and the way that they encourage a certain play experience.      
As stated, an approach always limits the scope of the research to a manageable set 
of issues. And for that reason, any approach is also forced to justify why some issues 
are not accounted for within its confines. For a systems approach based on 
neoformalism, this justification runs throughout this thesis, particularly in 
explorations of the role of the player in chapter 5. In short however, this thesis 
justifies its research scope by arguing that the single-player videogame is able to 
significantly confine the player’s freedom to exercise influence on what happens in 
the game, and that certain assumptions about the role of the player can facilitate an 
analysis of game devices and their functioning in cueing certain play experiences 
of the game violence.   
 Some brief notes on the conceptualization of game violence 
While this entire thesis in concerned with the different formal components making 
up game violence and thereby elaborately discusses many forms that game violence 
can have, I believe it is necessary to start off with at least some basic premises on 
what I consider to be game violence in this thesis. This is both to clearly delineate 
the object of study and to help start the exploration and prevent potential 
misunderstandings. 
First of all, when I talk about game violence, I mean something that is inherently 
different from real world violence. While this may sound like an obvious 
distinction, it is disconcerting to see how little thought is given to this difference in 
the literature on effects of violent games. As Goldstein puts it:  
There is much confusion about the definition of “violence” and terms like 
“media violence” and “violent video games.” Psychologists define violence 
and aggression as “the intentional injury of another person.” However, there 
is neither intent to injure nor a living victim in a video game (2001, p. 2).   
A similar point is made by Kerr in discussing aggression and violence in sports. He 
states that the psychological definitions of violence do not apply to sports violence 
since they do not account for ‘the unique context’ in which sports violence takes 
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place. This context make the violence ‘intrinsic’ to the competitive nature of the 
sport and, unlike real world violence which is generally considered illegal, sports 
violence is ‘sanctioned’ within its own rule system (2005, pp. 7–8).   
In line with these arguments, I start with the basic premise that game violence is 
different from real world violence because it is part of a game where different rules 
apply giving violence different functions within a game context. First of all, this 
means that, unlike real world violence, game violence can never be considered an 
illegal activity because the rules of the game sanction the performance of the game 
violence. It could of course be that the game itself is considered illegal in a specific 
country due to its excessive violent content. However, in that case, it is still not the 
performance of the violent act in the game that is illegal but the selling, buying and 
playing of the game in general. Secondly, the fact that the violence occurs in a game 
also means that the act itself as well as its consequences are different from the act 
that it represents. This does not mean that game violence cannot have real world 
consequences. However, the consequences of an in-game head shot are not the same 
as the consequences of a real word head shot. Finally, I would argue that game 
violence, by the sheer fact of being performed in a game, is playful which means 
that actions are, intrinsically purposeful. We do not perform violence in a game for 
other purposes than for the purpose of play. This makes game violence, in Apter’s 
(1991) terms, paratelic (also see chapter 3.3.2).  
A second note to make about the conceptualization of game violence used in this 
thesis, is that I focus specifically on the representation of interpersonal or collective 
physical violence rather than for instance sexual or psychological violence or self-
directed violence. Here I draw from the typology of violence that is adhered to by 
the World Health Organization in their World Report on Violence and Health 
(World Health Organization, 2002). This report distinguishes between four ways in 
which violence can be inflicted, namely physical, sexual, psychological, and 
deprivation. The report further distinguishes between different types of violence 
based on three different victim-perpetrator relationships: self-directed, 
interpersonal, and collective. By focusing on the representation of a physical type 
of violence between human-like (or animal-like) individuals or groups, I believe 
that I am accounting for most of the violence one can find in videogames to this 
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day. Videogames (and probably games in general) commonly employ mechanisms 
of conflict where the player has to overcome challenges that the game puts forward 
which leads to either winning or losing. One of the easiest ways to represent these 
states of winning or losing is by representing it as living or dying. Not surprisingly, 
the conflict in these games is therefore often represented as physical violence; a 
matter of killing or being killed. Unlike sexual violence, or psychological violence, 
this type of physical violence can therefore be found across the different generations 
of videogames, from the current day shooter to Space Invaders (Taito, 1978) where 
the collision between a bullet and an alien already lead to the physical destruction 
of the latter.  
However, there are certainly also games dealing with different types of violence 
such as Rapelay (Illusion Soft, 2006), in which the player’s goal is to stalk and rape 
a mother and two daughters. The reason that I choose to exclude these types of 
violence is simply because I believe that these types of game violence fall outside 
of the norms that the game industry, as well as many lawmakers and players find 
morally acceptable. This throws up challenges for certain claims around the ludic 
functionality of game violence proposed in this thesis. One could for instance 
rightfully ask whether removing a character’s clothing during a rape scene can still 
be seen as a ludic challenge even if the game frames it as such. In these cases, our 
moral objections will likely overrule the game’s ludic justification for the 
mechanism. While I will certainly mention the challenges that a different 
conceptualization of game violence would throw up for specific claims in this 
thesis, it is important to focus the object of study in order to prevent these kinds of 
misunderstandings.  
A third note on the conceptualization of game violence, concerns the games. When 
I talk of videogame violence in this thesis, I use the term videogame or game to 
refer to single-player videogames unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. The focus 
on single-player games is important for a systems approach like the proposed new 
game formalism to make any epistemological claims. After all, a systems approach 
is based on the assumption that the materiality of the system is capable of 
significantly structuring the gameplay, but gameplay in multi-player games is to a 
large extent governed by social norms and negotiations rather than the materiality 
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of those systems. For instance, despite the fact that many multiplayer games allow 
for players to harass or irritate one another through unjust killing or stealing 
(griefing), that kind of behaviour is condemned by the majority of players and 
therefore actively discouraged by the social norms rather than the material structure. 
Single-player games, however, have a much more definitive structure with much of 
a gameplay performance forced or encouraged through elements ‘hard-coded’ in 
the material of the system. This means that a focus on single-player systems indeed 
allows for claims about how game violence works. Like the focus on physical 
violence, this focus on single-player games is not a matter of choosing the games 
to confirm the approach, but simply a matter of knowing the boundaries of the 
approach. Although the neoformalist approach to games presented in this thesis 
may be able to say something about how violence in multi-player games works, 
those claims can be mitigated or even contradicted by the social structures in place 
in those games that take hold wherever the material structure leaves room for 
negotiation. 
Finally, I should note that the examples discussed in this thesis are mostly 
perceptually realistic examples of game violence. While I do not necessarily only 
focus on perceptually realistic game violence, these are the types of violence that 
are the most interesting for a consideration of their formal elements and the way 
these elements cue our responses. These types of violence are, after all, the types 
that trigger social concern and form the focus points of the effect research. 
However, as I will argue further in chapter 4, graphics and narrative devices such 
as characters, objects, and narrative justification can differ per videogame, thereby 
leading to many different variations of game violence. So, while my interest is 
mostly in the violence in a game like Grand Theft Auto V (Rockstar North, 2013), 
also the conflict in Super Mario Bros. (Nintendo, 1985) can be considered as a form 
of game violence that could be studied for the same formal characteristics and 
functions outlined in this thesis.  
 Some brief notes on game violence research 
As Gonzalez notes in an elaborate history of videogame controversies, game 
violence has been a constant subject of controversy almost as soon as videogames 
came into existence (2004). As early as 1976, controversies arose around the violent 
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content of the arcade game Death Race (Exidy, 1976). Although the game’s 
imagery does not look much more advanced than Pong (Atari Inc., 1972), the fact 
that the player could see himself drive his car into ‘gremlins’ whose pixelated stick-
figure representation could be associated with humans was enough for the game to 
become the centre of bad press and public protest (Plunkett, 2012). Although the 
game’s tagline was: ‘It’s fun chasing monsters,’ the further lack of context and the 
game’s clear tie in with the film Death Race 2000 (Corman & Bartel, 1975) meant 
that the game’s content was easily associated with driving over pedestrians8 and 
thus considered morally objectionable. Over the years videogames grew in 
popularity and became more and more sophisticated. Their representational content 
gradually became more graphically detailed with especially games in the early 
nineties such as Duke Nukem (Apogee Software, 1991), Wolfenstein 3D (id 
Software, 1992), Doom (id Software, 1993) and of course Mortal Kombat (Midway 
Games, 1992) sparking controversies.  
Around this time, also the interest from academic communities grew as it remained 
up to them to provide insights into the potential negative effects of violence in 
games that had continued to spark these social and political anxieties. Today this 
question about the possible impact that violent game content can have on its players 
still dominates research around violence in videogames but so far little agreement 
has been reached on the matter. In general, the impasse exists between two 
approaches: one approach that is particularly concerned with real-world social 
problems like real world violence and tries to investigate the potential cause of these 
problems in the experience of videogame violence, and another approach that 
criticises the first approach for making players look like passive victims of game 
violence while they should be approached as active users participating in meaning 
construction processes of culturally relevant media products (Jenkins, 2006; 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
8 Adding to the controversy was the fact that the game’s working title had apparently been 
‘Pedestrian’ making the association with driving over pedestrians all the more feasible.   
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Livingstone, 2002). Support could be provided for both sides of the debate. The 
intention to protect children from potential ‘harmful’ content appears to be an 
admirable one, but it does run the risk of singling out and scapegoating one of the 
many potential correlational or causal factors of societal problems, which in turn 
could lead to unjust censorship or other constraints on the freedom of expression. 
Similarly, defending freedom of expression by highlighting the many different 
variables at play when we study the effects of game violence is both valuable and 
necessary. But also this may lead to a defence of media content ‘at all costs’ which 
can ignore the ethical responsibility of game developers. Furthermore it does not 
seem very beneficial to research into the potential effects of violence in videogames 
when any kind of effect is a priori shrugged off as unfounded media panic (also see 
(Eitzen, 2014) for a thorough and comprehensive analysis of this discussion).   
If we follow Zagal (2010a) and consider videogame studies in its broadest sense as 
an interdisciplinary field containing social scientific player- and effect experiments, 
humanities based text analysis and player studies, and engineering studies into 
efficient game design, it seems that the disagreement about game violence creates 
a tension that lies at the core of the field. Paraphrasing Malliet (2007b, pp. 8–9) this 
dichotomy can be seen to exists between two of these three schools of research 
within game studies: humanities based ‘game theory’ and the social scientists. Also 
Aarseth (2007) recognizes this dichotomy and, in an attempt to build bridges and 
encourage cross-disciplinary collaborations, he tries to clarify the differences 
between the humanities and social sciences camp in both their different uses of 
methodologies and, perhaps even more importantly, in their different objects of 
study. He argues that for the humanities scholar, the ‘empirical target is the game 
as an aesthetic object’ which is best approached through a methodology of close 
playing (Aarseth, 2007, p. 131). On the other hand, for the social scientist, the 
‘empirical focus is the other players’ who are best approached through ethnographic 
methodologies like observation or surveys (2007, p. 131). Adhering to the same 
distinction and drawing from Bogost’s (2008) discussion about the object of study 
in game studies, Leino adds that also the purpose of research for these two schools 
may be inherently different. He summarizes this as follows: ‘It seems we can fairly 
state that what we can conceptualize as the ‘distinction’ between “those who study 
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players” and “those who study games” is in fact a composite of several variables: 
methodology, object of study, and purpose of the research’ (2010, p. 84).  
In line with these arguments, we would expect the debate about videogame violence 
to be held between game analysing humanities scholars and player observing social 
scientists. But, although Aarseth (2007), Bogost (2008), Leino (2010), and Malliet 
(2007b) adequately outline a distinction between those studying players and those 
studying games, superimposing this distinction onto the ‘violent videogame debate’ 
risks oversimplifying it. First of all, it is simply incorrect to equate the game-player 
distinction to a difference between humanities scholars and social scientists. After 
all, the humanities side of game studies is not purely concerned with studying games 
as it is not uncommon for a humanities scholar to use interview- or observation 
methods in combination with personal play experience to focus on player’s 
perceptions and behaviour as objects of study (Consalvo, 2007; Schott, 2008). 
Similarly, social scientists have long applied content analyses to categorize and 
study media content which comes much closer to a study of games than a study of 
players (Malliet, 2007a; S. L. Smith, Lachlan, & Tamborini, 2003). It thus appears 
that the game-player distinction is not necessarily one that divides research schools 
but one that permeates these schools individually. This is because player and game 
are two sides of the same coin; intrinsically linked in questions concerning 
epistemology (how can we know a game without filling the shoes of the player?), 
ontology (is there a game without a player?), and methodology (how do we study 
games without studying player actions?). 
Secondly, although the violent game debate is often held between humanities 
scholars (e.g. Goldstein, 2001; Jenkins, 2006) on the one end and social scientists 
(e.g. C. A. Anderson, Gentile, & Buckley, 2007; Bushman, 2004) on the other, the 
two sides of the debate are not limited to these schools of thought. This shows 
especially on the side with the more positive attitude towards games where also 
social scientists have grown more interested in different experiential components 
of the play experience like deep engagement/immersion (e.g. Brockmyer et al., 
2009) and socialization (e.g. Jansz & Martens, 2005), and where scholars with an 
engineering background have become involved in studying the emotional 
experience of gameplay (e.g. Nacke, 2009). For pragmatic convenience, (and 
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without normative intent) it is therefore more useful to refer to the group of scholars 
with more positive predispositions towards games as making up the school of 
videogame studies with its primary focus on the aesthetic, cultural, and 
communicative qualities of games.9 With an interest in the potential negative effects 
of game violence, the other group of researchers is then best described as media 
effects researchers.  
A third and final problem with applying the game-player distinction to the violent 
videogame debate is that, although the two sides of the debate often differ in their 
empirical target, this is not so much a difference between games and players but 
rather one between different stages in the gameplay process. While one side of the 
debate, which I will now simply refer to as videogame studies, mostly focuses on 
the moment of play where both the player and the game require equal scholarly 
attention, the other side focuses on the effects following play where the player’s 
post game behaviour and perceptions form the object of study. In the first case, the 
researcher may ask questions about the game’s design characteristics perhaps 
taking the design intentions into consideration, or he may ask questions about the 
player’s behaviours or perceptions during play which may extent into inter-textual 
inquiries about the player’s previous media use or other contextualizing factors. In 
the second case, however, the researcher takes the moment of play as a constant 
independent variable that he may change in order to answer questions about how 
the player’s views or behaviours are influenced by that preceding moment of play.10 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
9 This focus is also articulated in the mission statement of the journal gamestudies.org (see 
http://gamestudies.org/1202/about). 
10 This empirical difference between gameplay and post-gameplay is different from another also 
often held debate around media violence: that between the uses and gratifications approach and the 
media effect approach. In that case, the empirical difference is most often between pre-gameplay 
and post-gameplay because, originally, the uses and gratifications approach holds a position that is 
mostly concerned with the selective motivations that exist prior to the actual media use, which allows 
them to argue that users choose media to satisfy their needs and reach the desired arousal state 
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Following these considerations, we can say that this thesis fits within the school of 
videogame studies with a specific interest in critical reflection on violence in games. 
However, within this rather broad school, this thesis aligns with a narrower group 
of scholars who have an interest in the formal characteristics of games. This thesis 
is for instance not interested in the intentions of the designers behind the different 
game components, even though, within videogame studies, an exploration of the 
biography or psychology of the different game designers is well worth undertaking. 
This thesis is also not interested in the various idiosyncratic ‘playings’ of a 
videogame, even though personal behaviours and thought patterns of players are 
certainly worth studying within videogame studies. Instead, this thesis focuses on 
the system characteristics of violence in games thereby linking up with other 
formalist approaches like ludology and proceduralism.  
 Motivations and Contributions 
Although this thesis fits within videogame studies, this does not mean that it takes 
sides in the effects debate. As I argued above, effect research has a different 
empirical target that does not necessarily contradict or oppose this thesis’ object of 
study. In fact, this thesis complements effects research into game violence because 
it provides a closer look at the system properties that constitute the independent 
variables in the experiments of effect researchers. Analysing the different ways in 
which single-player games structure violence and cue certain play responses over 
others (whether the players have those responses or not) can then even help to focus 
future research into media effects and/or point out any discrepancies in previous 
studies by taking potentially mediating factors into account.  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
(Biocca, 1988). It should be noted that the uses and gratifications paradigm has been extended to 
also incorporate selective perception and even selective retention (recall) (Biocca, 1988), however, 
in its original (and strongest) form uses and gratification theory is used to describe selective exposure 
to media.     
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However, the main contribution of this thesis is not to the school of effects studies 
but to the school of videogame studies. In the broadest sense, this thesis contributes 
to a growing body of research into the formal components of games (i.e. ludologists 
and proceduralists) and how those components are manipulated to cue certain play 
responses. In this sense, this thesis also links up with research into game design 
since it claims connections between specific single-player game structures and 
hypothetical player responses. However, here the game devices are not analysed to 
see how, or in what interrelation, they could function to trigger the most appropriate 
and pleasurable player responses sought after by the game designers. Instead, game 
devices are analysed to see how they form and frame game violence in certain ways, 
thereby encouraging certain perceptions and performances of that violence.  
In a narrower sense, this thesis focuses on the violence in single-player games as 
structured by specific combinations of rules, style elements and narratives. As 
noted, the formal characteristics of videogame violence have been largely 
unexplored within videogame studies. While quite a few attempts have been made 
to focus on the formal characteristics of game violence through the methodology of 
content analysis (Dietz, 1998; Hartmann, Krakowiak, & Tsay-Vogel, 2014; S. L. 
Smith et al., 2003; K. M. Thompson, Tepichin, & Haninger, 2006), these 
approaches are mostly suitable for quantifying different game content categories, 
but often lack thorough discussions of the categories themselves and the functions 
of these categories in encouraging certain play responses. One notable exceptions 
however, is Malliet (2007a, 2007b), who has aimed to apply the principles of 
ludology for a content analysis of game violence. However, upon further scrutiny 
also Malliet’s approach is still aimed at quantitatively exposing different content 
categories rather than qualitatively analysing them. This becomes especially clear 
when the few thoughts that Malliet does give to the functions of these different 
categories are all borrowed from media effects theories such as the social learning 
theory, the desensitization argument, or the arousal argument. Here it shows that 
Malliet is not interested in how the formal components making up game violence 
may cue certain immediate play responses. Instead, Malliet is interested in 
quantitatively categorizing game violence to see how these categories may mitigate 
or aggravate the after-effects studied by effects scholars. While this makes his 
research highly valuable for a further refining (or debunking) of correlations found 
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in media effects studies, it still lacks the thorough exploration of the functions of 
the devices at play during in-game violence.  
This thesis fills this gap in the research by focusing on the formal components of 
game violence and their functions in cueing certain immediate play perceptions and 
performances of that violence. In doing so, this thesis also discusses the challenges 
that come with such a focus. More specifically, the contribution of this thesis is 
focused around three levels. On a theoretical level, it explores neoformalism as a 
new way of looking at games and more specifically at violence in single-player 
games. By looking at the usefulness of film neoformalism and adapting and 
expanding it by taking essential theory work in game studies into account, a 
neoformalist game approach is shaped that provides us with insights into how 
different devices function in relation to each other in the formal whole of the game 
system, and how these devices function to cue play responses. According to this 
neoformalist approach, the devices cannot fully determine these play responses 
since those responses are considered the result of an interplay of the game’s devices 
and the player in a particular historical context. In order to still gain intersubjective 
access to the game devices and their functions, the approach provides a set of 
assumptions about the processes that players go through in performing and 
perceiving the violence. It then becomes the basic task of the analyst to perform the 
encouraged play responses and then identify and study the system’s devices at work 
that are cueing those play responses.  
On an analytical level the new formalist approach helps to build a useful framework 
for the study of violence in single-player games. This framework highlights three 
distinct categories of game elements that all play an important role in cueing 
experiences of the game violence: rules, narrative and style. Of course, these 
categories can be found in many modern day videogames (with the exception of 
abstract games) and can thus be studied for the different ways in which they 
function to trigger any particular play response. However, in this thesis, the interest 
lies in the way that these elements function in cueing certain responses to the game’s 
violence. By identifying the player as both agent and spectator, the approach 
discusses the different perceptual, cognitive, emotional and behavioural processes 
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that characterize these different roles and helps to analyse how different game 
devices can function to cue these different processes.  
Thirdly, on an applied research level this thesis also contributes to the violent 
games research community by showing the possible results of a neoformalist 
approach to a wide variety of games that have been given an R-rating (restricted) 
in New Zealand. Similar to M (mature) and A (adult) ratings in the USA, or the 
Pegi 16 and Pegi 18 ratings in much of Europe, R-ratings are largely dependent on 
‘the level of violence’ in games (see www.censorship.govt.nz). Games that deal 
with violence during significant periods of the game, have violence of a certain 
level of intensity and deal with that violence in a certain manner (e.g. realistic or 
scary rather than funny), receive an R-rating and may therefore only be bought and 
played by players over the age of 16 or 18 (depending on the label) (see New 
Zealand OFLC, 1993). By analysing a number of R-rated games, I intend to 
highlight different interesting game devices that foster the application of certain 
backgrounds and activities in triggering our responses to the violence in these 
games.  
Finally, outside of academia, this thesis also hopes to contribute to the public policy 
regarding game violence and young players and more generally to a better-informed 
perception of videogame violence in society. Of course the step from academia to 
social perception or public policy can be a large one with policy makers often 
requiring straightforward evidence based answers that a humanities approach to 
videogames would find difficult to produce. However, by presenting a new 
formalist approach to violence in single-player videogames that is capable of 
highlighting the system elements at play in encouraging certain play responses, this 
thesis hopes to take a small step into the right direction.   
 Outline 
Ordered per chapter, the thesis looks as follows: 
2. Neoformalist Film Analysis: This chapter provides a critical overview of 
the neoformalist approach to films according to its three main pillars: 
system, viewer, and context.   
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3. A Neoformalist Approach to Games: This chapter outlines the 
fundamental assumptions of a neoformalist approach to videogames by 
exploring and adapting the premises of film neoformalism and setting these 
off against ludology and proceduralism as the two dominant formalist 
approaches in game studies.  
4. Devices and their Motivations: This chapter further explores the usability 
of the neoformalist approach for the study of videogames and videogame 
violence and outlines three categories of devices whose interrelated 
functioning encourages certain play experiences. By closely analysing the 
different devices, this chapter shows how certain devices can frame the 
violence as more or less justified in the narrative, voluntary or forced by the 
game’s rules, realistic, ludically significant, aestheticized, or more or less 
proximate to the player.   
5. The Roles of the Player: This chapter deals more thoroughly with the 
methodological challenge of an active player. The proposed theoretical 
construct of a cooperative player allows us to perform the appropriate 
responses according to the game’s functioning which in turn gives us access 
to the formal components of game violence while still recognizing that 
different players may perceive and perform the violence in different ways. 
Furthermore, the chapter links up with the previous one and further explores 
the different perceptual, cognitive, and emotional focus points that different 
motivated devices can have, thereby significantly changing our experience 
of the game’s violence. 
6.  Conclusions and Suggestions: This final chapter summarizes the findings 
from the application of a neoformalist film framework to a range of R-rated 
games and proposes a neoformalist approach to videogames. The chapter 
finally suggests some further research directions with regards to the 
experience of violence in games and outlines the potential benefits of a 
neoformalist game approach for the study of a range of other game related 
topics.   
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Chapter 2 
Neoformalist Film Analysis 
  
 Introduction 
When videogame scholars analyse a game, a range of games, or even one 
characteristic of games, they do so in accordance with a set of assumptions about 
the different characteristics of games, the processes that players go through when 
playing, and the way that games relate to other media and the world around us. 
These assumptions make up an approach. Sometimes such an approach is explicit, 
such as in Malliet’s (2007b) analysis of violent game content where certain 
principles of ludology are outlined and then used as a framework for analysis. Other 
times the approach may be more implicit, shining through in the analysis itself. In 
Zagal’s (2012) analysis of ethics in a range of different games, for instance, no a 
priori assumptions are outlined yet his analysis shows clear ideas about the 
processes that players go through in their understanding of the game and the guiding 
role that the game’s narrative and ludic components play in these processes.  
In many cases the chosen approach helps to focus on a specific object of study by 
providing certain assumptions about the object of study and other elements that are 
inherently tied up with the object of study but remain outside the scope of the 
research. In other cases, however, the approach is not the means to an end but the 
end in itself. In such cases, the game analysis serves to demonstrate the validity of 
a certain approach, and in doing so, the games are often carefully chosen to confirm 
that approach rather than to challenge it. In these cases the preconceived ideas risk 
becoming inherently self-fulfilling: if you assume that the elements in a game play 
a role in expressing a certain meaning, you will undoubtedly find the elements 
reinforcing your assumption even when those elements also, or even mainly, have 
other functions. The risk of a highly determinant approach only becomes apparent 
once a game is analysed that challenges the approach’s core assumptions. 
Eskelinen’s (2001) ludological approach would for instance be highly inadequate 
for an analysis of Heavy Rain (Quantic Dream, 2010) where all the player’s actions 
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serve to unfold the game’s narrative. And proceduralism struggles when for 
instance Treanor and Mateas (2011) try to find meaning in the ‘meaningless’ 
Burgertime (Data East, 1982) or when Murray (1997) famously tried to find the 
meaning in Tetris (List, 1984).   
Choosing an approach is thus a precarious task. When we choose an approach to 
study game violence, we want to make sure it fits the topic of interest, yet we do 
not want the approach to start determining our findings a priori. A good approach 
should be more focused than a general theory that tries to explain the fundamental 
nature of all games, yet it should be more general than a method that only constitutes 
the procedures for doing one particular analysis. In other words, the approach 
should provide us with a framework for studying the formal components and 
functioning of game violence, but it should not determine certain formal 
components and functions a priori.   
Neoformalism, at least in principle, promises to be such an approach. As it is 
outlined in film studies by Bordwell and Thompson (see Bordwell, 1985, 1989a, 
1989b, 1989c; Bordwell & Thompson, 2004; K. Thompson, 1981, 1988), 
neoformalism promises to guide research into form aspects without predetermining 
their relevance or their functioning during a specific film(sequence). The toolkit 
that neoformalists bring to the analysis is, as Bordwell  puts it, ‘grounded in a 
theoretical activity [emphasis in original] rather than a fixed theory’ (1989b, p. 380). 
It is not something that explains every film according to the same mechanisms but 
instead provides some helpful focal points, or what Bordwell terms ‘hollow 
categories’ (1989b, p. 381). These hollow categories do not tell us how for instance 
a specific formal element will function every single time, since neoformalists argue 
that that depends on the combination of formal components and their various 
functions in a specific film during a specific moment in time. However, the 
categories do help to distinguish between different types of formal elements and 
different types of functions. In the end however, the film is always the guiding force 
that drives the analysis.    
Neoformalism’s ‘modus operandi’ is probably best formulated by the Russian 
Formalist Eikhenbaum on whose work neoformalism builds. He states:  
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In our studies we value a theory only as a working hypothesis to help us 
discover and interpret facts; that is, we determine the validity of the facts 
and use them as the material of our research. We are not concerned with 
definitions, for which the late-comers thirst; nor do we build general 
theories, which so delight eclectics. We posit specific principles and adhere 
to them insofar as the material justifies them. If the material demands their 
refinement or change, we change or refine them (as cited in Bordwell, 
1989b, p. 381). 
In response to these promises of flexibility, we may rightfully ask whether 
neoformalism is not somewhat of a hollow framework that can be applied to 
everything but tells us nothing. Or, put differently, to what extent does 
neoformalism then provide analytical categories or departure points to help guide 
the analysis? It is the aim of this chapter to seek an answer to this question and 
thoroughly study the different analytical categories and theoretical assumptions that 
make up the approach. While a study of a neoformalist film approach may feel like 
somewhat of a digression in a thesis about violence in videogames, this study is 
essential because it allows us to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the 
approach which will eventually help us see where adaptations and extensions are 
necessary before the approach can form a useful framework for the analysis of game 
violence.        
I have divided this chapter into three sections that correspond to the three main 
focus points of the neoformalist approach. In section 2.2, I will explore how 
neoformalists see the film object as a system built up out of different interrelated 
materials that are manipulated in such a way as to cue certain viewer responses. The 
neoformalist sets himself the task of analysing the devices that manipulate the 
film’s material and focuses on those devices that the film foregrounds as the more 
important ones in cueing our responses. To understand how the film’s devices 
function to cue responses, neoformalists assume the existence of an intelligent 
filmmaker and then consider the ‘reasons’ (motivations) that this filmmaker may 
have had to add these devices. However, neoformalists only need the suggestion of 
authorial intent because the presence of the different devices is eventually based on 
the work itself and the way the devices function in cueing our viewing responses.  
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While neoformalists see the viewing response as significantly encouraged by the 
film object, this does not mean that they consider the viewer to be a passive 
consumer. Instead, as I will explore in section 2.3, neoformalists consider the 
viewer active and important for two reasons. First of all, neoformalists argue that 
the viewer comes to the film with certain skills and background knowledge that 
play an essential part in constructing the film’s form (Bordwell & Thompson, 
2004). In this sense, neoformalists adhere to a constructivist view of film perception 
where form is attributed to the film rather than found in it (which, as I will argue, 
raises important questions around the intersubjective access to the film). Secondly, 
the viewer is considered important because neoformalism is a poetics that starts 
with the viewer responses and then asks what devices are at play in cueing these 
responses. Because neoformalists argue that the main function of films is to trigger 
a special kind of non-practical perception, this non-practical perception becomes 
the starting point for undertaking the analysis.  
Finally, as I will discuss in section 2.4, neoformalism does not view the film as a 
self-contained system but assumes that it exists in a historical context where viewer 
backgrounds play an important role in shaping the perceptual response. However, 
by assuming backgrounds as a shared set of norms during a particular moment in 
time, neoformalists can still claim intersubjective access to the film’s form on the 
basis of those backgrounds, and also account for changes in film perceptions over 
time.   
 The Film as System 
As an approach to films, neoformalism was first developed by Thompson in 1981. 
Unsatisfied with the analytical toolkits available to her in film studies, she decided 
to draw upon the Russian Formalist movement in literature studies to develop a 
‘new formalism’ that allowed her to discuss the function of a range of formal 
elements such as narrative, mise-en-scène, editing techniques or sound in 
Eisenstein’s film Ivan the Terrible (Eisenstein & Eisenstein, 1958). 
In line with Russian formalism, neoformalist film analysis eschews a romantic 
concentration on the artist and instead aims to shift the focus to the work itself. For 
the neoformalist film analyst the focus lies on the formal characteristics of the film, 
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rather than on the director and his or her intentions. This does not mean that 
neoformalism considers the film somehow detached from its makers. In fact, the 
neoformalists are very clear about the fact that a film should be considered as 
something that is ‘crafted’ by a ‘skilled artisan’ out of cinematic materials such as 
sound, camera framing, editing, mise-en-scène and optical effects (K. Thompson, 
1981, pp. 12–13, 26). The use of terminology here signifies the film as a 
‘constructed system’, a ‘machine’11 that is put together by its makers rather than for 
instance an organic ‘growth of ideas from the material’ itself, as Thompson argued 
that the New Critics see a work (1981, pp. 12–13).  
The neoformalists also do not see the film system as divorced from its viewers 
since, as Thompson puts it, ‘backgrounds from other artworks (…) and everyday 
reality’ affect it (1981, p. 15). This means, as I will explain more thoroughly under 
section 2.3 and onward, that the viewer’s knowledge of other works and everyday 
reality allow him or her to recognize familiar elements and detect deviations from 
the norms of his or her prior experiences. Although it seems that here neoformalism 
is leaning towards more audience-oriented approaches that privilege a viewer’s 
personal perceptions of the work over the work itself, neoformalism argues that the 
background knowledge that the viewer draws upon is implied by the film’s formal 
devices. Or, as Thompson puts it in drawing from the Russian formalists, the viewer 
is ‘a construct suggested by the work itself’ (1981, pp. 15–16). Furthermore, as I 
will argue in section 2.4, neoformalists consider that the background information 
that a viewer draws upon is finite during a particular moment in history. So, by 
following the cues in the work and drawing from a finite amount of available 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
11 The wording of machine might seem odd here. However, Neoformalists draw this terminology 
from Russian formalists who indeed also considered literary works as machines. According to 
Steiner (2014), the machine metaphor is probably the most prominent one as it was advanced by 
Shklovsky (see for instance Shklovsky, 1965). As Steiner (2014, pp. 41–42)notes, Shklovsky used 
this metaphor to focus more on the workings (the how) of a literary work, rather than its meanings 
(the what).  
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information, the neoformalists perform the effects cued by the film, and gain access 
to the film’s formal elements through that effect.12  
Neoformalism’s approach to films as systems resonates with approaches like 
ludology and proceduralism that frame games as systems. In this sense, 
neoformalism can provide a way of thinking about games as a combination of 
interrelated components and helps our understanding of the role of the player in that 
system. Of course, as I will argue in the upcoming chapter, the filmic system is 
inherently different from the game system and the role of the player differs 
distinctly from the role of the viewer. Yet, neoformalism’s assumptions about the 
system as independently existing material capable of shaping its own use, helps our 
understanding of how games confine the player’s freedom to exercise influence on 
what happens in a game, and how we may gain access to that material. This then 
helps to construct a new formalist approach that counterbalances player-oriented 
approaches that argue that games are socially and culturally defined practices that 
can only be approached as individual play experiences (e.g. Malaby, 2007). 
Studying violent games with a neoformalist inspired, system-oriented lens can be 
highly fruitful because it allows us to look at the way the system structures the 
violence, which in turn allows us to make claims about how the player is expected 
to behave and perceive in accordance with that structure.       
2.2.1 Function 
Although neoformalism focuses on the film as system, it is not interested in the 
material as such but rather in the way that the material is shaped to cue a kind of 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
12 Here, ‘effect’ takes on a somewhat different meaning from the way that I have used it so far. While 
media effect studies generally focus on effect as a rather definitive alteration of thought patterns or 
behaviour resulting from media use, for neoformalists, the term effect is often used to signify more 
immediate experiences of the film. To avoid confusion, I will therefore now use ‘after-effect’ when 
referring to a media effect understanding of the term.       
-36- 
aesthetic perceptual response. Here neoformalism shows itself as a functional 
approach. Although neoformalism is interested in the film’s form, that form is only 
interesting for the way it triggers a specific type of aesthetic perception. 
Neoformalism’s focus on function and aesthetic response borrows heavily from the 
Russian formalist approach to art. According to Shklovsky (1917/1965), the 
difference between art and non-art does not lie in the used material or in the 
techniques used for manipulating that material. Instead, the essence of art for 
Shklovsky lies in the way that certain techniques are employed to manipulate the 
material for the purpose of achieving a certain aesthetic response, which he calls 
defamiliarization (see section 2.3.2). Language and techniques like hyperboles or 
parallelisms that manipulate language, can be used for practical every day purposes 
(prose) as well as aesthetic purposes (poetry). But the interest of the analyst should 
lie in the way that the techniques of hyperbole and parallelism function in triggering 
an aesthetic response.  
Neoformalism adopts this view and argues that a film’s material of mise-en-scène, 
sound, camera/frame, editing, and optical effects, can be manipulated with a range 
of techniques such as a specific use of lighting in the mise-en-scène or specific 
continuity editing (K. Thompson, 1981, p. 26). However, the interest of the 
neoformalist lies in the way that these techniques, which they refer to as devices,13 
function to cue an aesthetic response. For instance, where editing can be used to 
make both a TV commercial and a feature film, it is only in the feature film that 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
13 It should be noted that Thompson (1981) is somewhat unclear about the material/device 
distinction, and uses the terms interchangeably (see for instance page 26 and 70). However, 
following Shklovsky (1917/1965) it makes sense to distinguish between material and specific use 
of the material in the form of devices since it is the set of devices that constitutes the work’s form, 
not its material. Because neoformalism builds largely on the work of Shklovsky and because 
Thomson-Jones (2009) also attributes the material/device distinction to neoformalism, I choose to 
describe neoformalism here as adhering to this distinction. 
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editing is temporally and spatially structured in such a way that it does not serve 
some other practical purpose (selling something) but an aesthetic one instead.  
As I stated before, the focus on an aesthetic response rather than meaning, makes 
neoformalism a poetics. Unlike a hermeneutical approach which would be 
interested what a film means, neoformalism is interested in film devices for the 
ways they trigger all of our perceptual, emotional, and cognitive responses to the 
film as long as those responses do not serve some other practical purpose. As I will 
argue below, this non-practicality is important for neoformalists because it indeed 
facilitates the ‘defamiliarization’ that also the Russian formalists were interested in. 
However, for now, outlining neoformalism as a poetics focused on aesthetic non-
practical responses helps to see how neoformalists focus on function over form. In 
other words, when neoformalists ask: ‘how does a film work?’ they actually mean: 
‘how does a film work to cue our aesthetic responses?’ 
In this case neoformalism can certainly not be applied willy-nilly to an analysis of 
videogame violence. When I posed the question: ‘how does violence in singe player 
videogames work?’ I certainly did not mean: how does it work to cue an aesthetic 
experience? While it is interesting to pursue questions about the aesthetic 
functioning of games, these would be rather different questions than the one I aim 
to answer in this thesis. While I will delve into this problem with neoformalism 
more thoroughly under discussions of defamiliarization in this chapter and the next, 
I should already state that I will suggest a rather significant reworking of the 
approach on this matter, before it can be properly used for a study of game violence. 
In that reworking, the main purpose of games as systems is to facilitate and structure 
play (see for example Salen & Zimmerman, 2004) rather than to cue an aesthetic 
perception. This means that asking how violence in games works is asking how it 
works to cue our play experiences in all its registers of constructing a narrative, 
progressing towards a game’s goal, drawing on notions of the real world, 
referencing other games or films, and considering artistic quality.  
For the moment however, I should emphasize that neoformalism’s focus on 
function helps to base our analysis of game violence on a model that does not 
assume that form has the purpose of communicating meanings, or even the purpose 
of only structuring our configurative actions (see below). Instead, neoformalists 
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help to see that form triggers our responses more broadly, even if their aesthetic 
labelling of those responses must eventually be discarded for the purpose of this 
thesis.   
For analytical convenience, neoformalists categorize the devices used for 
manipulating the film’s material as either narrative or stylistic devices (Bordwell, 
1985). This distinction should not be considered as a form-content split since 
neoformalists consider both categories to constitute the film’s form. In other words, 
also the narrative is considered as a formal system made up out of different devices 
such as bound motifs which are necessary to push the narrative forward and free 
motifs which are unnecessary for the causal chain of events but may contribute an 
atmosphere to the environment or an identity to a character (K. Thompson, 1988). 
In this sense, neoformalists argue for a horizontal organization of devices, since 
they all are (a least in principle) equally important in their potential to cue our 
responses. As Bordwell (1985, p. 33) notices, narrative and stylistic devices interact 
with one another in every single case. So when watching a film, we arrange the 
events in a temporal sequence with the help of the cause and effect chain in the 
narrative, but our understanding is equally cued by the use of continuity editing.  
For games, we can of course not suffice with only outlining narrative and stylistic 
devices. As interactive phenomena, games contain rules that create possibilities for 
performing motor actions, encourage certain actions over others through rewards 
or limit or discourage actions through punishments (see for instance Suits, 1978). 
Furthermore, as I will show in chapter 4, the narrative and stylistic devices in games 
often take on different forms and functions than in films, for instance by also 
playing a role in structuring the player’s strategic decisions in a goal-directed 
process of gameplay. However, once we acknowledge the differences, 
neoformalism’s horizontal organization of different devices does help us see how 
all devices can be equally important in structuring our play experience and escape 
an overemphasis on rules. For instance, our experience of a moment of game 
violence can depend on the way rules allow or force us to perform certain actions, 
the way those actions are framed as justified in the narrative, and the way those 
actions are presented graphically or from a certain point of view. Also here, these 
elements are all interacting in every single case in triggering a variety of different 
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play responses. For the purpose of analysis however, I will separate between these 
three categories in chapter 4 which helps us focus on either violent themed 
narratives, the stylistic means through which the violence is presented, or the rule-
bound collisions between game entities and the potential reward of these collisions.    
Because the function of a device can range from a role in the causality of narrative 
events to the cueing of a certain kind of viewer response, function is a very broad 
concept for the neoformalists. For instance, in Hitchcock’s Sabotage (Balcon & 
Hitchcock, 1936) our attention is directed towards a sharp knife on the table during 
the dinner between Mr Verloc and his wife. In the causal chain of events the knife 
simply functions as a murder weapon. However, for the viewer, the knife also 
functions to trigger suspense. In this case the knife cues our anticipation of events 
to come. As soon as the camera shows us the knife we start to hypothesize future 
events involving the knife. Then, when the camera shows us Mrs. Verloc, our 
hypotheses get more finalized. The knife triggers our anticipation enough to start 
feeling suspense since it may potentially bring the tension between Mr. and Mrs. 
Verloc to a highly dramatic apotheosis.  
Any device may thus have different functions that we can try to find by asking two 
kinds of questions: ‘what is the device doing there?’ and ‘how does it cue us to 
respond?’ (Bordwell & Thompson, 2004, p. 60). Different films may often use the 
same devices such as the use of split-screen or low key lighting. However, this does 
not mean that that device will always function in the same way. These devices are 
instead one of the ‘hollow categories’ of neoformalists that I referred to in the 
introduction of this chapter (Bordwell, 1989b, p. 381): they focus our analysis 
without determining how we should understand their functioning. Sometimes a 
split-screen may be used to indicate two interdependent events happening 
simultaneously thereby triggering suspense, such as in the TV series 24. Other times 
the split screen may just be used to show both characters in a phone conversation. 
Furthermore, functions are highly dependent upon the context of viewing. For 
instance, a banana peel having a man trip and fall may once have served to cue 
laughter. However, these days the banana peel joke may only function to cue 
annoyance with the film’s lack of originality.  
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As I will argue in the next chapter, neoformalism’s idea of function is much broader 
than the function that ludologists argue for. With this broad conceptualization of 
function, we are again able to focus on a wide range of game elements, since rules 
as well as narrative and stylistic devices can all have important functions in cueing 
our play experience. Furthermore, this broader conceptualization of function also 
means that the play experience should be considered much broader than the 
configurative behaviour that the ludologists focus on, or the meaning construction 
that is of interest to the proceduralists. Instead, game devices can function to cue 
different perceptual, cognitive, behavioural and emotional responses, from the 
construction of a narrative, to devising a strategy or even having a feeling of awe 
over the beauty of a game environment. On this matter, a neoformalist analysis of 
game violence would explicitly move away from ludology or proceduralism whose 
narrower views of a game’s functionality leave certain devices and play responses 
unaccounted for.       
2.2.2 Motivation 
To help identify the functions of a device, neoformalists consider the motivation 
for the presence of a device. Because neoformalists consider that a film is 
constructed by a maker, they assume that any device will have a reason for being 
there. The ‘reasons for being there’ are what neoformalists call motivations. These 
motivations do not equate to authorial intent. To consider the motivation of a 
device, the neoformalist only needs the assumption of agency behind the presence 
of a device. Eventually though, the motivations are drawn from the work itself by 
considering how a device functions in the overall structure of the work. This means 
that the motivation is not the justification given by the maker but the justification 
given by the viewer on the grounds of the work’s functioning. By motivation, the 
neoformalists thus mean ‘the reason the work [my emphasis] suggests for the 
presence of any given device’ or ‘a cue given by the work [my emphasis] that 
prompts us to decide what could justify the inclusion of the device’(K. Thompson, 
1988, p. 16). Thompson (1988, pp. 16–21) divides these motivations up into four 
basic types:  
- Compositional motivation: justifies the inclusion of the device for its 
creation of narrative causality, time and space. 
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- Realistic motivation: justifies the inclusion of the device for having the 
perceiver appeal to notions of the real world. 
- Transtextual motivation: justifies the inclusion of the device for having the 
perceiver appeal to knowledge of genre conventions or other intertextual 
conventions (e.g. previous work by the same actor or the use of certain 
techniques such as the ‘cliffhanger’). 
- Artistic motivation: justifies the inclusion of the device for its contribution 
to the work’s abstract, overall shape. This is probably the most difficult 
type of motivation to define. It would seem that the artistic motivation is 
often overshadowed by more prominent other motivations and it only 
really becomes noticeable when the other ones are withheld. Generally 
speaking, abstract stylistic devices that trigger non-straightforward 
(symbolic) meanings can be considered to have an artistic motivation.  
For example, in a horror film the scene of a car breaking down in a dark and eerie 
forest is often motivated compositionally because the information creates narrative 
possibilities necessary for the horror film to achieve its effect (e.g. having to find 
shelter for the night in an abandoned cabin where the characters find a spell book 
that can awaken the dead). However, such a scene can also be considered for its 
realistic motivation since the stylistic device of low-key lighting may have us 
appeal to notions of how real forests can indeed be dark and quite eerie during night-
time.  
Here, our notion of reality should not be considered as something truthful but rather, 
as something probable, based on aesthetic conventions of realism and our personal 
experiences with the everyday world. This means that I understand realism in both 
mimetic and conventional terms. While the focus on mimesis may seem somewhat 
contradictory to formalist discussions of realism, I believe the focus is necessary 
for us to experience anything as realistic since also conventions of realism are 
related to our knowledge of the everyday world. For example when Thompson, 
following Shklovsky, argues that we perceive a work as realistic because the work 
makes use of certain conventions that we associate with realism or, more 
importantly, because it diverts away from other familiar conventions that we do not 
see as realistic (1988, pp. 197–198), we could rightfully ask how those conventions 
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become associated with realism in the first place. Here, I follow Grodal who argues 
that ‘our experience of the everyday intersubjective world (...) still provides the 
norm in relation to which special represented phenomena are evaluated and 
characterized’ (2002, p. 88). This does not mean that a work is realistic when it 
shows some sort of natural transparent relationship with the real world. After all, as 
Smith states, ‘praising something for its ‘realism’ depends implicitly on recognizing 
that it is not of the same order as the thing imitated’ (1995, pp. 32–32). 
All in all, Smith rightfully states that there is no reason to assume that a work cannot 
be both constructed according to its own conventions and still be mimetic (1995, p. 
32). Or to put it differently, arguing that there is no natural/transparent relationship 
between an artwork and a real world does not mean that we cannot argue that there 
is not a conventional relationship between an artwork and a real world either. This 
means that a shooting scene in Saving Private Ryan (Bryce, et al. & Spielberg, 
1998) can be realistically motivated since it adheres to filmic conventions that we 
associate with realism and because we perceive it as probable that such a shooting 
event could have occurred during World War II, not because that shooting scene 
actually took place. Furthermore, a shooting scene in Predator (Lawrence, et al. & 
McTiernan, 1987) is not (or at least less) realistically motivated since our 
knowledge of the real world tells us that predators do not exist.   
The horror scene of a car breaking down may also have a transtextual motivation 
since we may know from horror genre conventions that a stranded car in a dark and 
eerie forest spells trouble ahead. We may not immediately notice these transtextual 
motivations when they fit our assumptions so well. However once our assumptions 
are violated or otherwise made explicit these transtextual motivations become really 
noticeable. Many ‘postmodern horror films’ like the Scream series for instance play 
with these genre conventions by having characters articulate them explicitly.  
If the event would also show unusual camera movements or angles, or a surprising 
use of colour, our attention may also be directed towards those stylistic devices for 
their artistic motivation. In such a case these devices do not contribute to the 
narrative construction but draw our attention solely on the basis of their own 
interesting abstract form. 
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As I will argue in the next chapter, the different motivations that neoformalism 
considers also provide useful categories for the analysis of videogame devices. 
Certain cutscenes, for instance, are motivated compositionally because they drive 
the narrative forward. And in a war game like Medal of Honor: Vanguard (EA Los 
Angeles, 2007) the weapons that the player can carry are all realistically motivated. 
However, as I will argue more elaborately in the next chapter, elements in games 
are often predominantly ludically motivated because they are there to structure the 
player’s rule-bound goal-directed progress in the game.                  
2.2.3 The ‘Dominant’ 
Any film will have a plethora of different devices most of which will have different 
motivations for their inclusion in the work. Which devices are considered as the 
more important ones is largely dependent on what neoformalists call the dominant.  
As Thompson defines it: ‘The dominant is a formal principle that controls the work 
at every level, from the local to the global, foregrounding some devices and 
subordinating others’ (1988, p. 89). Because the neoformalists assume that the 
elements in a work do not coexist harmoniously but instead exist in a ‘dialectic 
tension among them’ (Steiner cited in K. Thompson, 1988, p. 90), they search for 
the more preeminent ones that are foregrounded and consider those to be the more 
important ones to discuss in their analysis of the work.  
Thompson argues that this foregrounding can be understood in terms of an 
element’s defamiliarizing capabilities (1988, p. 91). While I will leave a more 
thorough discussion of this concept until later in this chapter, this basically means 
that devices become more important once they are more effective at framing the 
represented thing in a way that is unfamiliar to us. This causes a more difficult 
perception of that thing and renews our understanding of it. In other words, the 
familiar bite-sized chunks in a film are considered less important, while the difficult 
unfamiliar elements become foregrounded as the more dominant ones.  
This idea of the dominant is important for the neoformalists because without it they 
would need to analyse every single element with equal attention. Although most 
critics of course do intuitively distinguish between more and less important 
elements in a work, neoformalists make this choice explicit by systematically 
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showing how certain more unfamiliar devices run throughout the structure of the 
work subordinating the automatized ones to fit the dominant structure. This does 
not mean that certain devices are inherently more important than other ones. On the 
contrary, neoformalists start from the basic premise that all devices are equal in 
their potential to cue the aesthetic response. And it is only once the dominant is 
determined that certain devices are analysed as more important. In such an analysis 
however, the stylistic and narrative devices often provide equal support to the 
dominant and in doing so enter into a relationship that shows their equal status.       
For a study of game violence, the idea of a dominant is both problematic and useful. 
It is problematic if we indeed equate the dominant to a game element’s level of 
defamiliarization. As I already noted briefly and will explain more elaborately 
below, the main purpose of a game is not to make things unfamiliar again, but 
simply to facilitate and structure play. If we were to focus on those components that 
were more defamiliarizing, we would likely skip most of the violent encounters in 
games since those encounters are often rather automatized and repetitive. 
Furthermore, even less automatized moments of violence would mostly be 
interesting for the ways in which devices function to cue the defamiliarizing 
experience and not for the many other ways in which devices can also function to 
cue more automatized performances and perceptions of violence that can still frame 
that violence as ludically enforced and/or purposeful, important in the narrative of 
the game, realistic, or even referencing other cultural artefacts. In other words, if 
we equate the dominant to those elements that defamiliarize, we base our analysis 
on a rather narrow conceptualization of play and can only focus on those devices 
and functions cueing that narrow play experience.  
For that reason, a new game formalism needs to rely on a broader conceptualization 
of play that goes beyond defamiliarization just as it goes beyond configurative 
activity (ludology), or interpretation (proceduralism). As I will argue more 
thoroughly in the next chapter, this broader conceptualization of play should 
include all the predispositions necessary for the game to achieve its effects in all its 
motivational categories, whether those motivational categories are indeed present 
in the game or not. Then game elements can become foregrounded once they are 
more essential for our progression towards the game’s goals, for our construction 
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of the narrative, for an experience of realism, for our references to other cultural 
artefacts, and for our experience of the game’s artistic shape.  
Once we base the dominant on our basic will to progress, construct a narrative, 
experience realism, transtextual references, and artistic quality, the dominant 
becomes useful on two levels. On a holistic level, the dominant helps to focus on 
certain moments that are more important with a reference to the overall functioning 
of the game. When analysing game violence, we can then argue that certain 
moments of game violence are more or less important with regards to the overall 
ludic, narrative, realistic, transtextual, and artistic ‘shape’ of the game. 
On a reductionist level, where we single out a specific game moment, the dominant 
helps to focus on the more significant motivations during that moment. When we 
analyse a moment of game violence, we could then for instance state that certain 
devices making up that particular violent encounter, serve an important ludic 
function while other devices serve a more important compositional one. As I will 
argue more thoroughly in chapter 5, the dominance of certain motivations can 
trigger certain types of perceptual, cognitive, and emotional responses to the 
violence. I should already note, however, that this does not mean that the different 
devices will always reinforce each other in one dominant experience but can also 
work against each other to cue a variety of experiences which can sometimes come 
across as rather contradicting.  
 The Roles of the Viewer 
Even though neoformalism is an analytical approach to film systems rather than an 
analytical approach to viewer responses, the viewer still plays an essential role for 
the neoformalists. To a neoformalist, the viewer is not passive but active. The 
viewer comes to the film with certain viewing skills and background knowledge 
which contribute to the perceptual experience. As Thompson puts it:  
The viewer actively seeks cues in the work and responds to them with 
viewing skills acquired through experience of other artworks and of 
everyday life. The spectator is involved on the levels of perception, emotion, 
and cognition, all of which are inextricably bound up together (1988, p. 10).   
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In this sense, it would seem that the viewer plays at least an important role in 
actualizing the game’s effects. The viewer is a necessary component for the film’s 
devices to function. Or to put it differently, a film’s formal devices cannot function 
to cue a response if there is no one to cue that response in.  
However, for a neoformalist, the response that is cued is of specific interest. This is 
because the neoformalist is not interested in any kind of response, but, as I already 
noted several times, specifically in an aesthetic response. It is this aesthetic response 
that functions as the basic premise for the neoformalist to do the analysis. In this 
sense, the viewer also plays another important role because it is due to his or her 
aesthetic response, which neoformalists term defamiliarization, that an analysis can 
take place. I will elaborate on these two roles in the following two subsections and 
already note some problems and potentials for the construction of a neoformalist 
approach to games.  
2.3.1 The Perceptual Activity 
With the viewer playing such an important role in actualizing the film’s effects, 
neoformalists have some explicit assumptions about how the activity of perceiving 
the film takes place. By assuming that viewers will perform certain standard 
activities in response to a film’s cues, the neoformalists claim intersubjective access 
to a film’s devices but still allow for changes in perceptions among different views. 
In this sense, these assumptions are important for our consideration of a game’s 
formal components, since they can provide a base for studying form while still 
acknowledging an active role for the player. However, before we can consider 
whether neoformalism’s assumptions of an active viewer indeed provide a solid 
base for a consideration of an active player and a study of game form, we need to 
thoroughly interrogate the assumptions here. 
According to the neoformalists, perception is an active process of forming 
hypotheses and testing them against the perceptual cues in the work. Thompson 
(1988, pp. 26–28) sees this process taking place across three different levels (not 
counting the unconscious level which she denounces as an ‘unnecessary construct’ 
for the neoformalists (1988, p. 27)). At the lowest level, the viewer engages in 
physiological processes such as perceiving moving images from the rapid display 
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of static film images, hearing music from a series of sound waves, differentiating 
colours, or seeing shapes. Thompson refers to these processes as physiological 
because they occur automatically without a conscious awareness of the viewer. We 
cannot help but see movement on the screen. And there is no way to make ourselves 
aware of this process through introspection since it happens as a kind of involuntary 
reflex. Bordwell (1985) calls these processes ‘bottom-up’ since the work is in 
charge and forces a certain response onto the viewer thereby creating the 
appearance of movement or music. Thompson (1988) argues that this perceptual 
level is of little interest to the neoformalist analyst since it is so self-evident. Instead, 
she suggests to focus on the two higher levels of perception.  
One level up from the lowest level processes, the viewer engages in what she calls 
preconscious perceptual activities. These preconscious activities are ‘nearly 
automatic’ in the sense that we can come to a realization of how we came to see 
continuous action over a scene cut up into different shots, but because we have 
become so familiar with these techniques we do not need to think about them 
consciously. This perceptual activity thus relies on internalized viewing skills that 
allow us to process certain perceptual cues relatively effortlessly. Bordwell (1985) 
argues that these processes do however operate ‘from the top down’ since our 
recognition of certain familiar elements is determined14 by our hypotheses. In those 
cases, though, the film’s cues confirm our hypotheses which means that we are not 
required to exert much more conscious cognitive effort to revise them. Many of the 
stylistic devices such as continuity editing, point of view shots, or the use of non-
diegetic sound, are all so familiar to us that our processing of them can be 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
14 As I will argue below, this is where I see the biggest problem with neoformalism. By arguing that 
the processes of comprehension and interpretation are determined by our application of conceptual 
structures, the approach becomes self-contradicting because it no longer allows for an analysis based 
on objectively existing, ‘response-structuring’ material. A better formulation here would then be, 
‘initiated’ rather than ‘determined’, thereby leaving the work to eventually still give the final say.      
-48- 
considered preconscious. Similarly, when we recognize certain objects or events, 
we do so preconsciously.  
At certain moments, however, we struggle to understand certain stylistic techniques 
or recognize narrative events or character traits. During those moments we go 
through conscious perceptual processes to make sense of the cues in the work. On 
this highest level of perception our hypotheses, assumptions, and expectations are 
continuously tested and require revisions so we can make sense of the work’s cues. 
Thompson (1988) argues that this level of perception is usually the most important 
one for the neoformalist analyst. This is because it is during these moments of 
conscious perception, that the film challenges our habitual day-to-day perception 
most strongly, which, as I will argue below, neoformalists consider as an artwork’s 
main purpose.  
Thompson derives these three levels of perception from Bordwell´s constructivist 
model of film spectatorship. According to this model, which Bordwell himself 
derives from a more general constructivist theory in perceptual and cognitive 
psychology, viewing is an active process where the viewer makes inferences about 
the perceived thing on the basis of clusters of knowledge called schemata 
(Bordwell, 1985, p. 31). As Bordwell explains, we have schemata for many things:  
The mental image of a bird is a schema for visual recognition, and the 
concept of a well-formed sentence functions as a schema for speech 
perception. Schemata may be of various kinds – prototypes (the bird image, 
for instance), or templates (like filing systems), or procedural patterns (a 
skilled behavior, such as knowing how to ride a bicycle) (1985, p. 31).  
These schemata guide our hypotheses that we test against the cues in the work, 
which allow us to make perceptual inferences about the work. This concept of 
inference is essential for Bordwell because it illustrates the incompleteness and 
ambiguity of the sensory stimulus that requires the viewer to infer his understanding 
with the help of pre-existing knowledge. In doing so, Bordwell argues, the viewer 
enriches the incomplete stimulus with his schemata. So, instead of seeing a pink 
shape with a black stripe, we see a man’s face with a moustache, and instead of 
encountering a set of random events, we construct a story out of it. On top of that, 
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Bordwell argues that the film viewer also constructs off-screen space or space 
between different shots not shown by the film’s cues at all.  
At first glance, these constructivist ideas seem to provide an interesting way of 
thinking about the role of the player. Also games, as Klastrup has argued, remain 
‘in potentia’ until actualized by a player’s actions (2003, p. 102). So, through his 
actions, the player significantly enriches an otherwise incomplete and ambiguous 
stimulus. In fact, in games, this enriching can go far beyond what Bordwell seems 
to argue for. Due to the interactive nature of games, players dot not only enrich the 
game perceptually and cognitively, but also behaviourally. Instead of constructing 
events between different shots, players will thus have at least some degree of 
influence over how many of the on-screen events will play out in the first place. 
However, this also causes problems if we wish to study the formal components of 
game violence. After all, how can we still study the formal components of game 
violence if that game violence is dependent on the player’s perceptual, cognitive 
and motor actions?    
Unfortunately, Bordwell’s constructivism is unable to provide an answer here. In 
fact, I believe that his constructivist ideas on film viewing run him into a similar 
problem when studying the formal components of films. As also Gaut (1995) and 
Thomson-Jones (2009) have noted, this problem occurs because Bordwell does not 
merely argue that film viewing is a constructivist process where viewers test 
hypotheses against film material (potentially enriching the perceived beyond what 
the sensory cues provide), but also that the viewer’s schemata and formed 
hypotheses determine the perceived, thereby turning the perceived into a construct 
of the mind (Bordwell, 1989c). As Thomson-Jones criticises Bordwell, ‘the fact 
that perception is an active, inferential process does not mean that the objects of 
perception – namely the things we perceive around us – are constructed’ (2009, p. 
139). In that case, a neoformalist approach that relies on objectively existing film 
material structuring the viewer’s responses is indeed directly contradicted by a 
constructivist approach to film spectatorship where this material is constructed by 
the viewer.   
To be charitable to Bordwell here, there is more ambiguity in his argument. 
Bordwell explicitly states that he does not argue for a constructivism in the 
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epistemological sense where also the stimulus becomes a construct but rather for a 
‘constructivist realism’ where we are able to make approximately true inferences 
(Bordwell, 1989a, n. 8, 1989c, n. 9). Here, his argument again gravitates towards 
more formalist ideas where, as Bordwell himself puts it: ‘the film presents cues, 
patterns, and gaps that shape the viewer’s application of schemata and the testing 
of hypotheses’ (1985, p. 33). However, these statements are directly undermined 
by many of his other claims. Bordwell for instance explicitly argues that ‘the 
organisation of sensory data is primarily determined [my emphasis] by 
expectations, background knowledge, problem solving processes, and other 
cognitive operations’ (Bordwell, 1985, p. 31). In other words, what we see depends 
greatly on our (un)conscious choice of cognitive concepts. This also means that for 
Bordwell, ‘meanings are not found but made’ (1989c, p. 3) making a film inherently 
polysemic. While this claim may suggest that it is only meaning that is constructed, 
which may be considered more plausible than the idea that the viewer constructs a 
much broader set of formal components, I believe Bordwell’s argument can be 
extended to incorporate other (stylistic and narrative) devices in films as well. After 
all, Bordwell explicitly argues that even the process of recognizing sensory data 
and comprehending stories is determined by our schemata (1985, pp. 31–32) and in 
their collaborated work Bordwell and Thompson state that ‘form is the total system 
which the viewer attributes [my emphasis] to the film’ (2004, p. 50).  
As I have argued above, neoformalists base their analyses largely on the material 
cues that are there in the work. Although these cues are eventually perceived with 
the use of background information, this background information is already implicit 
in the material cues of the work. However, when Bordwell argues that not only 
viewing a film for its meaning or formal elements is a constructive process, but also 
that the meanings and forms are constructs, he denies an existence of those material 
cues independent of the viewer’s perceptual processes which is what the 
neoformalists rely on for their intersubjective access to the film. While Bordwell’s 
solution to this problem lies in his suggestion for a ‘constructivist realism’ where 
the viewer can come to inferences that are approximately true, there are still two 
problems with it.  
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First of all, Bordwell (1985, p. 62, 1989c, p. 270) and also Thompson (1988, pp. 7–
13) explicitly reject any communication from the screen to the viewer. However, as 
Redfern explains, if we’re able to infer information from the film’s formal devices, 
such as a story from the shuzyet, there must be some sort of ‘communication of 
meaningful narrative information from the screen to the spectator’ (Redfern, 2005). 
Although Bordwell does discuss the concept of ‘communicativeness’, which he 
explains as the degree to which the film shares information that the film’s degree 
of knowledge allows for (Bordwell, 1985, p. 57), it remains unclear how a film can 
be more or less communicative without the communication of information from 
screen to viewer. 
Secondly, Bordwell’s suggestion for a constructivist realism hollows out the idea 
of constructivism since constructivism, in its epistemological roots, relies on the 
idea that we cannot come to any truth claims since also so called ‘facts’ are 
‘constructs based on regularities in a subject’s experience’ (Redfern, 2005). As 
also Redfern (2005) explains convincingly, you cannot claim to be a constructivist 
but stick to the idea that your knowledge can approach an independent reality since 
constructivism is built around the idea that there is no way of knowing that 
independent reality outside of your own experience so there is no way of knowing 
whether our knowledge reflects it.15 In other words, you cannot have your cake and 
eat it.    
Here then, I propose a rather significant reworking of neoformalism to keep it from 
contradicting itself and to provide a better base for considering the formal 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
15 Redfern critiques Bordwell’s constructivist realism from a radical constructivist argument and 
shows how Bordwell’s claims are indeed untenable from a constructivist point of view. However, 
where Redfern proposes to substitute Bordwell’s constructivism for a radical constructivism where 
the viewer does not test his perceptions against the cues in the work but rather against his own 
experiences in perceiving the work, I suggest here (see below) that neoformalism’s claims are better 
off relying on a communications model of art.   
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components of game violence while still acknowledging an active role for the 
player. This altered neoformalism entails a neoformalism that does not rely on 
Bordwell’s constructivist ideas of film perception. Instead, this neoformalism 
makes amends with the idea of a ‘communication model of art’ that Thompson and 
Bordwell have so firmly rejected. Once we acknowledge that the film still 
‘communicates’ certain narrative and stylistic ‘information’ to the spectator, 
neoformalism can again rely on a work existing independently of the viewer that 
significantly guides the viewer’s perceptions. And while the viewer still enages in 
hypothesis testing and inferences making, he does not construct the film’s form. 
Here, I partly align with Gaut (1995), who argues for an approach to film perception 
in which the viewer can be seen as a detective who tests background knowledge 
against existing clues to make sense of the work. Sometimes those clues may paint 
an incomplete picture which means that the viewer is required to fill in the gaps 
(e.g. off-screen space or ‘in-between events’). However, Gaut argues that also in 
those cases, the film (not the viewer) gives clear cues about what the viewer ought 
to imagine (1995, pp. 15–16). While I agree with Gaut’s main points here, he is 
specifically focused on finding meaning in a work, rather than on finding a broader 
range of formal components. This is problematic because it suggests that meaning 
conveyance is again the main purpose of a film which is exactly what the 
neoformalists tried to avoid by abandoning the communications model of art in the 
first place (K. Thompson, 1988, pp. 7–13).16 After all, neoformalism has clearly 
positioned itself as a poetics interested in the functions of film devices more 
generally rather than in the meanings that they express. For this very reason we 
should be wary when reinstalling a ‘communications model of art’ in a neoformalist 
approach. When I argue for a neoformalism based on a communications model, I 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
16 The other reason that neoformalists jettison any communication model of art (whether that model 
is a classic sender-message-receiver model of communication or an encoding/decoding model of 
communication), is of course to argue for a metaphor of construction rather than interpretation 
(Bordwell, 1989c). 
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do not mean to turn neoformalism into an approach that considers films for the 
meanings that they communicate. Instead, I simply wish to emphasize that the 
film’s material is there independent of the viewer’s perception of it, and that the 
material is manipulated with a range of different devices which trigger the viewer 
to have a certain aesthetic, non-practical response. In this sense, the film should still 
be considered communicative because it sends information from the screen to us. 
Here, I consider the trigger to be that information, and the devices as the source 
transmitting the trigger.  
Finally, I should emphasize that abandoning Bordwell’s constructivism and 
installing a communications model in neoformalism is not about preserving some 
sort of objectivity about meaning. Instead, arguing against constructivist film 
perception is simply a way of allowing intersubjective access to one and the same 
film and all its materials and devices. Different film viewers may still end up having 
different kinds of responses to the film’s devices, but in order to study those devices 
we need to acknowledge that those devices exist independently of the viewer and 
communicate from the screen to the viewer.  
Clarifying my stance on this matter is essential for the study of videogame violence 
since it provides us with a more solid base for further questions about the role of 
the player in the game’s violence. When players are considered to construct the 
game through their play behaviour, game violence becomes a highly subjective 
matter that only exists as a player’s individual performance. However, when the 
game is seen as a guiding force existing independently of the player, it could be 
argued that the player merely activates violence (in one of various ways) that is 
already existent in the system. This distinction does not only hold consequences for 
the way that we can approach game violence, but also raises questions about the 
responsibility of the player in acting out the violent behaviour.17  The role of the 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
17 By this I mean that the player only plays one part in the production of game violence, not that the 
player should therefore also be held only partially accountable for his actions. Although 
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player of course requires a lot more scrutiny since the interactive nature of games 
makes issues around intersubjective access to game violence all the more pressing. 
In the upcoming chapters I therefore aim to show how games indeed play a highly 
structuring role in the construction of game violence by encouraging or in fact 
forcing the violence to be performed and encouraging certain perceptions of that 
violence. We can then study moments of violence for the different ways in which 
different devices cue our responses, and also focus on a limited set of formal devices 
according to their dominance in the overall functioning of the game.  
2.3.2 Defamiliarization 
As a basic premise, neoformalists assume that the act of perceiving an artwork is 
significantly different from our normal day-to-day act of perceiving the world 
around us. They argue that our day-to-day perception serves a practical purpose; it 
is a means to an end. We perceive elements in our environment mostly for the 
purpose of achieving our set goals. This means that elements in our environment 
that do not contribute to our practical goals are kept peripheral. As Thompson puts 
it: 
We perceive the world, so as to filter from it those elements that are relevant 
to our immediate actions. Standing at a street corner, for example, we may 
ignore a myriad of sights, sounds, and smells, focussing upon a small traffic 
signal for the moment when it turns green, indicating that we may proceed 
toward our actual goal, an appointment a few blocks beyond. For such 
purposes, our mental processes must be focused down, factoring out other 
stimuli. If we noticed every perceptual item within our ken, we would have 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
acknowledging the structuring role of a game’s material may certainly lead us to question a player’s 
accountability, it seems to me that answering such a question also requires a consideration of the 
player’s understanding of his violent act as well as his voluntary decision to play the game.     
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no time to make decisions concerning our most pressing needs, like not 
stepping out in front of a bus (1988, p. 8). 
On the other hand, when viewing a film our perceptual processes are not focused 
down for practical purposes but employed more freely, allowing for perception of 
things that would otherwise be filtered out. During these moments we engage in a 
different type of perception that is non-practical which means that perception is no 
longer the means to an end but the end goal itself. Because the film holds ‘no 
immediate practical implications for us,’ we engage with the film in a more 
‘playful’ way which trains us to see things in a new light (K. Thompson, 1988, p. 
8). 
So, when we see a guy with a gun on the screen, or when we witness injustice, we 
cannot act on it, leaving us in a helpless situation where we can only perceive for 
the sake of perceiving. Consequently, our perceptions can be more dispersed, 
allowing us to incorporate a wider range of perceptual stimuli. We can come to see 
the details of the gun, or the details of a facial expression. Furthermore, we can also 
cognitively process the stimuli for more than the immediately practical action 
affordances. In that case, the gun can also become a thing of beauty rather than a 
threatening object. 
At first glance, Thompson’s claim for non-practical, playful perception in films 
does not seem to apply to games. After all, games are interactive media that do 
allow for the execution of actions. In this sense, it could be argued that a player’s 
perceptual resources are indeed focused down for the execution of appropriate 
actions rather than dispersed to account for a broader range of perceptual stimuli. 
However, such a conclusion would be too hasty in light of the fact that our play 
activity is more heterogeneous than perceiving for action. While the ludologists 
indeed argue that the configurative activity is a priori the most dominant one which 
would entail that we perceive for the purpose of performing actions, I will argue in 
section 3.3.1 (and beyond) that a player’s activity can be considered to exist on an 
axis between pure spectatorship and pure agency. In that case, the combinations of 
different cues and their functions encourage what kind of activity dominates during 
a particular play moment.  
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Because our roles as spectator and agent involve different perceptual, and as I will 
argue in chapter 5, also different cognitive and emotional focus points, our 
experience of the game’s violence can be very different depending on the kind of 
player activity that the game cues. In line with Thompson we could for instance 
argue that a more dominant role as agent has the player focus down on those game 
elements that are of immediate relevance for his or her progression towards the 
game’s goal. On the other hand, a more dominant role as spectator has the player 
disperse his attention towards other elements in the game and evaluate them for 
other roles they have in the play experience.  
Furthermore, similar to how Thompson characterizes film viewing, so is play often 
characterized as having an aim in itself which distinguishes it from more practical 
behaviour in daily life. Here, I link up with Apter (1991) who calls this 
characteristic of play ‘paratelic’ which he distinguishes from a telic state of mind 
where an outside goal provides the main motivation for the activity. While the 
player can still strive for goals during gameplay (which is exactly why players can 
also be agents in games), these goals still function in service of the play activity 
(Apter, 1991, p. 16). In other words, these goals make playing the game possible. 
Even an extrinsic goal like winning a trophy or an achievement can be said to 
function in service of the game since these encourage meaningful play behaviour. 
It is only when the goal becomes more important than the game, that play is no 
longer intrinsically motivated which also means that for Apter gamblers and 
professional athletes are often not playing. 
This paratelic characteristic of play shows similarities with Thompson’s claims 
about film viewing as an end in itself. However, there is a clear difference between 
games and films in this matter. Where games do not provide the player with a 
practical objective outside of the game’s objectives to facilitate play as intrinsically 
purposeful actively, neoformalists argue that films are free of practical implications 
to facilitate a process called defamiliarization. Borrowing the term from the Russian 
formalist Shklovsky (1917/1965) (who used the Russian language equivalent 
‘ostranenie’), Thompson (1981) argues that the main function of the film is to make 
objects ‘unfamiliar’ again. By removing immediate practical implications of the 
perceived actions, the film allows us to see those actions differently from the way 
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we would see them in our daily lives. This non-practicality is the first step towards 
defamiliarization since we see actions in a context that is unfamiliar to us. However, 
the non-practicality also creates the basic condition for further defamiliarization to 
occur. In that case the film can further challenge our habitualized perceptions by 
placing the represented events in new contexts and showing them in unaccustomed 
formal patterns (K. Thompson, 1988). This makes perception a more difficult and 
lengthy process and renews our perception of the things represented.  
Defamiliarization is not only dependent on the cues in the work but also on the 
backgrounds that viewers bring to the work. Certain elements in a film may become 
habitualized over time due to repetitive use. In those cases, our perceptual process 
may again fall back into mindless ease and the defamiliarizing devices will have 
lost their effectiveness. The violence in Bonnie and Clyde (Beatty & Penn, 1967) 
for instance, has now become a rather familiar sight to us. At other times, however, 
older films will again be effective in defamiliarizing our perception because the 
new generation of audiences will have attributed a new historical background which 
makes the work feel unfamiliar again.  
In principle, defamiliarization thus becomes a tool to judge the artistic quality (the 
artfulness) of a work. Following this principle, one could argue that the more the 
film is able to defamiliarize our perceptions of the everyday world or other 
artworks, the better the artistic quality of that film is. This does not necessarily mean 
that only highly original ‘arthouse’ films should be considered as art. After all, all 
films remove practical implications from our perceptual engagement with them, 
which already provides a context that is different from our everyday lives. As 
Thompson puts it: ‘even in a conventional work, the events are ordered and 
purposeful in a way that differs from reality’ (1988, p. 11). However, 
defamiliarization does come in different degrees with certain conventional films 
being less defamiliarizing than more original works. So, in principle highly 
defamiliarizing works could be considered as better artworks than the less 
defamiliarizing ones.  
In practice, however, the concept of defamiliarization functions rather differently. 
In fact, I do not believe that either Thompson or Bordwell have ever offered such a 
crude evaluation of a film. Instead, neoformalists use defamiliarization more as a 
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basic premise for doing analyses. As I have argued briefly in section 2.2.1 the task 
of the neoformalist is then identifying those formal components and the implied 
backgrounds whose interplay function in bringing about the defamiliarized 
perceptual experience. Or, put differently, as a poetics of cinema, neoformalism 
bases its analysis on defamiliarization as the film’s main effect and then tries to find 
out what devices are functioning to cue that effect to a greater or lesser extent.  
Defamiliarization is probably the most problematic concept of neoformalism when 
we aim to use it as a basis for constructing a neoformalistic approach to videogame 
violence. While neoformalists see defamiliarization as the main purpose of films, 
thereby considering all films for their artfulness, I am reluctant to presume a similar 
purpose for games. The main purpose of games is not to defamiliarize our 
perceptions of reality or other games, but instead to facilitate and structure play. If 
we were to base our analysis of game violence on an experience of 
defamiliarization, we run into two essential problems. First of all, while the 
practical use of defamiliarization may be different, the basic principle of the concept 
still allows for normative judgements about the artfulness of the object of study. 
Although I am not arguing that games are not art (there is a good argument to be 
made for why they are, see for instance Tavinor, 2009a), I am arguing that the 
question of games being art is of no use for the current study of violence in games.  
Secondly, as I argued above, basing our analysis on defamiliarization forces the 
focus on the unfamiliar rather than the automatized which would lead a lot of game 
violence unaccounted for in our analyses and determine our analyses towards those 
devices that are functioning to cause a sense of defamiliarization. However, also 
other functions that lead to more automatized responses can most certainly frame 
the violence in interesting ludic, compositional, realistic, transtextual and artistic 
ways.   
I therefore argue in the next chapter that, instead of defamiliarization, play can 
function as a similar premise to build our analyses on. Instead of identifying the 
formal components and implied backgrounds that bring about a more or less 
defamiliarizing experience, we then look for the devices and implied backgrounds 
that shape our play experiences on all accounts of ludic progression, narrative 
construction, realism judgements, transtextual references, and artistic experiences. 
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In this case, devices and motivations become significant in relationship to the 
different predispositions we bring to the game that are necessary for the game to 
achieve its effects in all the different motivational categories. With this in mind, a 
study of game violence can build upon our broad experience of play and still remain 
focused on the ways in which the material of the system functions to cue that 
experience. In my suggestion for a neoformalism in game studies, such an 
adaptation of film neoformalism will be explored further in the next chapter. 
 The Film in Historical Context 
As briefly argued in section 2.1, neoformalists see the system as grounded in reality 
and in relationship to other artworks, which means that a viewer’s knowledge of 
reality and other artworks become important factors in the perception of the work. 
This idea marks a clear difference with New Criticism that assumed the system as 
purely self-contained and self-referential. Neoformalists argue that such a view is 
untenable because without a reference point in the real world or in other artworks, 
the viewer would be unable to make any sense of the film. After all, how would we 
understand what we were seeing if the film showed no similarities with, or 
deviations from our everyday world? Presumably watching a film like that would 
be like listening to a an unknown foreign language; it would be complete gibberish 
to us (K. Thompson, 1981).  
When neoformalists argue that the artwork is grounded in reality and in relationship 
to other artworks they mean two things. First of all, they consider the artwork to be 
affected by the circumstances of its creation because it is constructed with material 
grounded in that work’s historical context. This focus on history is important 
because it helps the analyst assume that the film is a result of a filmmaker’s choices 
who then sees it as his task, as Bordwell puts it, ‘to reconstruct the options facing 
[the] filmmaker at a given historical juncture’ (1989b, p. 373). Bordwell calls this 
a ‘rational-agent model’ of analysis which he suggests to combine with an 
‘institutional model’ of analysis that also takes into account the social and economic 
context that permit and constrain the filmmaker’s choices during a certain time 
(1989b, pp. 382–383). Such an analysis does not constitute a study of authorial 
intent but focuses on the film in question and tries to reconstruct the circumstances 
of its creation through additional research into the film’s historical context.  
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Such an analysis could for instance provide an interesting take on a game like Death 
Race. By placing the game in its historical context, we can come to see how its 
making was constraint by existing game engines with relatively simple collision 
physics. But we can also come to see how this game broke some social conventions 
by playing into the controversies surrounding the film Death Race 2000 during a 
time when arcade games were mostly seen as colourful children’s toys. Such 
models can thus help us explore the history of violent videogames as restraint by 
technological boundaries and a fluctuating movement of game designs either 
challenging or agreeing to social conventions thereby leading to more or less 
original works.  
A second consideration that results from placing the work in reality and in 
relationship to other works is more reception oriented. Where the ‘institutional’ and 
‘rational agent’ models assume that the production of films is affected by the 
circumstances of its creation, this one holds that the perception of the artwork is 
also affected by the circumstances of its viewing. Bordwell refers to this model of 
analysis as the ‘perceptual-cognitive model’ (1989b, p. 383). It is this model that 
helps us describe and explain the perceptual, cognitive and emotional processes that 
viewers go through when watching a film. As I have already argued elaborately in 
the previous sections, this model assumes that viewers bring backgrounds to the 
film which help viewers recognize elements in the film or detect complex and 
original elements of the film because they deviate from those backgrounds.18 
However, in addition, neoformalists also emphasize the historical nature of those 
backgrounds since viewers will slowly adopt different norms over time (Bordwell, 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
18 As I have argued above, neoformalists assume that all devices will have a reason for being there 
which allows them to consider devices that challenge viewing norms as the more significant ones. 
However, such an assumption does rule out the possibility of a mistake. I would argue, however, 
that mistakes such as clear continuity flaws will not likely be considered as the original elements of 
the work since they go against the dominant structure of the work.  
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1989b).  This allows neoformalists to account for changes in the responses of 
viewers during different moments in history.  
To explain this, Thompson (1988) takes the interesting example of Bonnie and 
Clyde. She notes that when Bonnie and Clyde came out, it (and more particularly 
its trailer) stirred controversy amongst audiences due to its excessive portrayal of 
violence. Both the graphical representation of injuries and the use of slow motion 
meant that the film’s stylistic devices were manipulated for an aestheticization of 
violence (see Bruder, 1998) that was unprecedented in its time. However, nowadays 
the film’s graphics appear quite tame in comparison to many current day action 
films and the slow motion does not emphasize the violence half as much as for 
instance the slow motion in a more recent film like Dredd (Garland & Travis, 2012). 
This shows that with changing backgrounds the perception of the film can change 
significantly over time.   
Placing the work in a historical context also has specific implications for how 
neoformalists conceptualize the viewer. The viewer is not considered to be an 
‘ideal’ viewer who always performs the same activities in service of the work, since 
that would leave it impossible for different backgrounds to result in different 
viewings. However, neither is the viewer considered an actual person whose 
personal background leads to an idiosyncratic viewing of the film, since that would 
detach the viewer from his historical context where certain established norms are 
considered to be shared by a large group of viewers. For neoformalists the viewer 
is a construct suggested by the film’s perceptual cues who takes form in the 
backgrounds that the viewer would reasonably draw upon to come to his 
understandings of the film (K. Thompson, 1981, p. 15). In other words, the viewer 
is a ‘hypothetical entity’ that does not exist as wholly in the work but as a reference 
point outside of the work which allows the viewing responses to change in 
accordance with the historically defined backgrounds applied to the work’s cues 
(K. Thompson, 1988, p. 29).   
Although varied, the backgrounds that this hypothetical viewer draws upon can be 
divided into three general categories (K. Thompson, 1988, p. 21). First of all, the 
viewer draws upon knowledge from the everyday world. This background is 
necessary for our recognition of anything with a reference to the real world and 
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without it we would be unable to understand much about character behaviour, three 
dimensional spaces, or many of the events of cause and effect. Secondly we use 
knowledge of other artworks to understand general conventions of artworks, which 
allow us to follow plots, understand a cut up space into different shots as one 
coherent whole, or recognize verses and choruses in musical numbers. This type of 
background is probably the most interesting one with regards to many of the formal 
devices of the artwork since our understanding of a lot of fictional narrative events 
as well as most stylistic devices is largely dependent on this background. Finally, 
we also view films against our knowledge of films made for practical purposes 
such as advertisement or rhetorical persuasion. This background is not very explicit 
but functions more as an implicit backdrop that the viewer must recognize in order 
to acknowledge the artistic manifestations of cinema as something that does not 
serve some external purpose but is purposeful in its own right.  
So, in summing up, backgrounds have three important functions for the 
neoformalists. First of all, the neoformalist can account for the viewer’s ability to 
understand the film through a process of comparing the film’s cues with 
backgrounds taken from the real world, other artworks and other, more practical 
uses of cinema (K. Thompson, 1988, p. 21). Secondly, considering backgrounds as 
historical constructs helps the neoformalists to gain intersubjective access to a 
specific film’s formal devices by drawing on the a collection of norms during a 
certain period of time. It should be emphasized here again that neoformalists are 
not so much interested in making generalizable claims about how actual people will 
perceive the film. Instead, neoformalists draw upon a historically limited amount 
of background information and uses that information as it is implied by the film 
only as a way to study the film’s form and functions. Finally, the fact that 
backgrounds are historical constructs also helps neoformalists to account for 
changes in perception of a film over different periods in time.  
The neoformalist idea of backgrounds as historical constructs helps to further refine 
an approach for an analysis of the formal components of game violence. In such an 
approach, the player is still important in performing and perceiving the violence but 
does so by drawing from information that is available during a specific moment in 
time. This allows us to see how certain perceptions and actions can change over 
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time, but still draw upon a limited amount of information to gain access to the 
game’s formal cues. For example, when we now play a session of the first Mortal 
Kombat we will not likely be shocked by the highly pixelated representations of 
deaths even though the game sparked a big controversy at the time of its release 
because of the realistic representations of violence. An analysis of the game’s 
graphical quality therefore needs to account for the current state of game graphics 
which already limits our perceptions. Similarly, the invention of rocket-jumping 
where players are able to jump higher and reach new areas by firing a rocket 
launcher at the ground and jumping at the same time, may be considered as 
exemplary of the processual nature of games (Malaby, 2007). However, by 
considering backgrounds as historical constructs, we can still consider the game as 
a system and this new playing strategy simply a matter of gaining new available 
information about how to play the game. At this point in time, we should therefore 
keep this newly available strategic information in mind when studying the way that 
the rules of Quake allow for violent actions.    
 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an extensive discussion of the neoformalist film approach 
so that the next chapters can start to explore the usefulness of its basic assumptions 
for a study of games and a study of game violence more specifically. Such a 
discussion is important because we do not want an analysis of game violence to be 
based on sloppy or even self-contradicting foundations. As Thompson herself puts 
it: ‘if we examine our assumptions, we have at least a chance of creating a 
reasonably systematic approach to analysis’ (1988, p. 3).  
As argued in section 2.2, the neoformalist film approach is an approach that aims 
to study the film work itself. However, rather than wanting to expose different 
materials of a film, the approach is more interested in studying the ways that certain 
devices manipulate these materials to cue our viewing experiences. In this sense 
neoformalism can be considered a functionalism, or better yet, a poetics of cinema 
because the interest lies in the way that formal devices function to cue certain 
perceptual, emotional, and cognitive effects, not in the material as such, nor in what 
the film means.  
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By assuming that a film is crafted by a maker who has reasons for including the 
devices, neoformalists provide four types of motivations, which help to consider 
the different functions of a device. These motivations include: 
- Compositional motivations: when a device helps to cue narrative 
construction. 
- Realistic motivations: when a device refers to notions of the real world. 
- Transtextual motivations: when a device refers to other works and genre 
conventions.  
- And artistic motivations: when a device contributes to the abstract shape of 
the film.  
Since films will have many devices which can have any combination of these 
motivations, the analysis risks becoming overly broad. For this reason, 
neoformalism provides the concept of the dominant to focus on the more unfamiliar 
elements in the work.  
As I will show in the upcoming chapters, these motivations can also be considered 
as useful categories for considering the functions of devices making up videogame 
violence although they need to be supplemented with an additional motivation that 
covers the role of game devices in facilitating goal-directed play. Furthermore, the 
concept of the dominant requires some significant changes before it can help to 
tease out the importance of certain devices and motivations in games. Rather than 
limiting our analysis to the more unfamiliar devices, I will suggest to focus on the 
ways in which devices can be more or less important for our play responses in all 
motivational categories.  
Because neoformalists are interested in the ways in which certain devices function 
to cue our viewing responses, they also provide specific assumptions about that 
viewing response and the role of the viewer in it. As I showed in section 2.3, 
neoformalists depart from the idea that our film viewing responses are aesthetic 
responses since they serve no other purpose outside of the perceptual act itself.  The 
non-practicality of the viewing experience forms the basis for a process they call 
defamiliarization, since we start to see the film’s events in an unfamiliar, unpractical 
light.  
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While defamiliarization could theoretically be used as a tool to judge the artistic 
quality of a work (i.e. more defamiliarizing is better than less defamiliarizing), 
neoformalists use the concept more as a basic premise for doing their analyses. This 
means that the neoformalist starts with the assumption that the film cues a 
defamiliarizing experience and then tries to find those devices at work in cuing that 
experience. In this sense, defamiliarization focuses the analysis towards elements 
that the neoformalists find more important. These elements are considered part of 
the work’s dominant.  
However, defamiliarization does not happen solely due to the film’s devices but 
occurs in the relationship with the viewer’s background knowledge. Here the 
neoformalists ascribe an active role to the viewer who tests certain backgrounds 
against the devices in the film system. The neoformalists explain this active viewer 
role through a constructivist model of film spectatorship. However, this is where 
my main criticism of the approach lies. As I argued extensively in this chapter, the 
constructivist model does not mesh well with the idea that we can gain 
intersubjective access to a film’s formal devices and their functioning by 
performing the appropriate perceptions implied by the film. After all, the 
constructivist model assumes that our background knowledge determines what we 
perceive, which also means that we can have no access to the formal devices outside 
of our own experiences. Or, put differently, in a constructivist model a film cannot 
be studied in terms of its formal devices but only in terms of our own backgrounds 
and perceptual operations.  
While Bordwell tries to make his way around this problem by arguing for a 
‘constructivist realism’, this hollows out constructivism’s basic premise that we 
cannot know reality outside of our own experiences of it. For these reasons I argued 
for a significant modification of neoformalism by reinstalling a communications 
model of art. This model fits well with the idea that a film’s devices ‘communicate’ 
to us from the screen and trigger our perceptual responses although we should be 
wary not to turn neoformalism into an approach focused on films as containers for 
meanings. By acknowledging this we can indeed have intersubjective access to the 
film’s devices, which is what the neoformalists aimed for in the first place. 
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In this reworked version of neoformalism, the viewer still tests certain backgrounds 
against the communicated cues. However, the devices that are cueing, are 
considered there independently of the viewer and tell us what background 
knowledge is more or less appropriate. This does not mean that neoformalism 
argues that all viewers will perceive the work in one particular way, nor does it 
mean that the more appropriate viewings are considered fixed. After all, viewer’s 
backgrounds still play an essential role in the viewing experience, which means that 
it is very possible (even likely) that viewers with different backgrounds will 
perceive the work in different ways. However, a neoformalist would argue that a 
limited set of those perceptions are appropriate according to the functioning of the 
film’s devices, and decides to focus on those appropriate ones. Furthermore, as I 
argued in section 2.4, the neoformalists argue that the appropriate viewings will 
likely change over time since backgrounds consist of a collection of norms during 
a specific moment in time. Hence, the appropriate perceptions of Bonnie and Clyde 
now is very different from the perceptions of Bonnie and Clyde when the film was 
first released. However, the fact that backgrounds are historical constructs again 
allows neoformalists to make some generalizable claims about the appropriate 
viewings during a specific period in time.  
Based on this exposition of neoformalism, I would argue that the approach provides 
a range of interesting focal points that, with some obvious adaptations and 
extensions, can carry a fully fleshed out neoformalist approach to videogame 
violence that takes into account a broader range of devices and functions than 
ludology or proceduralism allow for. As I will show in the upcoming chapter, the 
four motivation categories help to consider different functions that violence-related 
devices can have, but the categories will need to be complemented with an 
additional motivation category that covers the way devices can also facilitate and 
structure a configurative gameplay activity. Furthermore, I will argue that the idea 
of the dominant helps us tease out more and less important moments of violence 
and more and less important devices and motivations during a particular violent 
encounter. However, before that can happen, we need to dispose of the tricky and 
normative concept of defamiliarization as a base for undertaking the analysis and 
replace it with a broad conceptualization of play. Finally, neoformalism’s 
consideration of the viewer as active participant who is nevertheless cued to 
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perform appropriate perceptions, forms an interesting starting point for considering 
the complex role of the player when one is trying to study a game’s formal 
components. These, then, are the challenges that lay ahead in the upcoming 
chapters.    
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Chapter 3 
A New Game Formalism 
 
 Introduction 
As outlined in the previous chapter, neoformalism approaches films as systems and 
studies the ways in which different devices in such systems function to cue our 
responses. In principle, the broad understanding of function (identified through 
different motivational categories), and the equal consideration of different devices, 
make neoformalism an interesting framework for the construction of a new 
formalist approach to videogames. As I argued in the introductory chapter of this 
thesis, there is a need for such a new formalism in game studies if we want to come 
to a balanced consideration of the many different functions that devices making up 
game violence can have. Such a new formalism should be capable of considering 
all of these different devices and functions, and not just focus on the rules or the 
ludic functions, or on subordinate functions to finding meaning. In fact, I believe 
that, if outlined well, the basic assumptions of such an approach, should allow 
further generalization to constitute a more general approach to videogames, rather 
than an approach to game violence in particular. For this reason, I will side-line the 
violence issue in this chapter, to enable a broader discussion around the weaknesses 
of available formalisms and the ways in which neoformalism may provide some 
starting points to construct a more inclusive formalism in game studies. The 
question around game violence will be picked up again in the next chapters where 
I will use this approach to investigate different devices and motivations during play, 
taking moments of game violence as examples.  
However, if we are to consider neoformalism as a blueprint for a new formalism in 
game studies, some significant changes must be made. As I briefly outlined in the 
previous chapter, neoformalism’s concept of defamiliarization focuses the analysis 
on the more unfamiliar and thereby ‘artful’ components in a film. However, 
building a game formalism on this concept becomes problematic because it would 
presume games to have an artistic purpose and would narrow down the analysis on 
the more ‘artful’ components in a game. While such a focus may be interesting for 
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an approach to games as artworks, it is not conducive to a more inclusive approach 
to videogames in general. Furthermore, neoformalism’s assumptions about the 
viewing experience need to be adapted and expanded to account for the motor 
actions of a player and the strategic planning that accompanies those actions. 
Finally, also the idea of functions and motivations need to reflect the different 
actions that players can perform compared to the actions of film viewers. 
In this chapter I will thus explore the advantages and limitations of neoformalism 
for constructing an approach to games by setting its main assumptions off against 
ideas about games and players prevalent in proceduralism and ludology. I focus on 
ludology and proceduralism in particular because I consider these to be the two 
main formalisms in game studies with a specific focus on the medium specific 
characteristics of games as systems. In this sense, proceduralism and ludology hold 
the potential to critique and supplement neoformalism’s existing assumptions with 
ideas about the workings of rules and the importance of play as a configurative 
practice. But although this chapter provides a brief introduction into proceduralism 
and ludology, it does so mainly to situate and refine a neoformalist game approach. 
This means that in this chapter proceduralism and ludology help to highlight where 
the neoformalist film approach leaves gaps and how a neoformalist approach to 
videogames could provide a more inclusive consideration of a game’s formal 
components. Through this exploration, a neoformalist approach to videogames is 
presented that shows both significant overlap with ludology and proceduralism in 
its focus on the system, as well as some essential differences in for instance its 
considerations of the various different functions a game device can have.  
Following the structure of the previous chapter, also this chapter will be divided 
into three main subsections. The first subsection (3.2) deals with the game as a 
system of interrelating components all of which deserve equal scholarly attention, 
despite the internal hierarchical organization of these components. But because 
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games are interactive systems,19 in which the player is able to change the 
combinations of devices through motor actions, our considerations of that system 
and its functions also need to account for this configurative play behaviour. For that 
reason, the already broad and useful conceptualization of function that neoformalist 
film theorists use, should be expanded to include affordances for configurative 
behaviour. This broader conceptualization of function also leads to a suggestion for 
a new ludic motivation in addition to the different motivation categories used by 
neoformalist film theorists. Finally, this subsection ends with a discussion of the 
dominant and the ways in which this concept helps to focus our analysis on more 
important game moments for the overall functioning of the game, and on certain 
devices and motivations per game moment which allow us to consider the different 
responses that different game events can invite.   
In the second part of this chapter (section 3.3), I will elaborate on the active roles 
of the player and the methodological challenges that this brings if we aim to focus 
on the game’s formal components. Because games are interactive systems, the 
player is required to respond to the game’s audiovisual feedback through motor 
actions and change the perceived events on screen. However, this does not mean 
that games are wholly constructed by players and that we can only approach games 
as individual play performances. Instead, I argue that games still shape their own 
use by enforcing and encouraging more appropriate play responses which leaves us 
with a limited set of appropriate play instances that allow access to the game’s 
formal devices. The play responses should not just be considered as the 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
19 I am aware of the fact that the term interactivity has received criticism for being too broadly used 
which would supposedly make it unsuitable for describing how a game affords player input (see 
Aarseth, 1997). However, I would argue that interactivity can be a useful term as long as it is clearly 
defined. Although I will further explore the issue of interactivity in this and the next chapter, I will, 
for now, describe a work as interactive when its standard use consists of performing physical activity 
to change the arrangement of formal components of the work and the work itself actively modifies 
this arrangement in response to the physical actions of its user.  
-71- 
configurative play behaviour but also as the construction of a narrative, the 
experience of realism, transtextual references or the game’s overall artistic shape. 
In this sense, the player should be considered as both agent and viewer, whereby 
different responses are required by different cues in the game.  
At the end of this section, I come back to the difficult issue of defamiliarization. 
Here I argue that similar to neoformalism’s ideas around film perception, play is 
inherently non-practical and different from everyday actions. However, I also argue 
that this should not lead to an analytical focus on defamiliarization but simply help 
to consider how game events are inherently different from real world physical 
events. Instead, I suggest to discard of defamiliarization as a concept for analysing 
games and replace it by a broad conceptualization of play.  
In the third part of this chapter (3.4), I explore how we should consider the game in 
its historical context, since a player draws upon historically available knowledge of 
the real world and other artworks for his playing of the game. In this sense, games 
cannot be considered as self-contained systems. However, in following the 
neoformalist film approach, we can state that games imply the appropriation of 
certain background knowledge just as the game implies a certain skill set necessary 
to play the game appropriately. If we are interested in a game’s formal devices, we 
should thus consider the player similar to how neoformalist film scholars consider 
the viewer (and how Aarseth’s (2007) considers an implied player): as a theoretical 
construct that exists as the background knowledge, skill set, and configurative 
responses that a game prescribes to achieve its effects. Then we can still claim 
intersubjective access to the game’s devices even though the functioning of those 
devices may change over time.   
In summary, this chapter further explores the usefulness of the neoformalist 
approach to films, to come to a neoformalist approach to games. As I will show, 
many of the basic assumptions of film neoformalism provide a solid base for 
thinking about games as guiding systems activated through play behaviour. In other 
cases, however, the neoformalist film approach falls short and requires some 
essential modifications and supplementations in terms of rules and configurative 
play behaviour. Eventually, though, this exploration helps me to coin a neoformalist 
approach to games that takes into account the different system devices and their 
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functions in triggering our play experience in a broad sense from goal-directed 
behaviour, to narrative construction, and from realistic or artistic experiences to 
transtextual references.   
 The Game as System 
Neoformalism’s conception of the film as a ‘system’ or a ‘machine’ of interrelating 
components also provides us with a useful way of thinking about games. In fact, 
the terminology has already been widely used in game studies. Aarseth conceived 
a cybertext, and consequently a game, as a ‘machine’: ‘a mechanical device for the 
production and consumption of verbal signs’ (1997, p. 21). And also Bogost (2006, 
p. 4) talks of games as systems of interrelating unit operational components. In these 
conceptualizations, however, the terms system or machine are no longer 
metaphorical in the way they were for neoformalist film scholars. And while 
neoformalists used the terms to signify the ‘machine-like’ process by which the 
different components in a film interrelate to cue our responses, Aarseth specifically 
focuses on the interaction between a game’s mechanical parts to produce different 
outputs. This signifies a clear difference between the game system and the film 
system. Where the film system is considered as a fixed set of interrelating 
components, the game system is often considered as a set of interacting components 
that can be combined in different ways to produce new sets.  
However, this difference between game systems and film systems is also a matter 
of analytical perspective. From a player’s point-of-view the game system can be 
seen in line with Bogost as ‘complex systems’ of interrelating (audiovisual and rule-
based) components which comes much closer to the neoformalist concept of film 
systems (Bogost, 2006, p. 4). However, internally speaking, game systems can 
indeed be considered more like ‘totalizing system’ where rules regulate output in 
the way that Aarseth describes it above. However, as I noted in in the introductory 
chapter, Aarseth’s conceptualization of the game system as the underlying engine 
regulating the production of audiovisual signs, leads to an overemphasis on the 
game’s rules in detriment of its audiovisual output. For the neoformalist film 
scholar on the other hand, the system is considered for the way its different 
components work in cuing viewing responses, not for how those components work 
internally. Here, I would argue that play responses (in its broadest sense) are also 
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cued by rules and audiovisual cues concurrently, not by rules first and audiovisual 
cues later. In this sense, also rules are just part of the game’s devices that cue and 
limit responses during a particular moment of play rather than an underlying 
algorithm that is ever present throughout the experience. Following Tavinor we 
could say that rules should then be understood as the affordances for actions 
(Tavinor, 2009a, pp. 95–96), but, I would add, also as the encouragements and 
enforcements of actions in the form of rewards and punishments. So, during an 
instance of play, the internal hierarchical or temporal organization of rules, 
narrative and stylistic devices makes way for the interrelation of these components 
as they manifest themselves to the player. I would therefor argue that from a 
neoformalist game perspective, it is the interrelation of system components that 
should be studied regardless of the internal mechanical interaction that underlies it. 
Considering the interrelating components of a game system from a player’s 
perspective has consequences for the way we study games. According to this view, 
a specific moment during gameplay should not be considered as regulated by an 
underlying rule system but structured by the interrelation of rules, narrative and 
stylistic components. Or, to focus back on the question of this thesis, we cannot 
understand how violence works by focussing on the rules alone. While those rules 
may facilitate or force certain motor actions, stylistic and narrative devices will cue 
certain perceptions of those actions, which in turn help to further determine our 
motor actions. In this sense, narrative and stylistic devices can also nudge us 
towards the execution of certain motor actions, as long as the rules afford it. All in 
all, considering a game as interrelating components requires a balanced 
consideration of all the different components and the way they enhance or 
contradict one another.  
This brief discussion does of course lay bare another clear difference between game 
systems and film systems. Other than in films where viewers only play a role in the 
perception of the work by bringing the appropriate background knowledge to the 
viewing, game players also play a part in the structure of the work because the game 
requires a human operator to activate various sets of game components through 
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motor actions.20 In this sense, games are interactive phenomena because the game 
actively changes its arrangement of formal components in response to the player’s 
physical mediated actions.21 This obviously goes for the game’s representational 
properties such as when we fire an in-game weapon at an enemy and the game 
shows, and produces the sound of a bullet being fired and a character being hit. 
However, this also goes for the game’s rules as I consider them here. Although the 
underlying algorithm does not change, the affordances that these algorithms create 
differ according to the player’s actions. As Linderoth argues, ‘many of the actions 
a player engages in during game-play have a transformative aspect, in that they can 
create new opportunities for other actions’ (2013, p. 7). Although I would use the 
term ‘activate’ over ‘create’ since the affordances were always available within the 
confines of the system, Linderoth is right in the sense that a different position in 
one of the Hitman games provides us with very different opportunities to execute 
the target. Similarly, choosing to pick up a rocket launcher in Quake allows for very 
different actions than choosing to pick up an axe.  
With this in mind it could be argued that the player’s ability to change the 
arrangement of formal game components undermines any system-oriented 
approach since we can no longer speak of just one work but only of many different 
performances of that work. By drawing from philosophical aesthetics, Tavinor 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
20 Here the term ‘activation’ is chosen carefully over alternatives like ‘creation’ or ‘bringing into 
being’. As I will argue in section 3.3, terms like the latter two deny a material existence of the game 
outside of the play experience. The term ‘activation’ on the other hand, acknowledges the existence 
of the game prior to and after play, and emphasizes the important role that the game has in 
encouraging certain play performances.  
21 This consideration of interactivity largely aligns with Lopes’ (2001) argument that interactivity is 
about changing the structure of the work (if that structure can be considered as the arrangement of 
formal components) rather than the way users experience it. Furthermore, I would argue in line with 
Ryan (2006, n. 5, p. 239) that the active response by the game system is necessary for something to 
be considered as interactive because it also distinguishes interactive phenomena from the ‘ergodic’ 
literature that Aarseth (1997) talks about.    
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refers to this in terms of multiples and instances. He explains that while some 
artworks are embodied in a single object, such as Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, other 
artworks can have multiple instances such as a music album or a movie. According 
to Tavinor, videogames are indeed multiples in the sense that they admit several 
instances of itself to be played (2009b, 2011). However, videogames are not 
multiples in the way that an album is a multiple, because unlike an album the 
instances of play are not as rigidly determined by the nature of the multiple. Instead, 
different ‘playings’ of a videogame can vary greatly. For that reason, Tavinor 
suggests that games may be more like Jazz performances in the sense that in these 
works, the shared structure is ‘less richly defined’ thereby leaving room for 
different variations among the multiples (2011).22 This however, leaves an 
important methodological question. How do we study the formal characteristics of 
games if that game can be instantiated in multiple different ways?  
Fortunately, neoformalism can help us find a way out of this dilemma. Although I 
will outline a fuller argument under section 3.3 (and even more elaborately in 
chapter 5), boiled down, a neoformalist solution to this dilemma is as follows. 
Rather than considering the game as a neutral platform for idiosyncratic play 
performances, we should still see the game an independently existing object that 
significantly structures its own use. This is in fact also what Tavinor argues when 
he states that videogames can still be said to exist in its algorithm and 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
22 The discussion around multiples and instances has a long history in art ontology and is much more 
intricate than what this brief exploration here suggests. However, in this case, the multiple/instance 
conceptualization is only used to highlight the epistemological and methodological difficulties that 
arise for the study of games as interactive systems, not to make any ontological claims about games 
or art. For that reason, we do not need to delve into the ontological discussion here but only need 
the general distinction between multiple and instance and an acknowledgement that the instances of 
games can vary amongst one another quite significantly. Games can of course also be considered 
multiples because games exist in a range of instantiated copies (e.g. CD ROMS). However, the 
multiple/instance conceptualization here refers to the game as the encoded interactive system that 
can be instantiated by play.   
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representational aspects all of which still encode the scope of the game variations 
(2011). In other words, while the game multiple does not determine the instances 
of play in the way that the album multiple determines the album instances, it still 
places a more significant constraint on the types of variations that can be played in 
Jazz music. This is not only the case for our perceptions of game content, which are 
encouraged by implying certain background applications. It is also the case for our 
configurative behaviour that is either forced by certain game rules or implied by 
what Tavinor calls more ‘subtle psychological nudges’ (2009a, p. 98). This means 
that the instance that we perform as analysts shares much (although inevitably not 
all) of the characteristics of the multiple it came from as long as we are willing to 
let ourselves be guided by the game’s cues. In this way, we can still claim 
intersubjective access to the game’s formal components on the basis of our play 
instance.  
3.2.1 Functions of Game Devices 
If we assume that the game cues the player’s configurative behaviour as well as his 
perceptions, cognitions and emotions, we could say that a game neoformalism’s 
concept of function is much broader than it is for ludologists. As noted, ludologists 
like Aarseth (1997) and Eskelinen (2001) focus on the game system as the 
underlying regulator that structures a player’s configurative behaviour. 
Consequently, the term ‘function’ is used to signify the way that that rule system 
regulates the behaviour of the different game components to allow for, and present 
challenges to certain physical manipulation by the player (see for instance the game 
typology based on functional categories by Dahlskog et al., 2009). In other words, 
when ludologists ask how a gun functions, they are interested in the way the rule-
based system regulates the gun’s in-game behaviour. Asking how a gun functions 
is thus asking about how the gun handles: how accurately it fires, how effectively 
it kills enemies, and how much ammunition fits into its magazine. For ludologists, 
function does not describe the way the element can contribute to the narrative cause 
and effect chain of the game or the way it may trigger a certain emotional response.  
In a neoformalist approach to games, function does not only refer to the way that 
something allows for configurative behaviour, but also the way that something 
contributes to a game’s narrative, the way that something can draw on our 
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knowledge of the real world or genre conventions, the way that something 
contributes to a game’s artistic shape, or even the way something cues certain 
emotional responses. This broader understanding of function is directly linked to a 
broader conceptualization of play. As an approach to films, neoformalism’s idea of 
user response is naturally focussed on perceptual, emotional, and cognitive activity 
performed by the viewer. When applied to games, this idea should not be replaced 
by a focus on configurative activity performed by the player, but should instead be 
supplemented with it. As I will argue more thoroughly in section 3.3, players can 
then be seen as both agents performing and perceiving for goal-directed progress in 
the game, as well as as viewers performing and perceiving for narrative 
construction, experiences of realism, transtextual references, and experiences of the 
game’s overall artistic shape. When the game system is seen as structuring all the 
activities we engage in as both spectator and agent, function can refer to the role 
that a system’s device can play in any of these activities.  
With this conception of function in mind, an in-game gun may not only function to 
perform violence but may also have the player anticipate upcoming enemies. The 
gun may also play a role in the narrative of the game because it can help to establish 
the main character as a confident action hero who does not shy away from a 
gunfight (or perhaps rather a cowardly villain who would choose to shoot someone 
in the back instead of facing his problems head on). The gun may also draw on our 
notions of real guns, such as the fact that guns can jam in America’s Army 3 (United 
States Army, 2009). The gun may make references to other famous videogame guns 
such as when the gun in Portal (Valve Corporation, 2007) seems to borrow 
characteristics from the gravity gun in Half Life 2 (Valve Corporation, 2004). The 
gun may be appreciated for its own artistic shape such as the golden gun in 
GoldenEye 007 (Rare, 1997) which is not the easiest to use (it can only carry one 
bullet) but can be appreciated for its beauty. In fact, the gun may even just function 
to cue a sense of empowerment, excitement or perhaps even disturbance in the 
player.  
This broader conceptualization of function also encompasses meaning. Here, I 
understand ‘meaning’ in line with Thompson (1988, p. 12) as ‘the system of cues 
for denotation and connotation’. Denotation involves both referential meaning, 
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where we recognize things (objects, characters, events, ideas etc.) in the game as 
aspects of the real world, and explicit meaning, where the game directly expresses 
more abstract ideas like socio-political attitudes through the dialogue and actions 
of characters. Connotation, on the other hand, can involve implicit meanings where 
the player needs to interpret the game to come to a non-straight forward (but 
implied) understanding such as the meanings we find in the circles and blue and 
pink square in The Marriage (Humble, 2007), and symptomatic meanings where 
we understand a game to be a reflection of a certain socio-cultural tendency of a 
large group of people such as when many current games reflect an America-centric 
perspective making them symptomatic of xenophobia and patriotism.  
Neoformalists see meanings as building blocks that an artist can use to build a work 
rather than something that is ascribed to a work by a user. By seeing meaning as 
one of the formal constituents of the system that can have a certain function in the 
work, a neoformalist approach to games also moves away from proceduralism. As 
briefly argued in the introduction, proceduralism does not see meaning as one of 
the game’s devices which can function in a variety of ways but sees the expression 
of meaning as the primary purpose of the system. This means that proceduralists 
like Treanor, Schweizer, Bogost and Mateas (2011) see ‘reading’ or ‘interpreting’ 
the game as their main critical activity. This does not only suggest that 
proceduralism comes closer to a hermeneutic approach that seeks to discover 
meanings in the game, rather than a poetic approach (like neoformalism) that takes 
meanings and other effects as departure points and tries to discover how these are 
achieved (see Culler, 1997, pp. 61–62). It also suggests that proceduralists focus on 
more ‘indirect’ (implicit and symptomatic) meanings, since, according to Bordwell 
(1989c, pp. 1–13), those are the meanings that require interpretation, while more 
‘direct’ (referential and explicit) meanings are grasped through comprehension.23  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
23 Although I am unsure whether proceduralists would wholeheartedly admit to a concentration on 
indirect meanings since ‘meaning’ or ‘interpretation’ are not explored in much detail in their works, 
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According to a neoformalist approach to games, proceduralism’s focus on 
interpreting meanings is problematic for two reasons. First of all, as also Thompson 
(1988, pp. 14–15) argues, a focus on interpretation means that even when a work 
has clear referential or explicit meanings, the analyst has to deal with them as if 
they were implicit. This problem shines through in Murray’s analysis of Tetris. 
Although the game’s audiovisual cues show clear similarities with block sets, she 
seeks for a symptomatic meaning and describes the game as ‘a perfect enactment 
of the overtasked lives of Americans in the 1990s – of the constant bombardment 
of tasks that demand our attention and that we must somehow fit into our 
overcrowded schedules and clear off our desks in order to make room for the next 
onslaught’ (1997, p. 144). Such a symptomatic meaning could in principle be ‘read’ 
from Tetris, as long as we acknowledge that it is based on Murray’s background 
knowledge from the time of her playing rather than the historical background during 
the time of its creation (which consisted of an economically stagnating Soviet 
Union rather than a demanding capitalist USA). However, such a reading ignores 
the more obvious referential similarities between Tetris and construction sets such 
as the Lego bricks, or similarities with assembly puzzles such as various pentomino 
puzzles. In other words, if one is keen to find the meaning in Tetris it is unclear why 
one would want to discard of these referential meanings in favour of more 
connotative symptomatic meanings.  
However, an even bigger problem with focussing on meaning like this, is that it 
ignores essential other functions that contribute to the overall experience of the 
game. This is exactly what Eskelinen gets at when he criticizes Murray’s reading 
of Tetris and states it does not tell us much about ‘the features that make Tetris a 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
their use of terminology and some of their ‘readings’ do suggest that this is the case (See for instance 
Treanor & Mateas, 2011; Treanor, Schweizer, Bogost, & Mateas, 2011). I should again add that this 
concentration makes sense for serious or persuasive games that are often build out of relatively 
abstract mechanisms that express more symbolic meanings. See for instance many of Bogost’s 
interpretations of persuasive games in (Bogost, 2007).   
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game’ (2001). While I wouldn’t phrase it in these ontological terms, Eskelinen is 
right if he means to say that it does not tell us much about the ludic functions of 
Tetris. In this case, the meanings of the tetrominoes (whether referential or 
symptomatic) only play a minor role in why they are there. A more important reason 
for why they are there is that they facilitate and structure our configurative actions 
by setting goals and providing challenges. Here also the referential meanings of the 
tetrominoes as puzzle blocks supports this ludic function.  
In this case, I would say that the ludologists are right. The formal devices in abstract 
games like Tetris, are often there for ludic reasons, and not to communicate 
meanings (The Marriage being an interesting exception to this rule). However, this 
does not mean that we should therefore assume that ludic functions are always the 
more dominant ones. While Aarseth (2004a, p. 49) has claimed that also the 
representational characteristics of Lara Croft’s body are irrelevant because they do 
not tell us much about the gameplay of Tomb Raider (Core Design, 1996), I would 
argue that her physique also functions to denote Lara as an athletic adventurer and 
her skimpy clothing helps to establish her somewhat rebellious nature which has 
led her to break bonds with her upper-class British family. In extension of these 
narrative functions, Lara’s body also functions in terms of erotic appeal. In this 
sense, Lara is simply a set of characteristics with some of these characteristics 
having specific ludic functions, others having certain narrative functions, and others 
again having a function to appeal to certain erotic desires.     
Neoformalism thus helps us situate an approach to games somewhere in between 
ludology and proceduralism. In line with ludology, this new game formalism 
concentrates on function over meaning, but closer to proceduralism, this approach 
still incorporates meaning as one of a game’s formal constituents that function to 
cue play responses. With this framework in mind, moments of game violence can 
be considered for the meanings expressed, the function that those meanings have in 
cueing our play responses, and the many other functions that a moment of violence 
can have. As I will argue below, certain functions may be more important during a 
particular moment of violence, and certain moments of violence may be more 
important for the overall functions of the game. However, the importance should 
not be determined by the approach but by the game and game moments under 
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investigation. So, for now, a broad conceptualization of function makes the 
neoformalist approach to games a more inclusive approach than ludology and 
proceduralism.  
3.2.2 Motivations of Game Devices 
As outlined in the previous chapter, neoformalism provides useful categories of 
motivations to help see how a device functions. By asking ourselves what the reason 
is for the presence of a certain device, these categories help us tease out 
compositional, realistic, transtextual and artistic motivations. As noted, these 
reasons are not the reasons given by a maker, but by the user on the basis of the 
work’s functioning. It seems that all of these motivations can be mapped neatly onto 
games. The opening cutscenes of Grand Theft Auto IV (Rockstar North, 2008) for 
instance, can be considered for their compositional motivation since they get us 
acquainted with the protagonist Niko and help us construct a narrative of an 
immigrant chasing the American dream through his violent ways.  
At the same time, these cutscenes can also be considered for their realistic 
motivation. The references to a war scarred Eastern Europe resonate with our 
knowledge of the war in former Yugoslavia, and Niko’s quest for the American 
dream makes sense because we know from the real world that this is one of the 
guiding beliefs of the current day American society. In these cases realistic 
motivation is more of an unobtrusive backdrop, a secondary motivating force to the 
unfolding of the narrative. To establish Niko Bellic compositionally as an eastern 
European character that has come to America for a better life, it makes sense 
realistically to give him an eastern European accent and to model the American city 
of his arrival on a real big city in the USA like New York. In other words, realism 
adds to the believability of the narrative and thereby keeps the player invested in its 
unfolding.  
I should reiterate that I understand something to be realistic in terms of certain 
aesthetic conventions of realism and in terms of its relationship with the real world. 
In conventional terms, the realism of Liberty City becomes salient because its 
graphics and physics show yet another leap in technological advancement 
compared to the game’s predecessor and because it is the first time that a game 
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environment was so closely modelled on an actual real world city. As Jenkins puts 
it in one of his blog posts with regards to Half Life (Valve Corporation, 1998):  
Because we read realism against existing artistic conventions, 
breakthroughs in realism call attention to themselves — they are spectacular 
accomplishments. When the marines behaved “realistically” in Half Life, it 
was so compelling precisely because we read them against how npcs had 
functioned in previous games (2007).   
Because our norms change over time, realism is also historically defined. Certain 
characteristics initially perceived as highly realistic may become automatized after 
a while which may then cause makers to employ other characteristics that cue a new 
kind of realism (e.g. Mortal Kombat).  
However, the realism of Liberty City cannot be cued without a reference point in 
the real world. Liberty City does not just look more realistic because it differs from 
other cities in videogames, but because it differs from other cities in videogames in 
its resemblance to real world cities. As Grodal puts it: ‘realism could (...) be 
considered a balancing act between the unique which provides the ‘salience of the 
real’ and the typical which provides the cognitive credibility and familiarity of the 
real’ (2002, p. 73). With this I am not claiming that our knowledge of the real world 
is in any way objective and unmediated by a specific cultural and historical 
perspective. The only thing I argue by installing a mimetic concept of realism into 
the neoformalism that I am arguing for here, is that our comprehension of the 
representation requires us to also draw on knowledge that we have adopted from 
our experience of the real world, however culturally or historically defined you 
think this is. 
In videogames, transtextual motivation is often centred on rule-based mechanisms 
such as the possibility to respawn, have a certain number of lives, or gain extra 
lives. These kinds of mechanisms are familiar to us because they exist across a 
range of different games and can therefore be considered for their transtextual 
motivation. However, we should keep in mind that these mechanisms will often 
have a more important ludic motivation, (as I will argue below). In other cases, 
transtextual motivation may be more dominant because the device is mostly there 
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to give an homage to other games or plays around with our knowledge of other 
cultural artefacts or game conventions. In this case, the physical appearance of 
Donkey Kong is a clear reference to King Kong, and the graphical style and three 
lives limit in the different warp zone levels in Super Meat Boy (Team Meat, 2010) 
are obvious references to Super Mario Bros. In another interesting example, Braid 
(Number None, Inc., 2009) ends each level with a clear reference to the Super 
Mario games by having a character tell you that ‘your princess is in another castle’. 
However, by using this reference in such a different context, the message takes on 
a different function. Where these messages in the Super Mario games simply 
functioned to congratulate the player for making it through the level, explain there 
were more levels to come, and keep the narrative of the kidnapped princess in place, 
in Braid the message becomes more sinister. By casting doubts in the player about 
the legitimacy of the character’s story and the actual existence of the princess, the 
message does not function as the congratulations for the achievement of yet another 
random level, but, in its contrast with the message in the Super Mario series, the 
message frames the player’s actions as a depressing, unrealistic and repetitive 
search for love.  
Artistic motivation is probably the most difficult category to pin down because it 
will often be overshadowed by more prominent other motivations. In a game like 
Fez (Polytron Corporation, 2013) the 8-bit graphical style of the game can certainly 
be considered for its artistic motivation although it also serves an important 
transtextual motivation as homage to the classic videogames of the 1980’s. 
Similarly, the black and white style of MadWorld (PlatinumGames, 2010) is clearly 
motivated artistically, but it also has a transtextual motivation because it is 
borrowed from the Sin City comic books created by Frank Millar.  
Thompson (1988, p. 19) has argued that abstract films or paintings are almost 
completely organized around artistic motivation. While this in no way goes for 
abstract games in general, one could argue something similar for an abstract game 
like Flow (Thatgamecompany, 2006) where the serene graphics and music are there 
only for an artistic purpose. There is no story that these devices can add to. There 
is no real reference to our notions of the real world. There is not even a clear game 
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goal that the player can strive for.24 The peaceful ‘swimming’ around in this 
environment is pleasurable for its own sake, and the devices are there only to 
contribute to its overall abstract shape. However, other abstract games like Tetris 
or Bejeweled (PopCap, 2001) clearly have a more important other motivation.  
Here then, the neoformalist categories only take us so far. With games being quite 
distinct representational media due to their configurative user function, these 
categories are unable to fathom perhaps the most essential reason for the inclusion 
of a device in games. After all, games also require motor actions from the player 
and for that reason a lot of the elements in games are there to structure those motor 
actions. A game device may be justified because it gives the player a goal to strive 
for, or an opponent to battle. Similarly, a set of game rules may be motivated 
because it tells the player what he can or cannot do in his quest for the game’s goal. 
Since neoformalist film analysis does not consider a category that can encompass 
these kinds of motivations I will provide one here.  
When a device facilitates the player’s rule-bound, goal-directed progress in a game 
I will refer to its ludic motivation. A device that is ludically motivated should 
facilitate a specific subset of play where the player acknowledges the game’s goals 
and strives for them actively while voluntarily subordinating himself to a confining 
set of rules and challenges. A ludically motivated device facilitates play as a 
competitive process of winning and losing, it allows the player to devise a strategy 
and execute it. This is not the broader play response we have with games, which 
may for instance also include the construction of a narrative out of the game’s 
formal clues. Instead, ludically motivated devices should be seen to facilitate play 
behaviour in a narrower sense which is often understood as ‘gameplay’ and set off 
against narrative (see Lindley, 2002). This narrower understanding of gameplay 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
24 I recently learned that Flow does have a victory condition which consists of getting to the absolute 
bottom layer of the game. However, this victory condition remains hidden from the player during 
the entire game which leaves the player to enjoy the aimless ‘swimming’ for its own sake.  
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comes closer to what ludologists refer to as configurative activity, if we assume that 
that configurative activity is also goal-directed and can be confined as much by 
rules as well as audiovisual elements. 
While ludologists would likely argue that this ludic motivation is always the most 
important one in games because they assume configurative activity to be a game’s 
dominant user function (Eskelinen, 2001), I am reluctant to make such claims a 
priori. Ludic functions indeed play an important role because they facilitate our 
progression towards the game’s goal, play is, however, more than that rule-bound, 
goal driven progress. As I noted briefly in the previous chapter, a neoformalist 
approach to games should rely on a broader conceptualization of play that also 
includes narrative construction, experiences of realism, references to other games 
and other cultural artefacts, and an experience of a game’s overall artistic shape. In 
line with this conceptualization of play, ludic motivations become more important 
when a device is absolutely necessary for our goal-directed progress. However, 
once a device is more optional for our goal-directed progress, other motivations can 
most certainly come to the fore. I will discuss this more thoroughly in the next 
subsection.  
Ludic motivations are of course dominant when a device has no other motivations. 
In abstract games like Tetris or Bejeweled, for instance, devices often only have a 
ludic motivation. But also in more figurative games that do include a narrative, 
devices can have ludic motivations without having a compositional one. A score 
counter that indicates the player’s success with some abstract units of points is a 
perfect example of a device that serves ludic purpose but adds nothing to the game’s 
narrative layer. These score counters that existed mostly in older style arcade games 
presented the player with a goal to strive for (i.e. a high score) but usually added 
nothing else.  
In the ‘beat ‘m up’ game Double Dragon (Technos Japan, 1987), for instance, the 
player controls one of the two main characters in his quest to save his kidnapped 
girlfriend Marian. While kicking and punching his way through four different areas 
in the game, every well-aimed kick and punch provides the player with a seemingly 
random increase in points. In this case the score system provides a secondary goal 
to strive for aside from the primary goal of finishing the game and saving Marian. 
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In other games like MadWorld, the points are more integrated into the game since 
they indicate the player’s progress in a level and even help to unlock new areas or 
power-ups. In this case the score system in directly linked to the primary goal of 
progressing through the levels. And because these scores make no sense whatsoever 
in the narrative of the game, the device clearly has no compositional motivation for 
being there.  
In many modern day videogames however, ludic motivations will often overlap 
with other motivations. In the first two Bioshock games for instance, the money is 
both ludically and compositionally motivated because it not only allows us to buy 
ammunition or healthpacks necessary to progress through the game, it also helps 
our understanding of the space and time of the fictional city of Rapture. The 
currency helps to tell the story of a once vibrant utopia founded by Andrew Ryan 
(depicted on the money) that has since fallen into chaos which left its currency 
invaluable to the city’s genetically modified former citizens. The player can 
therefore find money just about anywhere; thrown away in trashcans, left behind in 
cash registers or purses, or just scattered around the environment.  
In Grand Theft Auto (DMA Design, 1997), and Grand Theft Auto II (DMA Design, 
1999), score is counted in money and is a necessary device to unlock new areas. In 
these cases, the score system not only has a ludic motivation but also has a realistic 
motivation because it makes sense in reference to our real world that someone 
would get paid large sums of money for performing tasks for the city’s crime 
syndicate.  
One could argue that these score or money mechanisms also have a transtextual 
motivation since they are manifestations of game conventions existent across a 
large variety of different games. We may recognize the arbitrary score system of 
Double Dragon as a remnant of older arcade games like Pac-Man (Namco, 1980) 
where it provided the only victory condition. And we have of course gotten quite 
used to money systems allowing us to attain better weapons or XP-systems allowing 
us to level up our character.  
Finally, a ludically motivated device may also overlap with an artistic motivation. 
In the Max Payne games for instance, the bullet-time mechanism has a ludic 
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motivation because it helps the player aim more accurately thereby assisting him in 
his quest for the game’s goal. However, the bullet-time mechanism also has an 
artistic motivation because the slowing down of time presents the world in a highly 
stylized and original way that can be considered as aesthetically pleasing. Similarly, 
the unique use of almost only white, orange and red colours in the free running 
game Mirror’s Edge (EA DICE, 2008) can be considered for its artistic motivation 
but it also serves an important ludic purpose since it shows the player what the route 
is he can take. 
These categories of motivations help us see the many different roles that devices 
play in videogames. By considering the different devices at play during a violent 
sequence we come to see how certain devices are there for the establishment of a 
narrative, how certain devices are there for ludic reasons, how certain devices are 
there to refer to our knowledge of the real world or our knowledge of other cultural 
artefacts, and even how certain devices are there mostly to engage us in an 
appreciation for their own artistic shape. A particular device may have a range of 
(sometimes even contradicting) motivations, and a particular moment of violence 
will often consist of several of these devices. This means that a violent sequence 
often serves a range of different purposes, all of which contribute to our perceptions 
and performances of that violence.     
3.2.3 The ‘Dominant’ in Games 
According to the discussions above, a game or even a single game moment can have 
a range of different, narrative, stylistic and rule-based devices all of which can have 
a plethora of different motivations for being there. By considering games this way, 
we escape an overemphasis on rules, and can consider devices for more than how 
they structure our configurative behaviour or how they express meaning. Thereby, 
this consideration also broadens our ideas of what rules can do in games. Rules, as 
they are manifested in affordances, can indeed be ludically motivated. However, 
those rules can also have important compositional motivations, such as when the 
tape recorders in Bioshock (2K Games, 2007) afford listening to, thereby having 
the purpose to cue the construction of the game’s narrative. Rules can also be 
transtextually motivated such as the earlier mentioned example of the three lives 
limit in Super Meat Boy. Rules can have important realistic motivations, such as the 
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driving physics in a game like BeamNG.drive (BeamNG, 2013), which seem to be 
mostly there to experience the realism of driving and crashing cars. In fact, rules 
can even be artistically motivated, such as the control of flower petals in a game 
like Flower (Thatgamecompany, 2009).     
A neoformalist approach to games thus broadens the scope of our analysis. 
However, if we start from the basic premise that all devices are equally important 
in cueing out play responses through a variety of different motivations, how do we 
determine which devices and motivations to focus on?  
Here, the neoformalist idea of the dominant comes in handy, but before the concept 
can become useful for a study of games, some significant changes must be made to 
its conceptualization in film studies. As noted, neoformalist film scholars base their 
idea of the dominant on defamiliarization, which means that a device and 
motivation become foregrounded when they are more effective at making the 
representation more unfamiliar. However, transposing this idea to games, would 
again limit the scope of the analysis to study only the more unfamiliar components, 
which is what we were trying to avoid by exploring a more inclusive new formalism 
in the first place.  
As briefly pointed out in the previous chapter, I therefore suggest that we base the 
idea of the dominant on a broad conceptualization of play. To explain this, I first 
draw from Leino’s gameplay condition (2010). According to Leino, the gameplay 
condition is what the player needs to do in order to keep playing the game, with the 
added note that playing the game is significantly different from playing with the 
game in which the game sets no clear requirements for play and the player could in 
principle keep playing for as long as he wants. Leino then continues to argue that 
the player experiences content as more or less significant in relation to this 
gameplay condition. Put differently, certain game elements become foregrounded 
because they are essential for us to take note of to keep playing the game. This 
conceptualization of a gameplay condition is useful because it helps to see how a 
certain analytical playing strategy – in this case, the desire to keep playing the game 
– can foreground certain devices that become the focus points of our analysis.   
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However, as I will show more elaborately in chapter 5, Leino’s playing strategy is 
still somewhat limited in the devices it can foreground. Because Leino does not talk 
about goals but rather about the general imperative to keep playing,25 his gameplay 
condition only allows for a distinction between devices that are absolutely essential 
for ludic progress (the undeniable), and devices that are not (the deniable). 
However, a device can also have a ludic benefit while not being essential for us to 
keep playing, for instance when the game presents us with optional secondary goals. 
In order to highlight what is ludically important, we are therefore better off trying 
to optimize our chances of achieving the game’s goals (as I will show in chapter 5, 
this is what Smith (2006) calls a rational playing strategy).  
Furthermore, Leino’s playing strategy does not tell us anything about what devices 
are significant for the narrative of the game to unfold, or what devices are 
significant for the overall artistic shape of a game moment. In this respect, Leino’s 
gameplay condition is very much a ludological concept that focuses on play as a 
configurative practice: the ability of the player to keep manipulating the game. 
However, if we want to consider a broader range of motivations that a game device 
can have, we need a different playing strategy. We should not just focus our 
analyses on those elements that are essential for our goal-directed progress; we 
should also have the basic predisposition to construct a narrative from the game’s 
cues; we should be open to draw on our knowledge of the real world and certain 
realism conventions to experience a device’s realism; we should be willing to make 
transtextual references; and finally, we should be open to experiencing certain 
devices for their own artistic shape. This is a playing strategy that I will term the 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
25 Leino talks of a desire to keep playing rather than a desire to achieve the game’s goals because he 
aims to include those games that have no clear (end) goals like The Sims series or Tetris. While 
Leino explains that this formulation is simply a more analytic understanding of goals as the 
imperative to play (2010, pp. 141–142), it is still problematic if we aim to highlight important ludic 
elements in games that have a variety of different secondary goals, or games that allow for both free 
form play and goal-directed play such as the GTA series.  
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cooperative playing strategy in chapter 5. It is only when we fulfil all these 
predispositions, that certain game devices become more significant in relation to 
one or more of these predispositions.  
This is how we should consider the dominant in a neoformalist study of games. 
Instead of relying on defamiliarization, the dominant simply relies on a broad 
conceptualization of play in all its different registers. This allows us to focus the 
analysis on two levels. On a more holistic level, the dominant helps us see which 
of the various moments in an instance of the game should be considered as the more 
important ones to analyse. A moment can be considered more or less crucial to the 
development of the main plotline (what neoformalists film scholars refer to as 
bound and free motifs); it can be more or less crucial for the overall realistic quality 
of the game; it can be more or less crucial for the overall transtextual references that 
the game makes; it can be more or less crucial for the game’s overall artistic shape; 
and of course a game moment can me more or less crucial for the overall 
progression of the player towards the game’s goal. In general we could for instance 
say that main quests are often ludically and compositionally more dominant than 
side quests. Similarly, ‘easter eggs’ will be less ludically dominant than 
‘bossfights.’ However, what is perhaps more interesting here, is that, once the ludic 
function of a device is more optional or non-existent, certain moments can also 
become dominant moments of realism or artistic quality. For example, there is a 
specific moment in Bioshock 2 (2K Marin, 2010) where we are traversing the ocean 
floor when the music swells and we come to the edge of a cliff with a view of the 
underwater city of Rapture. While the city itself also serves compositional purposes, 
that particular moment cues us to appreciate the game as a crafted artefact. It is like 
the game is telling us, ‘look here, is this not something artistically spectacular?!’  
Secondly, on a moment-specific level, the dominant helps determine which game 
devices play an important role during a specific game moment because those 
devices will be the ones to function more significantly in one or more of the 
motivational categories. In extension, the dominant motivations during a specific 
game moment will cue certain perceptual, cognitive and emotional responses to that 
game moment.   
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Let’s take an example. During a quick-time-event (QTE) (also known as an 
interactive animation) in Max Payne 3, we get Max to fight a villain with a machete 
by pressing a specific number of keys within a set timeframe for the animation to 
reach its desired ending. During this QTE a wide range of devices are at work with 
a range of dominant motivations. First of all, the key sequence that is explicitly 
displayed on screen has a very dominant ludic motivation since the player is forced 
to take note of it and press it in order to progress in the game. While one could argue 
that the displayed keys also play a transtextual role since the combination of text 
and imagery refers to a graphic novel style that the Max Payne games are indeed 
known for, those motivations take a back seat to more dominant ludic motivations 
in this sequence. The reason for this is simple. During this QTE, the displayed 
number of keys are ludically enforced, not optional. In fact, the displayed key 
sequence follows an intentionally counterintuitive pattern which presents additional 
challenges to the player and forces the player to pay even more attention to these 
ludically motivated devices.  
However, there are also other devices at work in this sequence with more important 
other motivations. For example, the game’s virtual camera that pans around Max 
and the enemy to fully frame every moment of impact during the fight is 
predominantly compositionally motivated. The camera movement and framing help 
to emphasize the intensity and emotional significance of the actions in the narrative 
and do not add anything ludically. Furthermore, the screen often blurs and flashes 
during the QTE. These optical effects could potentially have three motivations. First 
of all, the blurring and flashing could have a compositional motivation since those 
seem to represent the effects of Max’s addiction to alcohol and painkillers. 
However, in this case, Max has just given up drinking a few missions before. This 
leaves two other dominant motivations. First, the optical effects have a clear artistic 
motivation, since they add an interesting visual element to the game. And secondly, 
these optical effects have a transtextual motivation because they make a clear 
reference to Tony Scott’s Man on Fire (Foster, et al. & Scott, 2004), which uses the 
exact same effects and tells a similar story as Max Payne 3 (a story of a kidnapping 
in a big Latin American city).   
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While there are more devices at work during this particular sequence, I would argue 
that the dominant guides us to these devices and motivations in particular. By 
having all the predispositions of play, we come to see how the sequence is built up 
out of a range of different devices that alternate between dominant ludic, 
compositional and finally artistic and transtextual motivations. Here I should add 
that the different motivations and different devices do not necessarily work to 
encourage one unambiguous response. In fact, different devices and different 
motivations can work independently of one another and therefor have the potential 
to contradict each other in the type of cues given to the player. This is in line with 
what different authors like Juul (2005), Sicart (2009), and Jørgensen (2012) have 
argued about the relationship between fictional world elements and rule-based 
elements. However, rather than framing it as a kind of ludonarrative dissonance 
(Hocking, 2007), I would say that game devices will often have a plethora of 
different motivations, some of which cue contradicting responses. When we 
consider the dominant motivations of a device or of a range of different devices 
during a particular game moment (e.g. violence), such contradictions should not be 
ignored in an attempt to come to one dominant consensus. Instead, such 
contradictions should be acknowledged to explain the various and sometimes 
paradoxical ways in which game devices cue our responses.   
 The Role of the Player 
Videogame scholars generally ascribe a very important role to the player in their 
account of games. This is no surprise since, as I argued above, play is not only the 
perceptual and cognitive process of hypotheses testing against a given set of cues, 
it is also the physical process of activating and configuring material to form 
different cues. This makes the player also a physical necessity to the game, not just 
a cognitive-perceptual one. We need a player so we can study the game, which leads 
to different epistemological and methodological issues. However, in much of the 
game studies literature the importance of the player has also permeated ontological 
queries into games. In their paper questioning the importance of players in games, 
Björk and Juul (2012) bring together an interesting selection of quotes from around 
the game studies community, many of which argue that there needs to be a player 
for there to be a game. Ermi and Mäyrä (2005, p. 15) for instance state that ‘there 
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is no game without a player’. Calleja (2011, p. 8) argues that ‘a game becomes a 
game when it is played’. And Consalvo (2009, p. 415) states that ‘games are created 
through the act of gameplay, which is contingent on acts by players’.  
Statements like these are common in game studies. They show us how games and 
players are indeed intrinsically connected. However, the rhetoric of these 
statements makes an epistemological and methodological issue into an ontological 
one. Not only do we need a player to know or study the game, we even need a player 
for there to be a game. Consalvo’s (2009) statement that ‘games are created through 
the act of gameplay’ therefore creates unnecessary complications in an argument 
about how our play responses are partly dependent on what background knowledge, 
skills set and intentions we bring to the game. That initial statement does not 
logically follow from the rest of the argument, nor does the rest of the argument 
require that first statement to be true. This statement only adds a highly relativistic 
element to her argument by denying the existence of a material system prior to the 
experience of gameplay. As Myers (2007) rightfully asks: ‘Are games such as 
Monopoly not to be considered games at all unless they are (...) played with proper 
effort?’ (2009, p. 3). I would argue that games do exist prior to play, and they are 
not created by players but by teams of programmers and designers who have certain 
intentions with their creations (even if the neoformalist approach is not interested 
in these intentions and only need the assumption of agency to consider the 
motivations for the presence of a device). In line with Tavinor (2011), I would thus 
argue that digital games do exist in the form of algorithms and representational 
aspects (see chapter 5), or to put it in neoformalist terms, its rule-based, narrative, 
and stylistic devices.  
Of course, Consalvo’s (2009) paper does raise an important epistemological 
question about how we can get to know the game system without our knowledge 
being tainted by our personal play performance. After all, even if the game system 
is not being created by the player, it still needs to be activated by his physical actions 
which risk clouding our understanding of the system with personal choice. The 
question thus becomes: how do we gain intersubjective access to the game multiple 
through our instance of play? Or more accurately, how do we make sure that our 
instance of play is appropriate with regards to the functioning of the game multiple?   
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While I will elaborate on this issue of appropriate play in chapter 5, I will briefly 
outline the argument here. To start us off, Aarseth provides an insightful quote. 
When discussing the broader category of ergodic works26 he states: 
The ergodic work of art is one that in a material sense includes the rules for 
its own use, a work that has certain requirements built in that automatically 
distinguishes between successful and unsuccessful users (1997, p. 179). 
This quote links to Leino’s gameplay condition discussed above. In fact, Leino 
follows this quote from Aarseth and argues that games can indeed enforce a certain 
play response by punishing certain responses with consequences that decrease the 
long-term chances of ‘the player remaining a player of the game’ (Leino, 2010, pp. 
150–151). Ludologists like Aarseth and Leino thus help to see how a game system 
can encourage or even enforce a certain limited set of play responses. Or to put it 
differently, the game multiple encourages a limited set of instances and does not 
function as a neutral facilitator of an endless array of different play performances.  
However, as I also noted in the previous section, ludologists like Leino and Aarseth 
focus only on how the game can encourage configurative behaviour. Aarseth even 
specifically argues that the difference between ergodic works like games and non-
ergodic works like films is that the first category shapes its own use, while the latter 
category does not because it does not allow for the physical manipulation of its 
material (1997, p. 179). This focus is problematic because it implies that games 
have no say in the narrative we construct, the realism we experience, the 
transtextual references we make, or the artistic shape we experience for the game’s 
overall shape. To be charitable to Aarseth and Leino here, it could be that they 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
26 Ergodic is the term Aarseth proposes to substitute interactive. Ergodic works are works that 
require ‘non-trivial’ ‘extranoematic’ effort to be traversed, while nonergodic are traversed with 
trivial effort and no extranoemtic responsibilities. Games are therefore considered ergodic while 
films are nonergodic (Aarseth, 1997, pp. 1–2).   
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simply mean that games can enforce a certain physical play response through rules 
while non-ergodic works like films can only encourage certain perceptual, 
cognitive and emotional responses. However, even if this is the case, they remain 
silent about how games may or may not encourage other types of responses since 
their interest remains fixed on the player’s configurative behaviour. Here then, I 
argue that neoformalism can contribute significantly. As I explained elaborately in 
the previous chapter, neoformalist film scholars assume that a film can most 
certainly shape our perceptual, cognitive and emotional responses in all its 
motivational categories. When translated to games, such an approach would thus 
argue that games are not just capable of shaping the player’s physical behaviour, 
but are capable of shaping our play responses more broadly from narrative 
construction to the experience of the game’s overall artistic shape. In fact, I would 
argue that all those responses are inherently tied up with the configurative decisions 
we make in instantiating a particular set of game devices. This means that games 
do not just enforce or encourage behaviour through rules, but also encourage 
behaviour by providing narrative context, referring to our notions of the real world 
or other artefacts, or even emphasizing artistic shape. At those moments, the game 
may give us what Tavinor (2009a) calls ‘psychological nudges’ to stop and 
appreciate the craftsmanship of a beautifully drawn background (see for instance 
Schott & Burn, 2004), or perform the morally dubious or instead morally right 
behaviour by providing narrative context. In other words, the game multiple 
encourages an even more limited set of play instances as long as we are willing to 
take into account the broader collection of devices and motivations that the game 
provides. I should note again, that certain devices and motivations may encourage 
contradictory behaviour, such as when compositionally motivated devices tell us 
we are a ruthless killer but certain ludically motivated devices punish us with a 
score deduction when we kill innocent bystanders. In such cases, I would argue that 
the game multiple encourages various appropriate contradictory instances of play. 
I will delve into this issue more in chapter 5.  
The neoformalist approach to games can thus be seen to overlap and expand on 
ludology’s idea of a ‘self-shaping system’. Because games are considered to 
enforce, encourage or discourage certain play responses, we can perform an 
instance of play that is more or less appropriate according to the functioning of the 
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game system as long as we are willing to let ourselves be guided by the devices and 
motivations of that game system. This means that a neoformalist would need to 
adopt an analytical playing strategy that follows the game’s cues in all the play 
responses from his goal-directed actions to the construction of a narrative, and from 
the experience of realism to the references to other cultural artefacts or the 
experience of the game’s artistic shape. In chapter 5 I refer to this playing strategy 
as ‘cooperative play’.27 It is finally through this cooperative playing strategy that 
we are left with a more limited set of appropriate play instances that are highly 
encouraged by the game’s formal devices and thereby also allow for intersubjective 
access to those devices.  
3.3.1 The Player as Agent and Spectator 
For a non-player the difference in motor action will likely be the most identifiable 
difference between game play and film viewing. Where the viewer remains 
relatively passive, only scanning the screen with perhaps an occasional bodily 
twitch, the player is engaged in continuous physical effort, pressing buttons and 
moving analog sticks. However, these lower level motor actions are preceded by 
certain planning, understandings and intentions, none of which can be grasped 
through observation alone. To quote Consalvo: ‘we cannot understand gameplay 
by limiting ourselves to only seeing actions and not investigating reasons, contexts, 
justifications, limitations, and the like’ (2009, p. 415). To fully understand the 
difference between playing games and watching films, you need to play yourself.  
Aarseth (2001, 2003, 2007) has emphasized this need to play on several occasions 
and argues that while other approaches like observation and player interviews can 
provide additional insights, only playing ourselves can give us a solid grasp on what 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
27 Cooperative play as I refer to it here in single-player games should not be confused with 
cooperative play in multiplayer games. In this case, the cooperation occurs between the player and 
the game, while in multiplayer games, the cooperation occurs between different players.  
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playing a game is like. For Aarseth and other ludologists like Eskelinen (2001) 
playing is essential because it helps us understand the activity of play as 
configurative practice different from other more interpretative practices like film 
viewing. In these cases, configuration is not just seen as the physical practice of 
changing the structure of the work, but extends to a more general sense of agency 
that includes the dispositions preceding those actions (see also Gregersen & Grodal, 
2009, p. 67). As Aarseth puts it:  
When others play, what takes place on the screen is only partly 
representative of what the player experiences. The other, perhaps more 
important part is the mental interpretation and exploration of the rules 
[emphasis added], which of course is invisible to the non-informed non-
player (2003, p. 3).  
Here ludologists make a strong point. They focus on the player as active agent and 
show us how observing screen action cannot put us in the role of the user the way 
observing a film’s screen action can. A first-hand experience of that action would 
not only make us aware of the intensified physical involvement one has during play, 
but also of the mental processes that come with an increased sense of agency. These 
mental configurative processes consist of constructing the general intentions behind 
our actions in the form of strategies or tactics. This means that a player’s perception 
of screen output can be very different from a viewer’s perception of a film, since a 
player anticipates actual motor control over the situation.  
To understand this better I refer back to Thompson’s (1988, p. 8) distinction 
between film perception and perception in everyday life quoted earlier in section 
2.3.2. According to her, our perception in everyday life is focused down on those 
elements that are relevant for our immediate actions and we filter out those elements 
that are not. Here Thompson’s explanation of everyday perception seems to fit the 
perceptual processes of the player as agent. As an agent in games, our perceptions 
are indeed closely related to our actions. We perceive the game environment so we 
know what to do or where to go. In line with ludology, our perceptual and cognitive 
resources are not employed for narrative comprehension but rather in preparation 
for the appropriate action executions. Here, perceptual processes are put in service 
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of action and not engaged in for the reception of narrative, transtextual references, 
realistic or artistic qualities.  
Neoformalism cannot adequately account for these processes since the whole 
approach is reliant on the idea that film viewing is a perceptual process that is not 
employed for action but rather purposeful in itself. However, exactly because 
neoformalism focuses on film viewing, it also adds an angle into the study of the 
play activity that is overlooked by scholars such as Eskelinen (2001) or Aarseth 
(2004b). By focusing on play as configurative activity (in physical and mental 
form), these scholars pass by the fact that playing games is not only configurative 
action but also our viewing of that action on screen for the construction of a 
narrative, experience of realism and artistic quality, or to find transtextual 
references.  
Here, I link up with other scholars like Newman (2002) or Ryan (2006) who argue 
that game play cannot be considered as just one type of engagement but should 
instead be considered as both a kind of configurative activity and a more film-like 
viewing activity (or what Newman refers to as online and off-line engagement). 
However, other than Newman who considers this a difference between active play 
and a more receptive engagement with cutscenes, films or even box-art, I would 
argue that a film-like spectatorship also occurs during active play and can even 
become the more dominant engagement with the game depending on the cues in the 
system. 
While neoformalism cannot adequately account for the configurative processes 
experienced during play, it does provide an excellent framework to emphasize and 
analyse the activities of the player as spectator. Here Thompson’s (1988) categories 
of perception can be applied quite accurately. On a physiological level we cannot 
help but recognize shapes and colours from a combination of different pixels on our 
screens since the game forces the application of certain schemata of these shapes 
and colours from the bottom-up. On a preconscious level we test certain schemata 
from the top-down and start to infer certain characters as the same person across 
different scenes, we come to follow causal relations in events, we see certain objects 
in the environment, and we understand what certain symbols stand for. As argued 
in the previous chapter, this does not mean that our schemata come to determine 
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our inferences, only that they initiate them. Finally, on a conscious level, our 
schemata are also tested against the game’s cues from the top-down but then require 
conscious revisions. During a game like Bioshock for instance, the surprise plot 
twist means that we have to re-evaluate our assumptions about the game’s narrative 
up until that point and create new hypotheses about what has actually happened and 
what will happen next. Scholars like Eskelinen (2001) or Linderoth (2013), who 
emphasize agency over spectatorship, are unable to satisfactory account for these 
processes since narrative comprehension or artistic interpretation always takes 
second place (or even no place at all) to perception for the sake of action execution. 
While it certainly makes sense to assume that we perceive for action during 
moments with dominant ludically motivated devices, we should not presume this 
to be the default engagement during any moment of play.  
I therefore suggest that a neoformalist approach to games should account for the 
player as both agent and spectator, whereby the dominance of either one of these 
player roles should not be presumed a priori but determined by the game moment 
under investigation. These activities exist as extremes on a continuum of player 
engagements and may be triggered to a greater or lesser extent by the existence of 
different devices and their functions in the game. As I will argue more thoroughly 
in chapter 5, the devices that have a dominant ludic function cue us to adopt a more 
preeminent role as agent. At these moments, other functions will move to the 
background or even work in service of the dominant ludic function (such as when 
the respawning mechanism also references genre conventions), and cue us to 
perceive for actions that are relevant for our success in the game. At other moments, 
the ludic function may be more optional or even non-existent. At these moments, 
more dominant compositionally, realistically, artistically or transtextually 
motivated devices may come to the fore and cue an engagement that is more on the 
spectator-side of the continuum where we engage our perceptual cognitive 
resources for construction of a narrative, drawing on our notions of the real or other 
cultural artefacts, or even to experience the overall artistic shape of the game or 
game moment. During play we then continuously shift between perceiving to 
execute action and perceiving different characters, objects, and events for narrative 
comprehension or realistic experience. This also explains why fast-paced, skill-
based games encourage more resources to be distributed to an appropriate execution 
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of the perception-action loops, while slower turn-based strategy games, or story 
driven role-playing games (RPGs) require more conscious processes to recognize 
objects in their larger representational context or store visual stimuli for later 
actions. As Juul (2005, p. 139) has noted, Quake III Arena (id Software, 1999) 
players are known to turn down their graphical settings to encourage faster 
feedback. In these games, object and character recognition for narrative 
construction is thus of minor importance compared to the affordances the objects 
make available. 
Acknowledging the player as both agent and spectator leads to some interesting 
considerations when it comes to game violence. If we assume that different games 
and different moments in games can encourage our perceptual activity towards our 
action-executions as agents or towards a narrative, realistic, transtextual or artistic 
comprehension or interpretation, then we should acknowledge that different violent 
moments will be experienced differently on the basis of the player’s dominant role 
as viewer or agent (see Van Vught, Schott, & Marczak, 2012). So, a violent act in 
RPGs will likely be experienced with a greater awareness of who the involved 
characters are, and what the place is of the violent act in the overall narrative 
structure of the game. On the other hand, characters and objects involved in 
violence in a fast paced first-person-shooter will be experienced more for the 
immediate actions that they afford. Logically speaking, game moments that require 
a lot of intense motor action will require more of our resources towards them while 
cutscenes encourage more viewing activity. However, as Klevjer (2002) and Salen 
and Zimmerman (2004) argue, certain cutscenes can also be seen as a more integral 
part of the configurative experience since they can present crucial information that 
help players plan their upcoming motor actions. In this sense, every violent 
encounter requires a careful analysis. In chapter 5 I will explore several examples 
more carefully for the type of player activity they encourage and go deeper into the 
implications of the dualistic role of the player for the experience of game violence. 
3.3.2 Play as Intrinsically Purposeful 
As I explained in the previous chapter, Thompson claims that the act of perceiving 
an entertainment film is different from perceiving the day-to-day world around us 
because our perceptual cognitive resources can be employed more freely towards 
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things that are not relevant for our immediate action executions. In extension, the 
thing we perceive, is put into a different, unfamiliar (non-practical) light, which 
would give us a renewed experience of that thing. 
This consideration seems problematic for a study of games since games are 
interactive media that do allow for the execution of motor actions. This would 
suggest that in games, our perceptual cognitive resources are focused down on those 
things that are relevant for our immediate action executions rather than dispersed 
for a non-practical aesthetic perception. While I believe there is certainly some truth 
in this consideration, it risks oversimplifying the game play experience in two ways.  
First of all, I have argued above that we cannot consider game play as only one type 
of engagement. Although games afford motor actions, they also afford the 
construction of narratives, experiences of realism, cultural references, and artistic 
shape. In other words, our perceptual cognitive resources can shift from being more 
focused on action, to being more dispersed for a broader viewing experience. 
Secondly, equating Thompson’s explanation of perception for action to our 
engagement with games, risks equating our cognitive perceptual engagement with 
games with our cognitive perceptual engagement with the real world. I would argue, 
however, that perceiving for game play action is very different from perceiving for 
real world actions because our play actions do not serve the type of practical 
purpose that our actions serve in real life. This does not mean that game play actions 
cannot have real world consequences. It simply means that any real world 
consequences are not likely to be the same as the consequences of the action’s real 
world equivalent, and that any real world consequences are of secondary 
importance to the performance of the play actions themselves. In this sense, I link 
up with the ideas of Apter (1991) and consider the play activity, similar to how 
neoformalist film scholars consider the film viewing activity: as purposeful in itself.   
This point is worhwhile stressing, because it shows how game action and thereby 
also game violence is intrinsically different from real world violence. When we 
shoot someone in a game, no one dies. In fact, no one shoots, at least not in the real 
world. That moment of in-game violence is only purposeful in the game itself. The 
violence may help to achieve the game’s goals or it may tell us something about the 
narrative in the game, but it does not serve a practical purpose outside of the game 
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play itself. Any goals are intrinsic to the game playing itself and when we engage 
in the violent activity we do so for its own sake.28   
In its non-practicality, play still shows similarities with film viewing as it is 
conceptualized by the neoformalist film scholars. However, for the neoformalist 
film scholars, the non-practical nature of the viewing experience is important 
because it puts the perceived thing in an unfamiliar light and further facilitates a 
process of defamiliarization. In principle, this makes neoformalism an approach to 
films as artworks since defamiliarization is a tool for judging the artistic quality of 
a work and focuses the analysis on the more defamiliarizing devices. As I argued 
in the previous chapter, such a focus is problematic if the aim is to come to a more 
inclusive formalism in game studies that can account for a broad range of different 
devices and functions. First of all, presupposing games as art in order to do an 
analysis of a game’s formal devices, risks igniting complex discussions around the 
artfulness of games. While this is an interesting discussion by and of itself, it is not 
conducive to a more general discussion of the formal devices in games or the formal 
devices surrounding game violence. Secondly, the focus on the more 
defamiliarizing devices risks glancing over a lot of game moments and game 
devices that are perceived as familiar to us. However, such familiar devices and 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
28 Here, one may wish to argue that we can also play games for extrinsic purposes, such as winning 
money or even for social recognition. While this is of course true, I would argue that the game’s 
formal devices do not encourage such extrinsic purposes but rather provide intrinsic goals. Any 
extrinsic purposes only come secondary to the primary purpose of play just as watching a film is 
intrinsically purposeful in spite of any other consequences one may wish to connect to the viewing 
experience (one could hypothetically also watch for money or social recognition). I would thus agree 
with Apter (1991, p. 16) here, who argues that someone is only playing when the activity is 
intrinsically purposeful and extrinsic benefits are only secondary to the primary goal of playing. As 
soon as extrinsic goals become more important than the playing of the game, that person is no longer 
playing the game appropriately. In that case the person might be going through the physical motions 
we might (from an observer’s standpoint) associate with play, but his actions are not accompanied 
by the appropriate ‘non-practicality’ that playing a game should have.       
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game moments can still be important for the ludic functioning, the narrative, the 
realism, the transtextual referencing, and the artistic shape of the game. In fact, as 
also Aarseth (2007) notes, most of our play responses consist of automatized, 
repetitive actions and perceptions, and while the more unfamiliar, surprising 
elements are certainly worth analysing (as also Aarseth argues), focusing only on 
those elements would draw a rather unrepresentative picture of the way formal 
devices work in games.  
Here then, I argue that a neoformalist approach to games rids itself of 
defamiliarization as a premise and focus point for analysis. Games do not have to 
be confirmed as art before we can start our analysis, nor does our analytical focus 
need to be on the more unfamiliar game components. Instead, our analysis can 
simply rest on a broad conceptualization of play as goal-directed behaviour, 
narrative construction, experience of realism, making transtextual references, and 
perceiving the overall artistic shape of the game. This allows us to account for a 
much broader range of game devices (also the more familiar ones), but it still gives 
us focus if we assume certain devices to be more important in one of the game’s 
motivational categories (see also the discussion of the dominant above). By 
substituting neoformalism’s reliance on defamiliarization with play, we can look 
for the devices that are cueing our play responses in all its motivational categories 
rather than only the devices cueing our defamiliarizing experience. In this case, the 
player analyst simply needs to fulfil the different predispositions for the game to 
achieve its ludic, narrative, realistic, transtextual and artistic effects. As players, we 
embody the backgrounds, skillsets, and motor-actions implied by the game and we 
demonstrate a general desire to experience all of the game’s different effects. In the 
end however, it is the game that decides. Sometimes, the game may not include 
devices that cue us to make transtextual references, or draw on notions of the real 
world. In such a case, we should not force ourselves to find such functions at all 
costs (such as when Murray tries to construct a narrative from the cues in Tetris) 
but we should take the route of least resistance and simply acknowledge the devices 
for the other functions that they have. In many modern day videogames, we are 
likely to encounter different devices with important functions in all of the 
motivational categories. By drawing on the notion of the dominant (discussed 
-104- 
above), our analytical focus can then be on the more important devices and game 
moments in these motivational categories.   
 The Game in Context 
If we follow neoformalist film scholars and assume that players, like film viewers, 
draw upon background knowledge of the real world and other artworks for 
recognition of game elements and the extent to which elements deviate from prior 
knowledge, a neoformalist game approach argues against games as self-contained 
systems. This differs significantly from ludology since Aarseth argues that games 
are in fact completely self-contained. As he puts it:  
Games are self-contained. You don’t need to have played poker or ludo to 
understand chess, and knowledge of roulette will not help you understand 
Russian roulette. (...) Knowing Star Wars: The Phantom Menace will not 
make you better at playing Pod Racer (Juul 2001). Unlike music, where a 
national anthem played on electric guitar takes on a whole new meaning, the 
value system of a game is strictly internal, determined unambivalently by 
the rules (2004a, p. 48). 
While it sounds plausible that a game has the capacity to train the player to 
understand its cues and perform appropriate responses, such an assumption only 
makes sense if we adopt a rather limited understanding of play as configurative 
practice. As I noted above, Aarseth argues that games can indeed enforce certain 
decisions by distinguishing between successful and unsuccessful ones, but this only 
goes for the basic manipulations that the player performs to keep playing the game. 
Play is of course a much broader experience that includes a much wider range of 
‘successful’ motor-actions, some of which are only discretely encouraged. 
Furthermore, play also includes the construction of a narrative, realistic and 
transtextual references, and a more overall artistic experience. In all of these cases, 
the player still draws on notions of the real world, other games or other cultural 
artefacts and certain aesthetic/game conventions. Without this background 
information we would be unable to recognize elements in the game. So, if watching 
Star Wars Episode 1: The Phantom Menace (McCallum & Lucas, 1999) does not 
make us better players in Star Wars Episode 1: Racer (LucasArts, 1999) it will at 
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least make us recognize the Podracers as a transtextual reference to the Podracers 
in the film.  
Furthermore, as also White (2012) argues, games (especially sequels) often rely on 
the knowledge of certain genre conventions to familiarize the player with the 
appropriate play actions. In these cases we are expected to already have a basic 
knowledge of what to do or what to expect when we are told the game is an RPG 
or a survival horror game. So even on a basic motor-action level, games are still not 
self-contained. Our experiences with other racing games give us some basic 
knowledge and expectations that will increase our chances of successful actions in 
the pod racer.  
When we consider that players, like film viewer, bring background knowledge to 
the game we may wonder whether our use of those backgrounds occurs in a similar 
way as our use of backgrounds in films. In our activities as player-spectator this 
indeed seems to be the case. We bring certain backgrounds to the game and make 
sense of the game in the relationship between our backgrounds and the cues in the 
game. We recognize narrative and stylistic devices such as characters, character 
behaviour, causally related events, or a certain point of view, because we test the 
cues in the game against the background knowledge we have gathered from our 
everyday real world experiences and our engagements with other artworks. 
Furthermore, our perceptions of entertainment games seem to be formed against an 
implicit backdrop of games and other artworks made for practical purposes. After 
all, without recognizing it as an entertainment game we may confuse Bioshock 
Infinite (Irrational Games, 2013) for propaganda against reactionary, xenophobic, 
puritan outflows of the Republican Party in the USA. Or we may simply confuse a 
violent entertainment game for a warfare training simulation. In fact, knowing that 
the game America’s Army 3 is used as training simulation and recruitment tool for 
the US Army leads to an entirely different game experience since we become aware 
of devices whose motivations (e.g. propaganda) are no longer only there to cue the 
play experience. 
Here the neoformalist approach shows similarities with proceduralism. Also Bogost 
(2006) acknowledges a process similar to background testing in what he considers 
a simulation. According to him, a simulation occurs between a user’s knowledge of 
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certain processes and the ‘less complex’ rule-based representation of these 
processes in the game system (Bogost, 2006, p. 107). Bogost sees the play activity 
as creating an instance of the game multiple where the components of the system 
are perceived according to certain preconceived ideas and values of the player. This 
argument resonates with neoformalism’s idea that our backgrounds play an 
important role in the perception of the film. For games, however, this background 
testing is not just a perceptual-cognitive process but, as Bogost notes, it also ‘takes 
place within the gameplay, as the player goes through the cycles of configuring the 
game’ (2006, p. 108). This means that the player does not just respond to the 
system’s cues with the application of certain backgrounds, the player also responds 
to the cues by physically manipulating the game’s material. However, the processes 
through which physical manipulation and background testing occur are still similar 
to the perceptual cognitive processes. The player also tests his configurative 
behaviour against the game’s action affordances and finally applies those 
behaviours that bring him the most successful progress. In this sense, the player is 
continuously trying to solve problems presented by the game’s cues by testing 
different physical and cognitive hypotheses.  
While the similarities with proceduralism are clear, the neoformalist approach 
argued for here, eventually differs from proceduralism in two distinct ways. First 
of all, Bogost is not so much interested in the way that formal elements cue all of 
the perceptual, cognitive, and behavioural processes, but he limits his focus 
specifically to those moments where the background knowledge of the player 
struggles with the system’s rule-based representations. This is what Bogost terms 
simulation fever (Bogost, 2006, p. 132) which is highly similar to the process of 
defamiliarization that neoformalist film scholars focus on. During moments of 
simulation fever the player’s assumptions clash with the built-in assumptions of the 
system, which may lead the player to question the system’s model or/and his own 
preconceptions on the matter. Or to put it in film neoformalist terms, when we 
struggle to understand certain devices, we go through conscious processes of testing 
and revising our expectations because the game challenges our habitual 
understanding of the representation and puts it in a new defamiliarizing light (K. 
Thompson, 1988, pp. 26–28). While a focus on the more difficult to grasp processes 
in the system is certainly interesting since it helps to lay bare the often ideologically 
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coloured assumptions embedded in the system or in the player, such a focus is also 
problematic since it glances over the elements that are more easily grasped. As I 
already noted above (with regards to a similar limited focus on the defamiliarizing 
components), such a focus draws a rather unrepresentative picture of the way formal 
game devices work since much of our play consists of relatively automatized 
perceptions and actions of familiar game devices.  
Secondly, the neoformalist approach differs from proceduralism because Bogost’s 
considers background knowledge and values as highly personal. As Bogost puts it, 
the instance of play cannot escape ‘the grasp of subjectivity and ideology’ (2006, 
p. 99), which becomes problematic when our only access to the game’s formal 
components is through that instance of play. As I argued before, neoformalism does 
not see backgrounds as highly subjective but rather as historically defined. By 
assuming that the player exists in a historical context where certain established 
norms are shared by a large group of players, we can claim intersubjective access 
to the game’s formal devices on the basis of historically shared instances. This does 
not mean that those historically shared instances are the ways that players 
empirically play the game. That is not issue here. It only means that we 
acknowledge that the available background information is historically limited 
which we then draw upon to study the way that the game’s formal devices work in 
cueing the application of certain information from that more limited set. 
Consequently, we can claim more and less appropriate play responses within a 
certain historical time and we can also account for changes in appropriate play 
responses over time. For instance, with our knowledge of modern day videogames 
and cinema it is hard to imagine the controversies around the violent arcade game 
Death Race mentioned in the introduction and also the first Mortal Kombat games 
appear pretty harmless compared to many other modern day games. Similarly, 
rocket-jumping is now a valid and often one of the appropriate playing strategies in 
first-person shooters such as Quake III: Arena or Team Fortress 2 (Valve 
Corporation, 2007) because of the currently available information.  
Because we assume that the historically defined backgrounds are implied in the 
game system, the role of the player is close to what Aarseth (2007), following Iser, 
has termed ‘the implied player’. As he puts it: ‘The implied player (...) can be seen 
-108- 
as a role made for the player by the game, a set of expectations that the player must 
fulfil for the game to ‘exercise its effect’ (Aarseth, 2007, p. 132). If we are to follow 
Iser’s ideas further, the implied player is by no means an ideal player who only 
needs to activate one already embedded set of effects. After all, this would remove 
the player from his historical context and would mean that a game encourages one 
predetermined set of responses in all times. However, the implied player should 
also not be confused with a real player since real players are of interest to those 
studying players. Instead, the implied player is a theoretical construct that is 
necessary for the analyst to study the game but who still finalizes the work by 
making choices and bringing in backgrounds that the work as a framework for 
possible decisions leaves open. This plants the implied player as an external 
reference point in the everyday world with historically dependent knowledge of 
reality and other artworks (games, films, etc.) to draw upon. The implied player 
thus activates the game only in one of many ways. However, this does not mean 
that there are an infinite number of valid activations of the game since the 
activations are implied by the game’s cues and the background information that the 
player draws upon is historically determined which makes the appropriate 
activations limited in numbers. Although this still does not deny the fact that we 
can (and often will) do different things in a game, the game forces or nudges us 
towards a limited number of play performances from which we can make claims 
about how the formal devices of the game work.  
However, this argument only holds when we are actually capable of performing 
according to the game’s plan. What if we simply do not have the skills to do so? 
Lacking skills may require the player to distribute more resources towards 
executing the appropriate actions which (assuming that these perceptual cognitive 
resources are finite) leaves less resources to perceive other narrative, realistic, 
transtextual or artistic functions of the game’s devices. A skilled player on the other 
hand, may already have incorporated the appropriate perception-action loop which 
leaves more room for a narrative comprehension or artistic interpretation. Similarly, 
very unskilled players may also confuse important ludically motivated devices for 
important compositionally or realistically motivated devices or the other way 
around. In a study with parents playing GTA IV (Schott & Van Vught, 2013) we for 
instance found that unskilled players were particularly attuned to the 
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representational world of the game. This means that these players lacked the ability 
to clearly distinguish between devices with ludic motivations and devices that are 
there more for realistic or compositional reasons which lead to players to stop for 
red lights.  
All this thus leads to the question how we can still rely on a limited set of 
appropriate ‘playings’ for the analysis of the game’s devices if those ‘playings’ are 
skills-dependent. It appears that the neoformalist film approach can bring a solution 
to this problem. According to Thompson (1981, pp. 46–47), also film perception is 
a skilled activity which means that also films can be perceived differently by 
viewers with different skill levels. To still be able to make generalizable claims 
about the film on the basis of her own implied viewings, Thompson argues that we 
should assume a certain skill level from the viewer when we analyse a film. This 
skill level is not the level of some hypothetical majority of film viewers, but the 
skill level required by the film to notice cues such as cutting or camera movement, 
that are structuring our perceptions. In other words, we should perceive the film 
with a skill level that allows us to perceive the film appropriately. Also these skills 
are historically available since we can only acquire the viewing skills from the films 
available in our lifetime. And because perception is a skill that can be learned, it 
becomes the analyst’s task to point out elements in the film to the less skilled viewer 
and thereby to encourage a more appropriate perception. 
This argument can also be applied to games. Although the skills for film viewing 
are used for perceptual cognitive processing of narrative and stylistic devices, while 
game play skills are also used for active planning and execution of goal-directed 
behaviour, also games require a certain level of skills to be played successfully. 
Here playing successfully should be considered in its broadest sense for all of our 
ludic, narrative, realistic, transtextual and artistic play responses. It is this level of 
skills that the analyst should assume when studying a game since also this skills 
level, like the background information that the player draws upon, is implied in the 
game. If we keep dying unnecessarily or keep getting lost for no good reason the 
game requires a higher level of skills. Similarly, if we run through the game without 
encountering much challenge, the game implies a lower skills level or in that case 
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perhaps a higher difficulty setting.29 If we do not assume an appropriate skills level, 
we could build our perceptions on play performances that do not do justice to the 
game’s design. For this very reason, games allow the player to fit their skills level 
to different difficulty settings. Bioshock, for instance, advises ‘Easy’ if you are a 
‘novice gamer or new to shooters’, ‘Medium’ if you are an ‘experienced shooter 
player’, and ‘Hard’ if you are a ‘veteran player looking for a challenge’. With these 
settings the game urges you to fit your skills level appropriately so that you will be 
able to play the game successfully. 
Similar to our film viewing skills, our game play skills increase when we get more 
familiar with the medium. This means that our skills level increases the more games 
we play (although it could be argued that some more general skills such as 
leadership skills or strategic planning can also be gathered from a wider range of 
day to day activities). Because genre games like first-person-shooters or racing 
games afford similar action opportunities with similar control schemes, players 
familiar with these genres will likely have gained an appropriate set of skills for 
many games in the genre. This means that, like backgrounds, skills are also 
historically available since we can only learn the skills from a set of games that are 
available in a specific time in history. In other words, current day videogames 
require a whole different skills set than an early arcade game like Pong. 
So, a neoformalist approach to games means studying the game’s formal devices 
by applying the appropriate skills level and backgrounds implicit in those devices 
to come to a set of reasonable user responses. For games, these reasonable responses 
do not only consist of the perceptual, cognitive and emotional responses to the 
narrative and stylistic devices, but also of the planning and execution of goal-
directed behaviour. While all these responses can at least in part be considered 
shared by a group of players since they are implied (and sometimes forced) by the 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
29 In this sense the relationship between skill and difficulty level can be considered to have an 
optimal channel similar to Csikszentmihaly’s flow channel (1990).  
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devices in the game, the empirical generalizability of the responses is not of interest 
here. Instead, the neoformalist analyst only needs the player as an implied 
theoretical construct existent in background knowledge, skills and motor action 
abilities to gain intersubjective access to the game’s formal devices.  
All this of course means that a neoformalist game analyst should also invest effort 
in familiarizing her or himself with the backgrounds and skills sets that players can 
reasonably draw upon in response to the games under analysis. For example, 
controversies around the game Bully (Rockstar Vancouver, 2006) arose among 
parents and teachers because they were under the impression that children playing 
the game were able to violently bully in-game students with baseball bats and 
slingshots. In these cases, the game is perceived with background knowledge of the 
problems with bullying in schools, the ideas of games as primers for antisocial and 
violent behaviour, and knowledge of the violent content of previous games 
produced by Rockstar such as the Grand Theft Auto series and Manhunt (Rockstar 
North, 2003). With a title like Bully30 these backgrounds are easily invoked. 
However, I would argue that these backgrounds are not the appropriate ones 
according to the functioning of the game’s devices. Once we play Bully we find that 
the game actually punishes us for bullying the weak and rewards us for protecting 
the weak from other bullies. In this case, a discrepancy shows between these 
backgrounds and the game’s cues, which means we need to revise our hypotheses 
and draw upon a different set of backgrounds for our understanding of the game. In 
this sense Bully is better understood, as Bradford (2009) argues, in a tradition of 
works that parody traditional school settings such as Tom Brown’s Schooldays 
(Hughes, 1857) or films like Ferris Bueller’s Day Off (Hughes, et al. & Hughes, 
1986) and The Breakfast Club (Tanen & Hughes, 1985). Bringing these 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
30 Rockstar later changed the title to Canis Canem Edit for the European market. Although it is not 
clear why Rockstar changed the title of the game it may well be because the initial title invoked too 
many negative background applications.   
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backgrounds to the game shows us how the violence in the game actually functions 
to revolt against a representation of a stuffy conservative boarding school 
establishment and even how it helps to challenge class divides between the 
privileged rich ‘preppies’ and the less fortunate lower class students. 
 Conclusion 
By exploring the different assumptions of film neoformalism in relationship to 
ludology and proceduralism, this chapter has presented a neoformalist approach to 
games. This approach can be seen as an alternative formalism in game studies that 
focuses on a wide range of game devices, the player as both spectator and agent, 
and acknowledges the importance of our historical context for the background 
knowledge and skills sets we draw upon during play.   
This approach is first of all a system-oriented approach, interested in the way that 
the different system components function in relationship to one another to cue our 
responses. However, the focus is not on the mechanical hierarchical functioning of 
these components in the system’s design, but rather on the interrelationship of these 
components as they manifest themselves to the player. In other word, the focus is 
on the system from a player’s perspective, and from a player’s perspective, rules, 
narrative devices, and stylistic devices are all experienced simultaneously in no 
hierarchical order.  
Here the neoformalist approach to games differs from ludology which considers the 
game system as the underlying rule-based system regulating output rather than a 
system of interrelating rules, narrative, and stylistic devices (Aarseth, 1997). In fact, 
from a player’s perspective, rules are not the underlying structure but manifest 
themselves in the form of affordances for actions as well as action encouragements 
and enforcements. These affordances do not regulate other narrative and stylistic 
devices but work together with these devices to cue and constrain our play 
responses. 
In this case, function is also considered in a much broader sense than ludologists 
do. A game device is not just functioning or functional when it plays a role in our 
configurative behaviour but, following neoformalist film scholars, a device can 
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have a range of different functions from encouraging narrative construction to 
triggering transtextual references. This broader function also subsumes meaning, 
since meaning is seen as one of the game’s formal components that can have various 
functions in triggering our play responses. Here, a neoformalist approach to games 
also differs significantly from proceduralism which is much more concerned with 
‘reading’ meaning in games.  
To structure the analysis of the game’s functioning, neoformalism provides useful 
categories of motivations. These categories turn our attention towards the different 
justifications of devices on the basis of their functioning in the structure of the 
game. A device can be there for compositional, realistic, transtextual or artistic 
reasons. But because games also require goal-directed configurative play 
behaviour, many devices are also there for ludic reasons facilitating and guiding 
this behaviour. If we consider that any game sequence can be built up out of a range 
of different devices with a range of these different motivations, the neoformalist 
approach to games is also based on a broad conceptualization of play. Only if we 
consider play to include a wide range of different responses can we focus on those 
devices and functions cueing those different responses. 
Although the neoformalist approach presented here is broadly orientated, it is still 
focused due to the concept of the dominant. Here, however, the dominant is not 
based on defamiliarization, as it is for the neoformalist film scholars. Instead, the 
dominant is simply based on a broader conceptualization of play and considers 
devices to be more dominant depending on their importance for our goal-directed 
behaviour, narrative construction, experiences of realism, references to other 
cultural artefacts such as films or games, and for our experience of the game’s 
abstract artistic shape. In other words, a device or set of devices becomes 
foregrounded once its functioning is more essential for our play experience in all of 
its registers.  This for instance allows us to focus the analysis on those moments of 
game violence that are more important to the game’s story or our progression 
through the game, or those devices that are determining a dominant functioning of 
a specific moment of game violence.  
Considering the game system from a player’s perspective does of course bring 
methodological challenges. After all, as interactive phenomena, games are 
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multiples that can be instantiated in different ways. So, to study the game’s formal 
qualities on the basis of an instance of play, the neoformalist approach argued for 
here assumes games to be self-regulating systems similar to what Aarseth (1997) 
and Leino (2010) have suggested. However, different from Aarseth and Leino, I 
have argued that games do not just distinguish between successful and unsuccessful 
configurative behaviour, but also encourage other more and less appropriate 
perceptual cognitive responses (i.e. narrative construction, transtextual references, 
etc.). As long as we let ourselves be guided by the game’s devices, the game 
multiple encourages (and sometimes enforces) a more limited set of appropriate 
play instances on the basis of which we can make claims about the functioning of 
the game’s devices. 
Also here, of course, play is considered as a much broader activity than just 
configurative behaviour. In line with other dualistic approaches to game play, a 
neoformalist approach to games assumes that the player goes through several 
processes as both agent and spectator. These processes occur simultaneously but 
are cued to a greater or lesser extent according to the more dominant functions 
during a specific game moment. For example, dominant ludic functions have us 
focus our attention on the preparation for and execution of motor actions to achieve 
the game’s goals while more dominant compositionally motivated devices 
encourage us to adopt the role of spectator and construct the game’s narrative.  
Since games allow for the execution of motor actions, it could be argued that the 
way we perceive game content comes close to the way that neoformalist film 
scholars describe the perceptual processes in our daily lives: focused down on what 
is of immediate practical relevance. While there is certainly some truth to this with 
regards to our activities as agents, the analogy does not hold up completely. The 
reason for this is simple. Our play actions do not serve the same practical purposes 
as our day to day actions serve because our play actions are still intrinsically 
purposeful. Any real world consequences come second to the play situation itself, 
and once they become the primary purpose of play, I align with Apter (1991) and 
would argue that we are no longer playing the game appropriately. For a study of 
games and game violence this is important to acknowledge because it allows for a 
clear distinction between (violent) game actions and actions in real life.  
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Finally, the neoformalist approach proposed here sees the game as existing in a 
historical context. This is of great methodological importance for three reasons. 
First of all, without knowledge of the real world, other representations, and certain 
(game) genre conventions, we would not be able to understand and play the game 
appropriately. Secondly, considering backgrounds as historical constructs limits the 
appropriate play responses because we can only draw on a limited set of information 
available during a specific moment in history. This, then helps us make more 
generalizable claims about the functioning of certain game devices during a specific 
moment in history. Finally, historically determined background knowledge also 
helps to account for changes in perception and appropriate actions over time. As 
noted, the first Mortal Kombat no longer cues the same sense of realism that it did 
when it first appeared, and rocket-jumping can now be considered an appropriate 
action in Quake even though it was not part of the gamer vocabulary when the game 
first came out.  
With the adapted neoformalist approach in place, the upcoming chapters will turn 
the attention to more specific game play and game violence. Here, the neoformalist 
approach provides the guideline for an analysis of a range of R16 and R18 rated 
games which helps us come to a better understanding of how game violence works. 
The next chapter will be dedicated to a study of the game as a system, and considers 
the devices and their more or less dominant motivations during moments of play. 
The chapter thereafter broadens the view and also consider the role of the player in 
greater depth to think about how certain functions encourage our perceptions and 
performances in a certain way. However, these chapters will not only form 
applications of the approach for a better understanding of game violence but also 
function as important testing grounds for the validity of the approach itself. By 
studying a range of different games, these chapters will show the possibilities and 
the restrictions of the neoformalist approach to games outlined here.  
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Chapter 4 
Game Devices and Motivations 
 
 Introduction 
After outlining the basic assumptions of a neoformalist game approach in the 
previous chapters, I now shift my focus to its more direct application to games and 
game violence in particular. For this chapter this means that I apply the neoformalist 
framework in a study of game play to discuss a range of different devices and the 
way that these devices influence our immediate emotional, cognitive, perceptual 
and behavioural responses. Here, neoformalism helps to highlight different 
narrative, stylistic and rule-based devices and their various functions in encouraging 
certain perceptions and performances of game violence. All in all, the discussion of 
such a wide variety of devices and functions enables us to ask questions and raise 
issues around the workings of in-game violence that other approaches to game 
violence have overlooked.  
As I noted in the introductory chapter of this thesis, other approaches focussing on 
the formal characteristics of game violence have consisted mostly of social 
scientific content analyses. Although these approaches are good at quantifying 
various content categories of violence in games, they lack thorough discussions of 
these categories and the functions that these categories may have in encouraging 
our immediate play responses. Even Malliet (2007a, 2007b) who does briefly 
discuss potential relationships between his content categories and player responses, 
does so mainly in terms of media effect theories. This means Malliet is looking to 
answer a different research question, focussing on potential changes in after-effects 
in relationship to different formal devices.   
The aim of this chapter is different. By further engaging with a neoformalist 
framework, this chapter is not focused on studying different game devices as such, 
nor on analysing the way that these devices might mitigate or aggravate potential 
positive or negative after-effects of game violence. Instead, this chapter is driven 
by the main research question of this thesis and focuses on the way that different 
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game devices function to structure our perceptions and performances of game 
content and game violence in particular. This for instance means that this chapter 
discusses points of view for the ways that they encourage or discourage a certain 
perceptual identification with a character committing or falling victim to in-game 
violence. Neoformalism helps us focus on several functions of these devices with 
the help of its categories of motivations. A first-person point of view can for 
instance be considered for its ludic motivations since it allows for swift movement 
but also creates challenges through its limited perceptual field. However, that same 
point of view can be considered for its realistic motivations since it could be argued 
to be more perceptually realistic than a third-person point of view. In a similar way 
devices can also be considered for their compositional, transtextual or artistic 
motivations.  
The devices discussed in this chapter are categorized into narrative, stylistic, and 
rule-based devices. These categories help to focus the analysis and highlight 
devices that may otherwise be overlooked. However, the categories are not isolated 
from one another. Narrative, stylistic and rule-based devices will interact in almost 
every single case, which means that discussing elements of interest will often have 
me transgress the boundaries of these categories. For instance, a consideration of 
characters as narrative devices must also include a discussion of stylistic mise-en-
scène elements like costumes and of course the character’s rule-based action 
abilities.  
Also, the list of devices discussed here is not exhaustive and the different examples 
below can only highlight a limited range of their different forms. The focus here is 
motivated by the research goals of this thesis, which means that the selected devices 
are of interest because they can significantly impact our responses to the game. By 
drawing on a wide range of different games, I aim to show examples of the many 
different forms and functions that these different narrative, stylistic and rule-based 
devices can take and the impact that these forms and functions can have on our play 
responses Given the focus of this thesis, and as indicated in the introduction, most 
of the examples below are taken from games that have received an R-rating 
(restricted to persons 16 or 18 years and over) in New Zealand primarily or partly 
because they contain violent content. However, the neoformalist framework also 
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has the potential to be applied more generally. In my selection of these game 
examples I have therefore tried to account for a wide variety of game genres to 
cover a broad range of different games available. However, the focus remains on 
those genres that are often rated for their violent content such as shooters, action-
adventure games, fighting games, and some role-playing-games.  
Since I have limited myself to games I have played extensively, the examples are 
naturally restricted. Although this means that it is impossible to outline all the form 
variations of the devices at play during moments of in-game violence, let alone 
during game play more generally, the limited selection does allow me to analyse a 
couple of games more thoroughly.  
This chapter consists of three sections according to the three types of devices we 
can find in the game. The first part of this chapter (section 4.2) is dedicated to a 
discussion of narrative devices. After a brief discussion of the ludology-narratology 
debate, I delve deeper into different narrative devices and discuss the way that 
narrative elements like opening cutscenes, character conversations or audio 
messages can establish a context for violence which can function as a justification 
of that violence, a motivator for play, a cue for strategy building, and also a 
reference to other artworks and/or our notion of the real worl. I then continue with 
a subsection on the character as an important narrative device. However, because 
characters are considered as a cluster of characteristics rather than a fictional 
persona, a character can take on a range of different dominant functions at the same 
time.  
In the second part of this chapter (section 4.3) I discuss four stylistic devices that 
can significantly shape our experience of in-game violence. First of all, mise-en-
scène elements like costumes, objects in the environment or lighting can have 
important narrative and realistic functions by creating an atmosphere for the acts 
which can make those acts come across as light-hearted or gloomy. However, mise-
en-scène elements can also have important ludic functions. Weapons for instance, 
play a very important role in the player’s goal-directed behaviour and different 
weapons can lead to different levels of success, but also different types of violence. 
Secondly, sound creates atmospheric context. However, sound also has a range of 
other functions. Sound can help to increase the perceptual realism of the on-screen 
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representation, and sound also has a clear ludic function by drawing our attention 
to important on-screen content or upcoming off-screen danger. Thirdly, point of 
view plays another important role in our perception and performance of in-game 
violence by encouraging or discouraging different types of identification with our 
in-game character. And finally, the game’s pace can spectacularize the game’s 
violent imagery, showing the impact of bullets and blood splatters in great 
(cinematic) detail. Furthermore, certain slow-motion devices can also have clear 
ludic functions by allowing the player to aim better and dodge bullets. 
In the third part of this chapter (section 4.4), I explore rule-based devices. This 
means that I look at the way rules stimulate, force, discourage, and inhibit certain 
in-game behaviour. In the first part of this section I follow and expand on Ryan 
(2006) in discussing the different levels- and points of action a game can afford. 
These levels- and points of action have obvious ludic functions but they can also 
increase our (behavioural) identification with the in-game character and/or increase 
our sense of presence in the game world. Finally, in the last subsection I discuss the 
rule-based devices of rewards and punishments and how our in-game actions can 
be either optional or obligatory, with optional actions also being able to be 
encouraged or discouraged by rewards and punishments. These devices have clear 
ludic functions and help to frame our in-game actions with a ludic justification.  
All in all, this chapter explores various rule-based, narrative and stylistic devices in 
games and the way that these devices function in encouraging certain play 
responses. Because the chapter uses a neoformalist approach, the game system is 
considered as a set of interrelating devices from a player’s perspective which makes 
all the different devices, at least initially, equally important. Furthermore, a broad 
understanding of function helps to consider these different devices for the various 
roles they play during moments of in-game violence, which can at times be rather 
paradoxical. From a neoformalist perspective all these devices are triggering our 
play responses in a certain way which means that in-game violence can be 
experienced significantly different depending on the combination of devices and 
their functions during a specific game moment. The different perceptual, cognitive, 
and emotional focus points that these devices and functions encourage will be 
explored more thoroughly in the next chapter of this thesis.  
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 Narrative Devices 
A neoformalist analysis of games and game violence in particular cannot escape a 
consideration of the game’s narrative devices. Narrative devices cover discussions 
around the characteristics of in-game character such as the perpetrators of violence 
and their targets, justifications of (violent) in-game actions in the form of retaliation 
or protection, or the narrative consequences of those actions. In other words, 
narrative devices consist of characters, objects, and spaces in a game that are 
organized in causally related events.  
However, discussing narrative devices in games does require some justification 
since ludologists like Aarseth (2004a), Juul (2001), Eskelinen (2001), and Frasca 
(2003) famously argue against any sort of narrative analysis of games. Their 
arguments generally combine (and often confuse) ontological descriptive claims 
that games are not narratives and normative prescriptive claims that games should 
not be analysed in narrative terms. The descriptive claim generally goes as follows: 
games are not narratives because the interactive nature of games gives them 
inherently different features from the narratives we know from other types of media 
like film and literature. The prescriptive claim, on the other hand, which often 
surrounds the descriptive claim in more politically motivated introductions and 
conclusions, goes like this: we should not study games in narrative terms since it 
focuses attention on uninteresting (Eskelinen, 2001) or coincidental (Aarseth, 
2004a) features and will make us lose sight of the more essential and interesting 
ones.  
Although ludologists successfully outline some of the differences between games 
and non-interactive media like films or books, their argument against narrative only 
holds when games are reduced to rule systems or when the variable character of 
games somehow disqualifies them as narratives. These two conditions are easily 
refuted. First of all, games are obviously more than just rule systems. From a 
player’s perspective, videogames consist of rules and audiovisual output that often 
show extensive fictional worlds with characters engaged in causally related events. 
The audiovisual output can (in many cases) be considered as narrative (Ryan, 2006, 
pp. 188–189). Secondly, theatre plays, hypertext fictions, or oral story expositions 
also produce variable outputs on different occasions, all of which can be considered 
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for their narrative features. It would thus seem that also variability does not 
disqualify something as a narrative.  
It seems that, as Ryan (2006) also notes, ludologists highlight the fact that game 
narratives take on a different form than the narratives we know from film or 
literature, but this does not mean that games should therefore not be analysed in 
narrative terms. It only means that when we analyse games in narrative terms we 
should be wary of the more intrinsic qualities of the game narrative and not let 
classical notions of narrative terms prescribe our analysis.  
The root of the difference between game narratives and more ‘traditional’ narratives 
can be unpacked further with the help of neoformalism’s distinction between fabula 
and syuzhet (Bordwell, 1985; K. Thompson, 1988). According to neoformalists, the 
syuzhet consists of the form and temporal relationships that the narrative elements 
have in the work, while the fabula is our mental construction of these elements into 
chronological, causally linked events, supplemented with broader contextual 
information like background stories, off-screen space and fillings of spatial and 
temporal gaps in the syuzhet. Neoformalists argue that although many people view 
narratives as transmedia phenomena, it is actually only the fabula that is transmedia 
while the syuzhet takes on different shapes in every new medium (K. Thompson, 
1981, p. 38). This goes for games as well. In games, players activate and manipulate 
the syuzhet components such as characters, objects, space, and events through play 
and then construct the fabula out of these components. This fabula construction 
does not take place after the act of play, as Aarseth (2004a, p. 50) has suggested, 
but is an important part of the act. During play we continuously form hypotheses 
about narrative elements and test them against the cues that make up the syuzhet.  
One way in which game syuzhets may be different from film syuzhets is in their 
workings of time. Basing his argument on Genette (1980), Juul (2001) argues that 
in films and literature there is always a fundamental distance between story time 
and discourse time since the time of the telling is ‘now’ while the events being told 
have already past. Juul argues that in games, this difference is removed since the 
events are produced in real time. These arguments are interesting and certainly hold 
some truth, however they require some nuance. First of all, Juul argues that a 
lacking difference between story time and discourse time makes games inherently 
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different from narratives, but it is not clear why a difference between story time and 
discourse time is an essential feature of all narratives. Admittedly so, flash-forwards 
and flash-backs are common devices in narratives but we could certainly think of 
narrative examples that make no use of them. A film like Timecode (Figgis, et al. 
& Figgis, 2000) for instance shows a split screen with four continuous shots, which 
makes the film completely chronological. Secondly, although Juul certainly makes 
a good point about how the interactive nature of games leads to chronological 
narratives in real time, this does not go for everything in the game. The game can 
still shuffle the temporal ordering of its missions, it can present the player with 
artefacts that tell the player about past events, and cutscenes can present flash-backs 
or flash-forwards. This means that players of Battlefield 3 can for instance play a 
flash-back which often leads to classic time machine problems where some player 
actions (e.g. dying) render the present impossible (also see Juul, 2004).   
There appears to be an intuitive difference here, between the moment-to-moment 
play incidents in which a player can indeed die, and an overall scripted game 
narrative in which he or she (most often) does not. Authors like Salen and 
Zimmerman (2004) and Calleja (2011) have indeed formalized and explored this 
difference in their scholarly work. Calleja for instance, distinguishes between 
scripted narratives and alterbiographies and argues that the scripted narrative is 
written by  the designer while the alterbiography is generated during gameplay 
(2011, pp. 120–132). Although this distinction makes sense at first glance, it is a 
problematic one. Since also the scripted narrative still requires player actions to be 
activated, we may wonder when our actions are generating an alterbiography and 
when our actions are ‘merely’ activating a pre-written narrative. Here, these authors 
are unable to provide a clear answer since the distinction is grounded in the player’s 
narrative experiences rather than in the game’s formal qualities. For Salen and 
Zimmerman (2004) for instance, any game or game sequence can be experienced 
as a more personal emergent or an author scripted narrative as long as our thoughts 
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that accompany our interactions warrant it.31 Although Calleja (2011) criticizes 
Salen and Zimmerman for exactly this issue, he does not succeed to overcome the 
problem since also Calleja notes that players can ‘absorb scripted events in the 
world into their alterbiographies’ (2011, pp. 120–132), suggesting that as long as 
the player perceives the events as part of his personally generated narrative they 
simply change from scripted to alterbiography.  
To distinguish better between actions that are more crucial to the activation (or even 
potential manipulation) of an overall game narrative and actions that make up 
localized incidents that are more futile to the overall narrative, I draw on 
neoformalism’s distinction between free and bound motifs. As Thompson explains, 
the bound motifs consist of actions more crucial to the progression of the narrative 
while the free motifs consist of actions that digress from the main plot line (1988, 
p. 38). In this respect, our actions needed to complete quests in the main quest line 
are bound motifs while actions in side quests or free roaming actions should be 
considered as free motifs. In fact, even dying in the game is often a free motif since 
it has no real crucial role in activating the game’s narrative but only briefly stalls 
the plot development until the player tries again.32  
This distinction between free and bound motifs is very much a formal one and 
thereby also replaces the suggestion that certain narrative game elements are more 
‘designer dependent’ and others are more ‘player dependent’. Such a distinction 
namely runs into trouble as soon as our actions are not only crucial to the activation 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
31 See for instance their discussion of the dramatic tension during poker as an emergent narrative 
(Salen & Zimmerman, 2004, p. 388).    
32 An obvious exception here is ‘permadeaths’ that affect the outcome of the game’s narrative. In 
Heavy Rain for instance, any of the characters may die, thereby altering the overall narrative. 
Another interesting example is Middle Earth: Shadows of Mordor (Monolith Productions, 2014) 
that has an interesting nemesis system in which Uruk enemies rise in rank if they kill you, thereby 
altering the plot.    
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of a narrative but also specifically alter the shape of that narrative. In Bioshock and 
Bioshock 2 for instance, the ending of the narrative depends on the way we interact 
with the ‘Little Sisters’ and in a game like The Elders Scrolls V: Skyrim (Bethesda 
Game Studios, 2011) the choices we make will impact the type of missions we can 
play. In these games our play actions impact the overall form of the narrative. This 
does not mean that the narrative is in any way more or less pre-scripted than a game 
narrative that does not allow for such alterations. It only means that the narrative is 
constructed in the interaction between formal game elements and player effort and 
that the game is designed in such a way as to make some player efforts more crucial 
to the development of the overall narrative than other.  
The differences between free and bound motifs and the difference between fabula 
and syuzhet are of great interest for the study of game violence. First of all, free and 
bound motifs help to establish the more dominant narrative functions of game 
devices. As I noted in the previous chapter, a bound motif denotes the more crucial 
devices for narrative construction which means that, in accordance with a 
neoformalist approach, these are the devices that should form the focus of our 
analysis. Devices with dominant narrative functions frame the game violence in 
certain ways. These devices may focus our attention on the narrative role of the 
perpetrator of the violence or the target. And these devices may focus our attention 
on the narrative context in which the violence is performed which may or may not 
provide a moral justification for the violence. However, in discussing these issues 
we should remain wary of the fact that narrative devices can also have dominant 
other functions and that other stylistic and rule-based devices will finally also figure 
in the player’s experience of the violent act. This means that a character could very 
well have an equally important ludic motivation for the player, or that the narrative 
justification of the violence only plays a minor role in the player’s responses to the 
violence since it is framed with more dominant other functions.  
Secondly, it is through the manipulation of the differences between fabula and 
syuzhet that many of our play responses to the game’s narrative can be triggered. If 
we consider that games can make use of narration in the sense that they can guide 
the player through the reorganization of the syuzhet into a causally logic fabula 
(Bordwell, 1985, p. 53), then games can also reveal or conceal narrative information 
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to the player to cue certain responses. For instance, surprise can be triggered by 
withholding essential information about characters or passed events, such as when 
the apparently friendly character ‘Atlas’ turns out to be the main antagonist in 
Bioshock. Curiosity can be triggered by having the game start with a crucial event 
‘in medias res’ leaving the player to find out how this event came to pass, such as 
in all of the Max Payne games. And suspense can be triggered by disclosing all of 
the important narrative events in the syuzhet that could have us anticipate 
significant outcomes for the characters such as when we for instance feel suspense 
for the faith of Lara Croft in Tomb Raider (Crystal Dynamics, 2013) or Ellie and 
Joel in The Last of Us (Naughty Dog, 2013) (see Brewer, 1996). Furthermore, our 
feelings of curiosity and suspense can be prolonged by delaying the resolution with 
free motifs, such as when we have to fight our way through endless hordes of 
enemies to finally find out who killed Max’s wife in Max Payne (Remedy 
Entertainment, 2001) or to come to the dreaded ‘bossfight’ in Dead Island 
(Techland, 2011).  
In this section I thus consider narrative devices as the characters, objects, spaces 
and events in a game that contribute in some way, bound or free, to the construction 
of the game’s fabula. With a specific focus on the various functions of these devices, 
the upcoming sections will specifically explore the roles of narrative context and 
characters in the ways in which game violence is formed.  
4.2.1 Cutscenes for Context 
Many videogames present us with narrative devices that contextualize actions. 
Given this function, these devices have a clear compositional motivation for being 
there. Context is usually established in the opening cutscenes, but other narrative 
devices such as character conversations, audio messages, in-game text, or even the 
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game manual or game box can also explain us the narrative context.33 In the case of 
game violence, devices generally frame the events and actions within a simple good 
versus evil dichotomy. They show us how we are about to assume the role of a 
prototypical hero that has to fight the forces of evil and protect the galaxy, the 
world, the country, or some individuals from the intentions of evil forces. In the 
Mass Effect series, for instance, the player has to fight the Reapers, a violent race 
that plans to wipe out all organic life in the galaxy. In The Elders Scrolls V: Skyrim 
the player is set out on a quest to fight the legendary dragon Alduin that is 
prophesized to destroy the world. In a game like Prince of Persia (Brøderbund, 
1989), the hero sets out to rescue a ‘damsel in distress’. And of course in most first-
person shooter games, the player tries to rescue the country or some countries from 
an evil occupant or a group of terrorists. In these games, the narrative devices justify 
the violent action as something that needs to be done (a necessary evil) in order to 
overcome an even greater evil.   
Of course, not all games present equally admirable justifications for the violent 
actions. Sometimes it seems that violent actions are performed for nothing more 
than sport or for the personal benefits of an in-game character. Carmageddon 
(Stainless Games, 1997) for instance, lacks any explanation of why the player is 
rewarded for driving over pedestrians.34 Furthermore, in Grand Theft Auto IV, the 
character’s main motivations for his violent actions are personal gain and revenge. 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
33 In Fact, the narrative context is of course also established with the help of contextual information 
outside of the game. For example, many games are a part of a game or film franchise which means 
that the narrative context in such a game is partly established through the application of our 
knowledge of this franchise. In such a case, the game’s formal devices cue us to draw on our 
knowledge of these other artefacts through transtextual motivations.    
34 To be fair, the game is inspired by the cult film classic Death Race 2000, which could mean that 
the narrative context is partly established through the application of our knowledge of the film’s 
plot. However, other than the title and collisions between highly stylized images of people and a car, 
the game has completely done away with any reference to the film’s plot and only focuses on the 
race action. 
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In Manhunt the character is portrayed as a death row inmate killing his way to 
freedom. And in fighting games like Mortal Kombat the only justification for 
violence seems to be the ‘sport’ of fighting (and killing) each other for victory. 
However, once we dig deeper we find that many of these games still present the 
player with some narrative devices that shine a more virtuous light on the 
character’s misbehaviour. In GTA IV the player-character Niko Bellic explains in 
several cutscenes that the Yugoslav wars in which he experienced a lot of atrocities, 
led to his cynical perspective on life. In Manhunt the narrative devices of cutscenes 
and audio-messages inform us that the main character is forced to perform these 
violent actions by a sinister snuff film director to save himself and at a later stage 
also save the members of his family. And even in Mortal Kombat various text 
sequences inform us about the various motivations characters have for fighting in 
the tournament. This ranges from rather virtuous reasons such as saving your 
captured Special Forces unit from the antagonist Shang Tsung to less virtuous 
reasons like a hostile take-over of the corrupted tournament. Carmageddon remains 
the exception to the rule and really lacks any narrative devices framing the violence 
as more virtuous. However, Carmageddon TDR 2000 (Torus Games, 2000), a later 
instalment in the series, did add an opening cutscene that frames the player actions 
as the more justifiable job of freeing the world of a zombie plague.   
The moral justifications presented by these narrative devices have the potential to 
severely influence our emotional responses to the in-game violence. In film studies, 
Smith (1995) has argued that representing a character’s actions as morally 
desirable, or at least preferable over other actions or other outcomes, can stimulate 
allegiance with that character. In such a case, we are not just spatially aligned with 
the character in the sense that the information we gain of the represented events 
roughly aligns with the information that the character gains, but we also can start to 
form more sympathetic allegiances with that character which can lead to a 
sympathetic view of violent behaviour (M. Smith, 1995, pp. 74–86). In games, this 
process is similar. While studying factors contributing to enjoyment of game 
violence, Hartmann and Vorderer (2010) for instance found that an opening 
cutscene framing the player’s actions as justified significantly reduced feelings of 
guilt and general negative emotions towards the performed acts. And also Klimmt 
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et al. (2006) found that players rely heavily on narrative justifications to manage 
their moral concerns to videogame violence.35   
One may wonder though, whether a brief explanation of a hostile invasion or a 
kidnapping morally justifies the amount of terrorists, zombies or Nazis we kill in 
games. After all, if we assume that most of us would find murder only acceptable 
in very rare cases of self-defence or perhaps not at all, then it would seem that no 
game provides sufficient moral justification for the violent actions it affords. 
However, such an argument mixes up our sense of what is morally right and wrong 
in real life and our sense of what is morally right and wrong in the narrative of the 
game. Just as we are more accepting of morally dubious actions from our heroes in 
films (Carroll, 1999; Zillmann, 1996), so are we inclined to accept a lot of in-game 
violence as morally justified that we would condemn as morally objectionable in 
our daily lives. This is of course because the violent actions and the victims in 
games are fictional. In this sense, as Carroll has put it, what is morally justified in 
the work should be seen more ‘in terms of the values inherent to the fiction’ (1990, 
p. 138) rather than the values governing our daily lives.   
Of course, Carroll talks about fiction films here and it is interesting to consider 
whether the value system in games functions in a similar way given their interactive 
nature. For instance, Sicart (2009) has noted that the interactive nature of games, 
leads to players drawing more on their own value systems since players are actively 
performing the potentially morally dubious actions. Also Gee (2003) argues that 
the value system in games that governs our moral appraisal of our character’s in-
game actions is partly made up out of the values we project onto our character and 
not just the values that the fiction portrays. This would mean that we are more 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
35 Klimmt et al. also found that narrative justifications are more important ‘if the issue of 
achievement is not the only salient component of game enjoyment’ (2006, p. 319). This makes sense 
since then other ludically motivated devices start to play an important role in our experience of the 
game violence.  
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inclined to compare the moral justification given by the game with what we 
ourselves would consider a sufficient moral justification for the fictional actions of 
our character which can lead to interesting ethical play experiences (Sicart, 2009). 
Although this still does not mean that we evaluate our character’s in-game actions 
according to the values we would hold for real world equivalents of these actions, 
it does mean that we more critically reflect on the game’s moral justification since 
it has to be sufficient for us to feel right about what we are making our character do 
fictionally.  
As I noted above, because the narrative devices are mostly there to provide story 
context to the play actions, their motivation should be considered as predominantly 
compositional. The opening cutscenes, in-game texts, audio messages, game 
manuals, and character conversations set the scene for the rest of the narrative to 
unfold. However, because these devices also outline the quest for the player, they 
also function as a motivator for play actions. This does not give these narrative 
devices a ludic motivation per se since the opening cutscenes will usually not help 
the player plan his actions in any detail. However, these narrative devices do present 
the player with a clear goal to strive for, thereby encouraging the player to perform 
the necessary violent actions towards achieving that goal.  
As Tavinor (2009a, p. 124) notes, videogame narratives are often narratives of 
discovery or disclosure. This means, as I noted above, that game narratives are often 
structured to trigger curiosity in the player by revealing narrative information about 
a murder or the discovery of some sort of mysterious place at the beginning of the 
game. In Bioshock for instance, the player discovers an underwater city at the start 
of the game, which leaves him curious to find out what kind of a place this city is 
and what happened there. Similarly, in a zombie game like Dead Island, the player 
wakes up on a zombie-infested island, only to gather more information about the 
zombie plague during further play. In these cases, our violent actions become partly 
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motivated by our curiosity to uncover the mystery presented to us at the beginning 
of the game. 36 
In other cases, narrative context does indeed have a clear ludic motivation since it 
encourages very specific play responses in the form of strategy building. This is 
what Salen and Zimmerman refer to when they discuss cutscenes used as planning 
tools (2004, pp. 408–410). The cutscenes in the Hitman series for instance, provide 
the player with crucial information necessary (or at least highly valuable) for the 
proper execution of the target. Furthermore, most games will have cutscenes 
establishing a particular villain as highly dangerous, thereby encouraging a careful 
playing strategy, as opposed to a more reckless one, when we finally encounter that 
character during game play. Also here goes, the more crucial the contextual 
information is to the proper execution of our goal-directed actions during play, the 
more dominant the ludic motivation becomes.  
The game’s narrative contextual information can of course also have other 
motivations. Many World War II games contextualize the actions as part of historic 
battles, thereby referencing our knowledge of real world history. Furthermore, the 
opening cutscene of Call of Duty: Ghosts (Infinity Ward, 2013) in which the legend 
of an elite military unit (Ghosts) is presented in beautiful black and white, also has 
a clear artistic motivation. Finally, games that are part of a larger media franchise 
such as the Batman games, draw heavily on knowledge of the films and other games 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
36 Related to this last point it could also be interesting to consider the impact of the narrative context 
on our moral appraisal of games and of our playing of them in general. We may for instance wonder 
whether the promise of fictionally saving a damsel in distress or freeing the world from an alien 
invasion puts games in a rather virtuous light for those aware of these narrative contexts. On the 
other hand we may also wonder whether the moral condemnation of games and those playing them 
could be partly explained by a lack of knowledge of these contexts or the feeling that they 
insufficiently counterbalance the amount of morally disapproved actions in games. Although these 
topics go beyond the range of this thesis, a further analysis of these narrative contexts would 
certainly be able to inform and advance debates around these issues. 
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when presenting their narrative context, thereby showing clear transtextual 
motivations.  
The point I aim to make here is of course that devices making up the narrative 
context of the game can still have a range of different functions thereby encouraging 
different play responses. Even though these devices will most often have dominant 
compositional reasons for being there, other motivations will likely also play a role 
in triggering our responses. A further exploration of a variety of different functions 
will follow in the upcoming sections.    
4.2.2 Characters 
For neoformalism the character is an important device in structuring the narrative 
(K. Thompson, 1981, p. 38). This means that different motifs and events 
conglomerate around characters in a story with the protagonist forming the centre 
of the key events. In this sense characters have important compositional 
motivations.  
Neoformalists consider characters not as some kind of ‘fictional person’ but rather 
as sets of characteristics, as clusters of traits that concentrate in and around some 
sort of physical representation (K. Thompson, 1988, pp. 40–41). These 
characteristics consist of things like looks, name, voice, physical abilities, 
costumes, moral qualities, dreams, or the actions that the character performs, but 
also extent to other levels of a film such as the use of musical themes. While I agree 
with Smith (1995) that these different characteristics still contribute to the 
construction of a character since they are perceived against a background concept 
of ‘a person’ (what Smith calls the ‘person schema’), I do wish to emphasize the 
usefulness of Thompson’s breakdown of a character into characteristics. By 
acknowledging that the character concept is made up of a variety of different 
characteristics, we can namely easily pinpoint the wide range of functions that the 
character may have. For an analysis of videogames, this approach thereby helps to 
unpack the various roles of game characters as tools for ludic success and focus 
points for narrative construction.  
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Focusing on the ludic function of characters, Newman (2002) for instance argues 
that game characters are very different from characters in non-interactive media 
since game characters are mediators for agency. In other words, game characters 
allow players to act in the game world through virtual extensions of themselves. 
Newman (2002) terms these game characters ‘vehicles’, similar to cars in racing 
games. In this case, Newman focuses on playable characters and considers them for 
the action abilities that allow the player to jump over obstacles, deal with enemies, 
and generally progress through the game. However, player-characters are not only 
vehicles for actions. Player-characters are also focal points in the game world 
around which narrative events conglomerate. In this case, characters are not just 
considered for the action abilities that they provide but also for their appearances, 
their relationships to others, their history, their motivations, and their values.  
These different character roles can be specified if we consider game characters, in 
line with Thompson (1988), as a variety of characteristics. Here the focus is neither 
on the character as a tool for ludic action, nor on the character as a person. Instead, 
dividing up the character in a range of different characteristics allows us to see how 
certain traits contribute to the construction of the narrative events while other ones 
are more essential ludically. For example, the fact that Max Payne is presented as 
an anti-hero, scarred by the death of his wife and child has no real ludic function 
but does set the scene for a dark and depressing tale of revenge and self-
preservation. On the other hand, Max’s ability to enter bullet-time mode has no 
function in the narrative whatsoever but has a ludic motivation since it helps us aim 
and shoot better. Similarly, the fact that Lara Croft is a strong female archaeologist 
sets a narrative in motion but does not add much to our strategic progression through 
the game. However, her ability to jump relatively long distances plays an essential 
ludic role since it helps the player overcome obstacles. Aside from the more 
prominent ludic and compositional motivations, characteristics can also be 
motivated otherwise. As argued, Niko Bellic’s Eastern European accent makes 
sense realistically, and the visual characteristics of the main character in MadWorld 
can be considered artistically motivated.  
All these characteristics with their various functions play their part in triggering our 
performances and perceptions of game violence. A character’s ludic abilities 
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regulate much of the actions that we can actually perform in the game. For instance, 
we can only strangle someone with a fibre wire or inject someone with poison in 
Hitman: Blood Money (IO Interactive, 2006) because agent 47 consists of certain 
characteristics that have the essential ludic function of sneaking up on someone 
without being seen. Furthermore, the behaviour that other (enemy) characters 
display, provides the opposition that is needed to sustain challenge during 
gameplay. Because basic game structures consist of battling opponents or 
overcoming obstacles, violence is something that the game relies on for substance. 
As Tavinor puts it, ‘characters are obstacles, and how those obstacles are tackled is 
typically by fictionally killing them’ (2009a, p. 165). In this sense, the ludic 
function of the enemies as obstacles also contextualizes the violence performed on 
them as necessary play behaviour to be able to continue playing. 
Compositionally, realistically, or transtextually motivated characteristics can 
contextualize the actions as more or less justified similar to the cutscenes and other 
devices making up the narrative context discussed above. For instance, a cowboy 
action hero like John Marston in Red Dead Redemption (Rockstar San Diego, 2010) 
is not condemned but praised for his violent actions because he shows 
characteristics - certain compositionally motivated behaviour, certain friendly and 
heroic looks transtextually referencing western heroes - that help trigger more 
favourable dispositions towards him. On the other hand, the evil appearance of 
game antagonists does the opposite. In their study into how players negotiate moral 
concerns towards in-game violence, Klimmt et al. (2006) for instance found that 
players articulated more moral concerns about the violence when the enemies 
consisted of characters portrayed as friendly or innocent (e.g. children). Expanding 
on these findings, Hartmann, Toz and Brandon (2010) found that players felt 
guiltier when they performed violence on game characters whose private social 
background was known and less guilty when the character’s background was not 
known. In other words, when enemies are portrayed as clear-cut villains, players 
feel less guilty about fictionally killing them than when the enemies have more 
ambiguous characteristics or are portrayed as friendly and innocent.  
Compositionally, realistically, or transtextually motivated characteristics can also 
play a role in encouraging certain in-game behaviour. As Gee (2003, pp. 54–58) 
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argues, aside from possibly projecting our own values onto a player-character and 
acting accordingly, our actions are also shaped by what we expect our player-
character to do in a certain situation. So when our player character Altaïr in 
Assassins Creed (Ubisoft, 2007) is shown to have calm and friendly characteristics, 
our behaviour is encouraged to be different than when we assume the role of hyper 
masculine action hero Duke Nukem in Duke Nukem Forever (3d Realms, 2011). 
Even when the two characters would share similar action capabilities. Furthermore, 
the audio and visual characteristics of enemy characters helps us to identify them 
as such and thereby helps us to plan our subsequent attacks. Zombies are easily 
identified as enemies because our knowledge of other zombie games and films tell 
us that they will try to eat us. The same can be said for evil looking monsters, aliens, 
enemy soldiers, or terrorists. In Manhunt, for instance, the enemies consist of neo-
Nazis and mercenaries wearing ice hockey masks and clothing showing swastika-
like symbols. One of the reasons that we engage these characters as enemies is that 
we recognize these symbols as signs of evil. Similarly, boss enemies in games 
ranging from the Super Mario Bros. series to the God of War series, are often 
accompanied with fast paced and chaotic ‘boss music’ which emphasises their evil 
characteristics and establishes them as serious threats (also see 4.3.3).  
These examples also show how the game’s devices indeed encourage a limited set 
of appropriate play responses as long as we are willing to let ourselves be guided 
by them. In many cases we already do so since we are all likely to respond with 
appropriate hostile behaviour to an evil looking monster. In other cases, the cues 
may be less obvious or more ambiguous. In RPGs for instance, we can have the 
opportunity to experiment with different appearances, and action capabilities. In 
Skyrim the player can choose between several human races, elf races, and beast 
races. The choice of race impacts our initial action capabilities and the way that 
non-player characters engage us. Our actions in Skyrim can thus range from the 
quest of a dragon slaying wood-elf known for his cannibalistic rituals, to the quest 
of a dragon slaying ‘Breton’ human known for his magic and cooking skills. 
However, even in such cases, where the set of limited actions is indeed larger than 
in other games, the game is still not a blank canvas facilitating any kind of play and 
any kind of story. For example, whatever character the player chooses, all will be 
equipped with certain attacking characteristics and all characters will eventually be 
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revealed as ‘dragonborn’ capable of performing dragon shouts. While these 
characteristics may differ slightly per chosen race, they still have similar essential 
ludic and narrative functions that encourage a certain set of limited play behaviour: 
fight, become the dragon slayer, save the people.  
 Stylistic Devices 
While stylistic devices have been established as valid analytical focus points in film 
studies, the term remains somewhat alien to game studies. Nevertheless, I believe 
stylistic devices can certainly be found in games. So what are stylistic devices? 
Thompson (1988, p. 43) argues that stylistic devices consist of the techniques of a 
medium for presenting the narrative. This does not mean that stylistic devices exist 
independently of narrative devices but rather that they interact with them to cue our 
perceptual responses. Over the years, film scholars have established a fairly 
exhaustive set of four categories for stylistic devices in cinema. These are mise-en-
scène (setting, lighting, costumes, and acting), cinematography (optical effects, 
framing, and duration), editing (shot-to-shot relations), and sound (music and on-
screen and off-screen sounds) (Bordwell & Thompson, 2004, pp. 175–388). It 
would seem that these categories also exist in some form or another in games. 
However, with games being quite distinct media, these techniques take slightly 
different forms and work differently from their cinematic predecessors. As Nitsche 
for instance shows, the virtual game camera is not actually a camera but a 2D 
projection plane, which also means that the ‘camera’ is not bound by any physical 
restraints and any stylistic effects of lenses, filters, shutters, movement etc. have to 
be specifically programmed (see for example Nitsche’s discussion of lens flares) 
(Nitsche, 2009, pp. 92–93). However, the ‘in-game camera’ can still draw our 
attention to certain elements in the game environment that may be essential for our 
ludic progression through the game or our narrative construction. Similarly, 
because camera views are often designed to optimize the player’s access to the 
game world (a dominant ludic function), games make use of relatively little editing 
techniques and instead present the game world from one continuous perspective. 
However, there are still moments where the player has direct or indirect access to 
different camera angles which can have the ludic function to execute actions more 
efficiently (e.g. the sniper view), or trigger suspense by limiting our view of a 
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dangerous situation (e.g. the predefined viewing frames in Resident Evil (Capcom, 
1996)) (Nitsche, 2009, pp. 122–124).  
In spite of some obvious differences, the categories of stylistic devices in cinema 
can be used as reference points to draw our attention to stylistic devices in games. 
In their film studies approach to games, King and Krzywinska (2002a, 2006a) do 
just that. They identify point of view (which can include switching between 
different points of view to achieve a more montage-like style) as an important 
cinematographic device that structures our perception of the on-screen game world. 
They argue that mise-en-scène analysis can highlight the atmosphere in which the 
play actions take place. And they argue that sound can trigger specific emotional 
effects.37 In this section I adopt these three stylistic devices to see how their 
different forms and functions can affect our play experiences. However, I also add 
to these devices a discussion of pace as an important stylistic device capable of 
emphasizing or deemphasizing certain game actions.  
As I noted above, the selection of these devices is not exhaustive but motivated by 
their ability to significantly impact our experience of game content and violence in 
particular. Just like narrative devices, also stylistic devices in games can have a 
significant impact on the way that our perceptual, emotional and cognitive 
responses to in-game violence are cued. The graphical resolution can make the 
violence look more or less realistic, the point of view can help to direct our attention 
to or from the violent act, the use of slow motion can emphasize consequences of 
violent actions, and the use of certain sounds or music, cues expectations and frames 
the violence in a certain atmosphere. In his essay on violence in cinema, Prince 
states that ‘violence on the screen has two components, the depicted behaviour and 
the stylistic means through which it is presented’ (2009, p. 282). And he argues that 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
37 King and Krzywinska (2006a) also discuss narrative, genre, iconography and spectacle as film-
derived characteristics deserving scholarly attention in game studies. However, these elements do 
not fall under the heading of stylistic devices.   
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while ‘the behaviours themselves has not changed awfully much (...) the stylistic 
designs (...) have changed considerably in ways that make violent behaviour on the 
screen today more insistent and emphatic’ (2009, p. 282).  
It would seem that Prince’s observations about the history of film violence also 
translate to games. The difference between the first Mortal Kombat and the most 
recent one is not so much the types of actions that the player can perform, since 
playing with Subzero still allows you to throws ice balls and playing with Scorpion 
still allows you to throw his spear. Instead, the difference lies in the stylistic devices 
used to present this violence in higher graphical resolution and with added x-ray 
vision to show bones crushing and organs exploding. Whether players also 
experience this violence as more ‘insistent and emphatic’ is not solely dependent 
on the stylistic devices. It also depends on narrative and rule-based devices, the 
actions we perform in-game, and the backgrounds we bring to the game. However, 
Prince’s observation that film violence is largely shaped by stylistic devices remains 
true for games as well.  
4.3.1 Mise-en-scène 
Mise-en-scène elements consists of the environment in which the action takes place, 
the objects in the environment, the clothes that different characters wear, the way 
that the environment is lit, and the gestures and expressions of characters. However, 
other than films, the mise-en-scène elements in games are not actually things in 
front of a camera, but animated images rendered in real time and mapped on a 2D 
projection plane. Nevertheless, all these elements still create a stage for the action 
and are designed in such a way to create a certain atmosphere, shape our narrative 
comprehension, show action affordances, refer to our notions of the real world or 
other artworks, or even just draw our attention to their unusual but artistically 
interesting form.  
In a game like Condemned 2: Bloodshot (Monolith Productions, 2008), for instance, 
Metro city’s decaying neighbourhoods with burning steel barrels placed all over the 
city streets, neglected apartment buildings, and continuous use of low-key lighting, 
have important compositional motivations since they set the tone for a dark and 
eerie tale of a depressed protagonist fighting violent homeless people. On the other 
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hand, the beautiful brightly lit cloud-city of Columbia in Bioshock Infinite gives a 
surreal feel to the game with both the familiarity and joy of American state fairs 
and the futuristic jolting and cracking machinery we know from the steam punk 
genre. These elements provide atmosphere for actions. While the mise-en-scène 
devices in Condemned 2: Bloodshot continuously shape the violent actions as 
something heavy hearted, the devices in Bioshock Infinite make the violence more 
light-hearted but potentially also more regretful considering the more peaceful 
society this utopian setting deserves.  
Mise-en-scène elements can also function more ludically. As King and Krzywinska 
(2006a) explain, blood splatters on a wall in horror games generally indicate trouble 
ahead and, as I noted above, clothing and accessories can make a character into a 
threat. So, once we move from a brightly lit parking lot into a dark abandoned 
apartment building in F.E.A.R. (Monolith Productions, 2005), we know something 
bad is about to happen. And when we get sight of a massive zombie in a 
straightjacket in Dead Island we anticipate a tough fight. In these cases, mise-en-
scène elements help the player anticipate oncoming danger and thus prepare 
appropriately.   
Also weapons have a clear ludic motivation. Weapons allow us to overcome the 
challenges that the game puts in our way in the form of enemies. Firing weapons in 
a first-person shooter like Battlefield 3 lead to different strategies than the 
availability of melee weapons (weapons used for hand-to-hand combat) such as 
knifes or a screwdriver in a game like Hitman: Blood Money. Furthermore, weapons 
can also form motivations for our actions. In many games, especially RPGs, better 
weapons can be found during the course of the game and weapons can be upgraded 
to increase their effectiveness. In a game like The Elders Scrolls: Oblivion 
(Bethesda Game Studios, 2006), for instance, the weapons become stronger as the 
player levels up his character skills. So if the player wants to get a very good sword, 
his best way to acquire it is by increasing his sword fighting skills through combat. 
In other words, the promise of better weaponry can motivate the player to perform 
more violent actions in-game. 
However, weapons can also add to the narrative of the game. The hidden blade of 
the character Altair in Assassin’s Creed or the fibre wire of agent 47 in Hitman: 
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Blood Money, establishes these characters as trained silent assassins and help tell 
their story. Also, the heavy guns that Marcus Fenix carries in Gears of War (Epic 
Games, 2006) establish him as the prototypical tough guy, while the flimsy handgun 
and rifle in Silent Hill (Konami, 1999) help establish the player-character Harry 
Mason as an ordinary man. In these instances, the mise-en-scène elements also form 
a characteristic of the character as discussed above.   
As Bordwell and Thompson note, mise-en-scène elements in film are often judged 
in terms of realism (2004, p. 170). However, in such cases, realism becomes a 
problematic, culturally, historically and often personally varying threshold that all 
these elements are judged against which makes us lose sight of all the various 
functions that these elements can have. Nevertheless, mise-en-scène elements can 
still be there for important realistic reasons if they are specifically functioning to 
have us appeal to notions of the real world. Following Prince’s (1996) distinction 
between two kinds of realism, I would argue that they can do so in two important 
ways.  
First of all, a mise-en-scène elements can appeal to our notions of the real world 
because the elements actually reference things we perceive to be real. Prince terms 
this referential realism and he indeed argues that ‘referentially realistic images 
bear indexical and iconic homologies with their referents’ (1996, p. 32). In this 
explanation, a representation of a dog can have a realistic motivation but a 
representation of a dragon cannot. Secondly, a mise-en-scène element can 
appeal to our notions of the real world when its audiovisual quality is detailed 
enough to correspond to the norms we hold for the audiovisual representation of 
three dimensional spaces, characters and objects. Prince terms this perceptual 
realism and in this explanation a dragon can most certainly still have a realistic 
motivation as long as its audiovisual qualities are deemed as such.  
I should add here that I consider both referential realism and perceptual realism in 
a mimetic and conventional sense. As I noted in the previous chapters, a device has 
a realistic function when it leads us to draw on aesthetic conventions of realism 
(because it adheres to them or breaks with them), and on our knowledge of what 
our physical reality is like or what we could imagine with a certain probability that 
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our reality is like (see Shapiro & Chock, 2003). In this sense, the dragon can have 
a realistic motivation because its audiovisual qualities more or less correspond to 
wat entities look like in our physical world, but also because these qualities form a 
breakthrough in the graphical qualities of games. Similarly, one of the character’s 
dogs in GTA V (called chop) can be considered for his realistic motivation because 
the fact that you can play fetch with him corresponds to our knowledge of real dogs 
playing fetch, but also because the dog’s behaviour is a lot more realistic than the 
behaviour of the dogs in Bully whose only behaviour constitutes of attacking our 
character when he gets too close.      
Discussions on realism and game violence are often focussed on perceptual realism 
of mise-en-scène elements like blood and weapons. Perceptually speaking, 
videogames have indeed become far more realistic over the years and this increased 
realism has led some scholars (Bensley & Van Eenwyk, 2001, p. 256; Sherry, 2001, 
p. 424) to speculate that graphically more realistic game violence may be more 
prone to cueing aggressive after-effects. Furthermore, Ivory and Kalyanaraman 
(2007) found that the technological advancement in games, defined by increased 
graphical detail and sound quality, increases our sense of presence, our general 
involvement and our level of arousal during play. Similarly, in relation to television 
violence, Potter and Smith (2000) have argued that graphicness can bring viewers 
closer to mediated violent actions and make it more real and shocking.  
Here, however, we should be careful not to overstate the perceptual realism of 
videogame violence. First of all, even if the graphical qualities of many current 
games have become increasingly detailed, the imagery is not live-action but 
animated and, as Ward argues, this makes games very different at the level of ‘the 
ontology of the image’ (2002, p. 133). This means that in a mimetic sense, they 
have a lower level of perceptual correspondence to the norms we hold for the 
audiovisual representation of realistic three-dimensional spaces, characters and 
objects. In other words, we are likely to realize that we are looking at something 
that is computer generated. Secondly, realism including perceptual realism is 
historically determined, which means that what we perceive as perceptually real 
and potentially disturbing today, may not be perceived as such ten years from now. 
In this sense, the moral panic surrounding the first Mortal Kombat game can partly 
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be explained by the fact that the game used sprite-animations made from 
photographic images which gave the game a highly perceptually realistic 
appearance for its time. When we play the game now however, the graphical quality 
is not very realistic at all. 
4.3.2 Sound 
Sound works in similar ways as mise-en-scène elements. Sound, whether it is 
speech, sound effect or music, has important compositional motivation in the sense 
that it can create atmosphere for actions (see Kiegler & Moffat, 2006), such as when 
the ominous sounding tones in Condemned 2: Bloodshot add to the horror setting 
of the game, or when the barbershop music in Bioshock Infinite cues nostalgia for 
the simple times of early and mid-twentieth century America. Also, in many war 
games the music is often grand and orchestral which creates a stage for heroism and 
virtue. In this sense, sound can also frame the actions as more or less virtuous 
thereby becoming a context for violent actions as I have explained above. In the 
many Star Wars games for instance, the more virtuous rebel alliance is often 
accompanied with a rather heroic musical leitmotif, while the galactic empire is 
framed by the darker sounds of the ‘imperial death march’. Furthermore, the low-
pitched voice of the character Darth Vader indicates power and evilness. Or, as 
another compositionally motivated example, the voice-over in the Max Payne 
games adds Max’s thoughts and feelings to his actions. To put it in Bruner’s (1986, 
p. 14) terms, the voice-over adds a ‘landscape of consciousness’ to a story landscape 
that otherwise consists predominantly of action. In these cases, sound as a stylistic 
device also connects with the character as a narrative device to cue our 
understanding of the narrative of the game.  
Sound can also have important realistic motivations for being there (Grimshaw, 
2008). This entails two things. First of all, As Grimshaw and Schott (2007) note, 
many sounds in games help to create the experience of a 3-dimensional space 
similar to our real world acoustic ecology. Consequently, the game world becomes 
more like a real place that we can feel present in. Secondly, the sound in a game 
can be conceived as more or less faithful to its sources. With regards to film sound, 
Bordwell and Thompson (2004, p. 365) term this ‘fidelity’ and explain that it has 
nothing to do with what originally made the sound but rather with the extent to 
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which the sound fits our expectations or norms. In other words, the sound of a 
shooting gun needs not come from an actual gun or the sound of piercing flesh 
needs not come from real flesh being pierced. Instead, these sounds are considered 
relatively faithful to their sources once they fit the norms that we hold for the sound 
of a gun and pierced flesh. Because our norms are partly derived from our 
perceptual experiences of other artwork and games in particular, sounds that have 
no reference point in the real world can still be experienced as relatively realistic. 
This is also why Jørgensen (2007) talks of ‘perceptual fidelity’ rather than audio 
fidelity. So, even though a samurai sword slicing through a body would probably 
not sound the way it does in a zombie game like Dead Island, that sound can still 
be experienced as perceptually realistic because our experiences of other zombie 
games and films have created a set of norms that divert considerably from sound 
that the samurai sword actually makes. In fact, since players expects some sort of 
audio feedback from their actions, game designers often exaggerate sounds of 
impacting bullets or knifes to adhere to these expectations and cue a greater sense 
of perceptual realism. Gregersen (2014) even argues that our sense of embodiment 
in the game may well be dependent on exaggerated sound effects because games 
often lack the possibility to give other kinds of (bodily) feedback to the player’s 
actions.  
Aside from shaping our narrative understandings or having us refer to notions of 
the real world or other artworks, sounds also have a clear ludic function. Sounds 
have us focus our attention on elements on screen (Jørgensen, 2006) or cue our 
expectations for elements off-screen which helps us prepare for action (Collins, 
2008). So, the voices and footsteps of oncoming guards in Hitman: Blood Money 
help us anticipate upcoming danger and stay hidden. The cueing of rapid 
suspenseful music in Bioshock Infinite makes us aware of enemies nearby. And the 
volume and speaker direction of the growling monsters in the audio-only horror 
game Papa Sangre (Somethin’ Else, 2010) helps us navigate the space successfully. 
With regards to this ludic function, the voice-over in the Max Payne games also 
forms an interesting example. In Max Payne 3 for instance, Max’s voice gives clues 
about where to go and urges the player forward. When the player takes too long to 
find a way to open a lock on a door, the voice-over will state: ‘a bullet will 
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sometimes work as well as a key.’ In this case the voice-over functions ludically 
because it assists the player in his goal-directed progress through the game. But the 
voice-over also encourages a fast-paced somewhat reckless playing strategy. For 
instance, as soon as the player starts to linger a bit, Max’s voice will tell us to hurry 
up and keep moving. In a sequence where Max is sent out to rescue two kidnapped 
members of the Branco family, an attempt at exploring the area is for instance met 
with the following voice-over: ‘I had to move quick or Branco’s next charitable 
donation would be to the worms’. Max’s friend Raul Passos, who accompanies him 
on several missions in the game, shows a similar impatience. As soon as the player 
starts to linger, Raoul shouts things like ‘Hurry up Max’ or ‘What are you doing 
Max?’. In all these instances, the sound devices clearly encourage a certain pace of 
action and discourage play strategies like exploring the environment for hidden 
Easter eggs. However, here the player is presented with contradicting cues since the 
game does award exploratory behaviour with painkillers or golden guns (also see 
chapter 5).  
 In games, just like in films, sound can come from inside the world of the characters, 
which neoformalists generally refer to as diegetic sound, or from outside of that 
world which is called non-diegetic sound (Bordwell & Thompson, 2004). However, 
as Collins rightfully remarks, ‘the relationship of the audio to the player and to their 
character in games is different from that of film because of the participatory nature 
of games’ (2008, n. 3). This for instance means that player-characters can react to 
sounds that are not in their world (non-diegetic) because they are being controlled 
by the player. Collins therefore further sub-divides the non-diegetic and diegetic 
sounds as either linear, adaptive or interactive sounds (2008, pp. 125–127). Linear 
diegetic and non-diegetic sounds are sounds in- or outside of the character’s world 
that cannot be changed by the player. These sounds generally occur in cutscenes 
but can also be heard during gameplay when one musical score, originating from 
either an in-game radio or from a source outside the character’s world, accompanies 
our entire play session. These sounds which are mainly heard in older arcade games, 
are there to create atmospheric context for action. Adaptive diegetic and non-
diegetic sounds, on the other hand, can also function more ludically by indicating 
upcoming danger. These sounds respond to game events but cannot be directly 
influenced by the player such as when the music in Super Mario Bros. speeds up 
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when we are about to run out of time, or when we hear the ominous words ‘Kirov 
reporting’ once our opponent has built a dangerous Kirov airship in Command and 
Conquer: Red Alert 2 (Westwood Pacific, 2000). Finally, interactive sounds are 
sounds that respond directly to player actions, such as when non-diegetic music 
changes when we approach an enemy, or when we hear footsteps approaching or 
the sound of a gun loading. Just like adaptive sounds, interactive sounds can also 
function ludically. The suspenseful music in Serious Sam 3: BFE (Croteam, 2011) 
for instance, is an indicator of nearby enemies and when we hear the off-screen 
sounds of radio conversations of the enemies in F.E.A.R. we know we should 
prepare for a fight.  
4.3.3 Point of View 
In videogames the location from which the on-screen events are shown plays an 
important role in our perceptual relationship to the on-screen actions. First-person 
perspectives put the player visually in the shoes of in-game character, merging 
player point of view with character point of view, while third-person perspectives, 
or what Nitsche terms a ‘following camera’ (2009, p. 93), disconnect character- and 
player points of view making the character the object of perception rather than the 
subject.  
These different points of view can have different ludic functionalities. Third-person 
perspectives, for instance are more suitable for platform games that require a greater 
sense of where our character is in relationship to other characters, objects and 
platforms.38 Also stealth games are generally in third-person because that point of 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
38 An obvious exception here is the free running platform game Mirror’s Edge which employs a 
first-person perspective. While this indeed makes jumping between platforms more difficult, the 
game has tried to make up for this by allowing the player to see the character’s body, arm and leg 
movement from that first-person perspective. This way, the player can still see where the character’s 
legs are in relationship to the platforms.    
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view allows us to sneak by enemies easier, make sure we remain out of sight, or 
even peak past a corner without being spotted because the camera can move 
separate from the player-character. The first-person point of view, on the other 
hand, helps the player fire weapons more accurately which means that shooters 
often employ such a point of view. However, also third-person games often allow 
for switching to a first-person point of view for accurate aim and firing (most 
notably when using sniper rifles).  
Points of view also have clear compositional motivations in the sense that they 
provide us with a certain perspective on the narrative space thereby also influencing 
the way that we perceive that space and the actions in it. For example, the first 
person point of view is often employed in horror games that rely on limited vision 
to cue our anticipation of a potential startle. In these games we only see a relatively 
small part of the world which means there is a good chance that something will 
jump on us from off-screen. Points of view can therefore be considered as a form 
of narration. As I argued above, games can make use of narration by concealing or 
revealing certain information to achieve certain responses from the player. In this 
case, surprise or startle can indeed be triggered by employing a limited point of 
view of the game world that thereby withholds information about oncoming 
enemies.    
However, the most prominently discussed function of point of view in games and 
game violence is its presumed realistic function which is often connected to 
character identification. For example, several scholars studying the after-effects of 
game violence (C. A. Anderson & Dill, 2000; Dill & Dill, 1998; S. L. Smith et al., 
2003; Tamborini, 2000; Tamborini et al., 2004) have suggested that first-person 
games present us with a perspective that is highly similar to our perspective on the 
real world which would consequently cue a stronger sense of identification with the 
aggressor than third-person games and thereby lead to a greater sense of presence 
in the game world with a closer proximity of the player to the violent act. However, 
this argument falsely merges perceptual identification with a more general type of 
identification that involves feeling, thinking, and acting along with the character. In 
other words, although we may share the point of view with an in-game character 
we do not necessarily wholly become that character. In fact, Farrar et al. (2006) 
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found that third-person games, rather than first-person games, tended to increase a 
sense of presence, which may suggest that showing the player-character on-screen 
cues another type of identification which is more effective at increasing our sense 
of presence.  
Let me try to unpack the role of point of view in identification a bit further by 
drawing from Gaut’s (1999) ideas about identification as an aspectual process. As 
he puts it:  
the act of identification is aspectual. To identify perceptually with a 
character is to imagine seeing from his point of view; to identify affectively 
is to imagine feeling what he feels; to identify motivationally is to imagine 
wanting what he wants; to identify epistemically with him is to imagine 
believing what he believes, and so on (Gaut, 1999, p. 205).   
For videogames, a similar distinction can be made although I should add that 
videogames also allow us to identify behaviourally since we can, in certain cases, 
have direct control over a character’s actions (see section 4.4.1). When scholars 
argue that first-person perspectives in games encourage identification with an in-
game character, we should thus ask ourselves, in what aspect?  
It makes sense to assume that first-person games allow for perceptual identification 
with the character since the in-game ‘camera’ is positioned in such a way to match 
the eyeline of the character and emphasizes the subjective process of seeing. As 
Galloway (2006) argues, first-person games can be seen to make use of what film 
theorist Branigan (1984) has termed the perception shot where the difficulty of 
seeing is emphasized over the clear perception of an object. This means that 
perception shots can be shaky and blurry when the character is made to look drunk, 
drowsy, or drugged, or that the vision of cybernetic beings include computer-like 
characteristics like flashing cursors, diagrams and scrolling text. In many first-
person shooters like Battlefield 3, the camera jugs and tilts in accordance with the 
action of the character and sometimes becomes blurred when for instance a grenade 
explodes in the near vicinity of a character. The perception shot is often even more 
enhanced by what Bordwell and Thompson (2004, p. 85) call a sound perspective, 
such as when we hear a ringing sound or a slightly muffled sound after an exploding 
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grenade. It seems that all these techniques are there for compositional reasons to 
increase the idea that we are seeing what the character is seeing and thus establish 
a perceptual identification.  
Logically speaking this perceptual identification does not occur in third-person 
games since the camera is positioned behind the character rather than at the 
character’s eye level. However, it is worth noting that while the camera position 
makes perceptual identification impossible, third-person games still make use of 
the same techniques that show perceptual subjectivity. In GTA IV for instance, the 
player can direct his character to a bar to get drunk. This drunkenness is then 
reflected in the character’s vision by blurring the camera lens. This seems 
paradoxical since the player is not presented with the character’s point of view but 
looks upon the player character in a third-person perspective. A similar thing 
happens in Tomb Raider where our vision becomes blurry while it is our character 
Lara that gets attacked, or in Hitman: Absolution (IO Interactive, 2012) where we 
can switch to our character’s ‘instinct vision’ even though we are not looking 
through his eyes. These games thus employ certain cues to encourage perceptual 
identification while at the same time the position of the in-game ‘camera’ denies a 
proper establishment of this kind of identification. While this sounds paradoxical, 
it could be that in these cases the techniques for perceptual subjectivity are not there 
to cue perceptual identification but rather to increase the chances of an affective 
identification.  
In such cases then, perceptual subjectivity in either first-, or third-person point of 
view may be one of the few ways in which games can still portray a character’s 
feelings since game characters are otherwise rather flat, focussing mostly on the 
execution of actions (see Van Vught & Schott, 2012).39 Such techniques may 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
39 Although game characters generally do not look like they are sad, angry, or happy during 
gameplay there is an interesting example in Doom that shows a small animation of the character’s 
face in our heads-up-display. In this case the face grimaces more and more upon every hit and slowly 
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indicate certain bodily states like drunkenness or drowsiness that can then 
encourage us to identify with the character in this respect. However, game 
developers can employ other techniques as well. Similar to films (see Bordwell & 
Thompson, 2004, p. 85), games can for instance show hallucinations, dreams or 
memories of the in-game character. This is for instance the case in the first Max 
Payne game where Max enters a couple of dream sequences and we have him run 
along seemingly endless hallways to arrive at the death scene of his wife and child. 
Such a sequence gives us insight into the subjective states of our player-character 
and thus opens up the possibility for affective identification. Furthermore, the 
game’s imagery can be complemented with a character’s internal monologue in the 
form of a voice-over or some on-screen text, which is the case in Thief: The Dark 
Project (Looking Glass Studios, 1998) or the Max Payne games. In these cases, the 
relatively objective visual representation of action is complemented with audio 
representing the thoughts and feelings of our character; thereby creating 
opportunities for affective identification. These various techniques can however be 
employed equally in first and third person perspective games, which means that a 
first-person perspective is not necessarily better at fostering affective identification 
than a third-person perspective.    
Also with regards to epistemic identification, it would seem that first- and third-
person games do not differ much from one another. Epistemic identification 
requires us to know the same thing as our character does and in both first-and third-
person games this happens automatically since the in-game camera is spatially and 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
goes more bloody when our character’s health deteriorates. The face also shows a malicious grin 
when a new weapon is picked up and an expression of shock when the character receives an 
unusually hard blow. Although the facial expressions are relatively few, it could be argued that these 
are still capable of cueing some kind of affective identification with the character since they give us 
some insight into what our character is feeling. 
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temporally attached (M. Smith, 1995, p. 83) to a single character .40 In both cases 
we thus come to know the game world along with the character and find it 
increasingly difficult to see it from any other point of view.  
Perceptual, epistemic, and affective identification can all foster sympathy for or 
empathy with a character, however, they do not have to. As Gaut  (1999) explains, 
empathy and sympathy require us to feel real emotions in response to the fictional 
events while these different types of identification only require us to imagine being 
in the situation of the character (affectively, epistemically, or perceptually). In other 
words, even though we see (perceptual) and know (epistemic) the game world from 
our character’s point of view and identify with his feelings (affective) by imagining 
his anger or sorrow, we do not necessarily empathize with him unless we ourselves 
feel the anger or sorrow that we imagine him to feel. 
It would thus seem that the difference between first-person and third-person points 
of view lies predominantly in the promise of a more complete perceptual 
identification with the in-game character. Although this is a much more limited 
understanding of identification than the one that some of the effect scholars referred 
to above seem to have in mind, we may still wonder whether this perceptual 
identification is an effective way of encouraging a sense of presence in the game 
world which would put us closer to the violent act and increase the cognitive, 
perceptual, and emotional impact of that violence. One argument in support of this 
idea is indeed the presumed realistic motivation of the first-person perspective. In 
this argumentation, the first-person perspective is familiar to us since it is similar 
to the perspective that we have on our day-to-day actions. As Dill and Dill put it:  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
40 I should add that certain games like Grand Theft Auto V also allow players to alternate between a 
couple of different characters. This means that the camera can jump from one character to the other. 
However, once the camera is fixed on one character, it generally remains there for quite some time 
allowing us to perceive the events along with the character and build a connection.  
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In our everyday lives, we do not have a full view of our bodies (...). Rather, 
we see the world through the window of our own eyes: we see our arms and 
legs, but not our faces and backs (1998, p. 413).  
The familiarity of the first-person perspective could then encourage us to adopt it 
more easily as our own and step into the world of our character.  
However, there is also a counterargument to consider here. Taylor (2002, 2003) for 
instance, argues against this presumed realistic motivation of the first-person 
perspective and states that these perspectives are not familiar to us at all since they 
give us a very unnatural limited view of the game world. She argues that in our 
everyday lives, our perception of the space we are in is much richer. Not only do 
we see more (peripherally), we also see within a context of other non-optical 
registers such as when we sense someone is behind us due to a shift in pressure on 
a floor or a smell. She therefore argues that the third-person perspective creates a 
perceptual experience that is closer to our day to day perception since it employs a 
wider visual field that compensates for a game’s inability to stimulate other 
perceptual registers. If Taylor is right about this, a third-person perspective may be 
more effective at encouraging a sense of presence than a first-person perspective.  
In further support of this idea, Taylor (2003) also argues that a first-person 
perspective makes identification impossible because the player does not see a 
character on-screen to identify with. As she states:  
the structural design of first-person point of view games (...) dictates that the 
first-person agent (...) should be within the space of the screen, but only as 
reflected through the other characters and not as discernible by the player. 
This is because (...) disembodied first-person characters (...) [exist] outside 
of the player's perceptual space (Taylor, 2003). 
In other words, first-person games encourage us to step into the game world as 
ourselves rather than identify with the other, but because we cannot enter the game 
world as ourselves we remain outside of it. Third-person games, on the other hand, 
are better capable of increasing our sense of presence since we always see our 
character on-screen and get used to being the other rather than vainly trying to 
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transport ourselves into the game world. Although I do not think the argument can 
be made for identification in all aspects since the first-person point of view is still 
capable of cueing perceptual identification, Taylor does have a point with what 
Gaut (1999, p. 205) talks about as a kind of physical identification. In this sense, a 
third-person point of view rather than a first-person point of view encourages 
identification with a character’s physical properties like his or her size, looks, 
physical position, or physicality of action because we can actually see those 
properties on screen.  
A similar argument can be made for 2D Fighting games like the first Mortal Kombat 
or beat-‘m-up games like Shank (Klei Entertainment, 2010) that also present the 
player with a third-person point of view, but rather than spatially positioning the 
camera behind the character, the camera is fixed on the side line. Since the character 
in these games is also visible on screen, I would argue that these games are also 
capable of encouraging a physical identification with the character, similar to other 
third-person games. However, it could be that, everything else being equal, the 2D 
characteristics vitiate our sense of presence in these game to some degree because 
it is perceptually more difficult to assume spatial coordinates in a 2D environment.  
It may well be that our sense of presence in the game world is largely cued by our 
identification with a virtual body since it gives us a real physical extension of 
ourselves in the game world rather than only a perceptual or affective one. One 
could of course argue that a behavioural identification (see section 4.4.1) already 
presupposes a physical identification since behaviour requires a physical body to 
perform that behaviour. However, in first-person games, bodily behaviour is still 
only performed by an on-screen hand holding a weapon while other bodily 
behaviour like running or jumping is only suggested through the movement of the 
in-game camera. As I mentioned above, this increased sense of presence in third-
person games is also confirmed by Farrar et al. (2006) which would mean that third-
person games rather than first-person games make us feel ‘physically’ closer to the 
violent act.  
Finally, the third-person point of view also plays another important role with 
regards to our experience of in-game violence. Besides seeing the violent act 
performed by our player-character on other characters, third-person games also 
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show the violence that other characters inflict on our player-character. In other 
words, where first-person games only show violence in which our character is the 
perpetrator, third-person games also show the violence in which our character is the 
victim. For this reason alone, it could be argued that third-person games show more 
violence than first-person games. However, the violence against our player-
character may also be experienced very differently since we are more likely to hold 
favourable dispositions towards our character. As Zillmann (1998) argues, we hope 
for positive outcomes for characters that we like and hope for negative outcomes 
for characters we do not like. Depending on the outcome of the violent act we then 
experience either positive or negative reactions to the in-game violence.     
I have thus far focused my attention on first- and third-person points of view. This 
includes fighting games, shooters, horror games, many action-adventure games, 
stealth games, and most RPGs. However, Nitsche also recognizes the ‘overhead 
view’ and ‘predefined viewing frames’ as dominant points of view used in games 
(2009, p. 93). Although these points of view are employed less frequently in games 
that get rated for their depictions of violence, they do deserve a brief consideration 
here. Strategy games like the games in the Command and Conquer series for 
instance, employ an overhead view and thereby allow the player to float over the 
landscape as a kind of all-seeing force. The camera can remain focused on one 
character or a group of characters when these are selected, but the player can also 
move the camera freely across the game world not focusing on anyone in particular. 
Although the camera assumes a position in the 3D game world, it is not fixed to any 
character in particular which means it becomes more difficult to experience an 
epistemic identification. After all, our knowledge of the game world differs 
immensely from the knowledge that any one of the in-game characters have.  
In later games in the Command and Conquer series (as in most other more recent 
strategy games), the camera can be used even more freely by zooming in and out 
on the actions below. This allows the player to gain different perspectives on the 
actions, framing the action as either more up close and personal or from a birds-eye 
point of view to emphasize the scale of the event. As Tong and Tan put it in regards 
to Ground Control (Massive Entertainment, 1996):  
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The gamer becomes, literally, a director of a theatre of war and a director 
of something like a movie on-the-go. The player can refocus on the action 
s/he deems most interesting and assume the position of a war reporter, 
reporting on his/her own battle as it is being staged (2002, p. 106).  
The overhead view also has clear ludic functions. With the ability to move freely 
over the game space, the player can keep an eye on enemy activities and prepare 
countermeasures appropriately. Similarly, the player can visually explore the 
surrounding landscape to plan for resource gathering, base expansions or 
appropriate routes of attack. In many strategy games, the surrounding landscape is 
only fully shown after a player has directed one or more of his military units to 
scout the area (the so called ‘fog of war’). This makes the functionality of the 
overhead view directly dependent on other player decisions, making point of view 
an inherent part of the overall ludic functioning of the game.   
Finally, quite a few early survival horror games, such as the first four Alone in the 
Dark games or the first three Resident Evil games, employed predefined camera 
angles. While these fixed camera angles were mostly instigated by technological 
limitations, since only a static camera allowed the developers to include such 
detailed (pre-rendered) 3D spaces, these fixed angles became an important 
dramatizing tool for early horror games (see Nitsche, 2009, pp. 108–112). 
According to cinematic conventions, low angle camera angles can be used to make 
a monster look bigger and scarier, shots resembling those made by a surveillance 
camera can give us the feeling we are being watched, and of course the fixed frame 
can cue certain expectations due to a specific focus on a door or window or the fact 
that the frame cuts off the space at a certain position.41  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
41 See (Nitsche, 2009) for more elaborate examples of the cinematic functioning of these predefined 
camera angles.  
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With these clear compositional motivations, these predefined camera angles show 
the greatest similarities with camera use in cinema. In fact, even the constant cutting 
between different angles comes close to the editing techniques used in films with 
the obvious exception that the cuts are triggered by the player’s movement through 
the game space. However, these kinds of camera angles are not always the most 
ludically effective. These angles require a high level of literacy and control since 
the constant switching between shots can have us lose track of the architecture of 
the game space or have us direct our character into walls when forward movement 
becomes sideward movement in the next shot. In this sense, the predefined viewing 
angles in games have a more dominant compositional motivation since, as Nitsche 
puts is, ‘they do not affect the action but narrate the event’ (2009, p. 112). 
4.3.4 Speed of Motion 
A final stylistic device worth exploring with regards to violence in games is the 
speed of motion. Speed of motion in games consists of two components. First of 
all, there is the pre-set pace of cutscenes or in-game animations which can be shown 
at a normal pace, in slow-motion or in fast-motion. Secondly, speed of motion is 
also determined by the tempo in which the player decides to play (Wolf, 2001b, p. 
86). The player may decide to move faster or slower through a level, linger at certain 
moments and take in the (violent) imagery. Although this makes game pace more 
relative to player choice, this choice is still structured by different game devices. 
These devices consist of the rules and audiovisual cues that function as goals pulling 
the player forward or as opposing forces holding him back. Davies (2009) calls 
these elements ‘movement impetus’ and lists them in an overview. He argues that 
narrative elements like a threat from behind or an objective ahead help to increase 
the tempo of play actions. Rule-based elements like a time limit or narrowed down 
travel options also help to increase pace while lack thereof slows the game down. 
Stylistic elements like graphically detailed scenery can have the player slowdown 
in admiration. And mise-en-scène elements and sounds can create atmospheric 
tension to slow the player down or instead create a sense of urgency to speed the 
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player up.42 Aside from the player’s will to move, Davies also argues that game 
pace is dependent on the level of actual action the player is able to perform. This 
means that pace and action affordances (see 4.3.1) go hand in hand, with puzzle 
games usually exhibiting a slower pace than first-person-shooters because puzzle 
games have different action affordances.  
For example, a survival horror game like Silent Hill has a slow pace because the 
game has relatively few affordances that require immediate action for ludic success. 
In large parts of the game we have no, or only a few flimsy weapons and we spend 
much of our time walking around a dimly lit environment rather than engaging in 
combat. Furthermore, the mist and eerie music create an atmospheric tension that 
tells us we could walk into a dangerous situation at any point. Because the lack of 
strong weapons makes us quite vulnerable, this tension keeps us from moving 
forward to quickly. On the other hand, a game like Serious Sam 3:BFE has a very 
fast pace. It generally puts us in a large open environment and sends big hordes of 
alien enemies running towards us from all sides. These enemies are accompanied 
by fast-paced music that signifies the urgency with which we will need to act in 
order to survive. In this case we are able to carry a wide range of strong weapons 
with seemingly infinite amounts of ammunition, which means we are engaged in 
the fast paced repetitious actions of spotting and eliminating the threat.   
The functions of slowing down or speeding up pace can vary. In the capturing of 
sport events, slow-motion is often used to show certain moments in great detail. In 
a film like The Cell (Caro & Singh 2000) slow-motion is used to indicate that the 
events are occurring in a dream. In the martial arts film Crouching Tiger, Hidden 
Dragon (Kong, et al. & Lee, 2000) slow-motion techniques are used to indicate the 
power of a certain kick or punch. And in The Matrix (Silver & The Wachowski 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
42 Davies’ exploration of design characteristics encouraging or discouraging player movement is not 
limited to the ones presented here. For a full list of characteristics see his article at: 
http://www.gamasutra.com/view/feature/4024/examining_game_pace_how_.php.  
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Brothers, 1999) or Dredd slow-motion indicates perceptual subjectivity of certain 
characters. With regards to violence however, slow-motion is generally used to 
dwell on the violent moments and its consequences in order to spectacularize or 
aestheticize the actions (Bruder, 1998). The shootouts in Bonnie and Clyde, The 
Wild Bunch (Feldman & Peckinpah, 1969) or Hard Boiled (Kuk, et al. & Woo, 
1992) famously showed the violence in slow-motion with the aim of emphasizing 
both the gruesomeness and the majesty of the violent acts. In these cases, slow-
motion has a clear artistic motivation. It makes no sense realistically or 
compositionally, but is only there to make the violence look artistically pleasing or 
gruesome.    
In games, slow-motion has this same artistic function. In F.E.A.R., Skyrim, or the 
three Max Payne games, slow-motion allows the player to be astounded by the 
graphical detail of the animations of bullets and arrows entering flesh, and body 
parts jerking in response to the impact (ragdoll physics). In F.E.A.R. slow-motion 
also has a narrative function because it reflects the perceptual subjectivity of the 
player-character who possesses the superhuman ability to slow down time and give 
him super-fast reflexes. More dominantly however, almost all the slow-motion in 
games has a more dominant ludic function. In F.E.A.R. and the Max Payne games 
for instance, slow-motion presents the player with a significant tactical advantage. 
It allows the player to aim more accurately and fire more shots within a certain time 
frame which helps to deal with large groups of enemies, fast enemies or enemies at 
a great distance. If handled well, slow-motion can even help to dodge bullets. In the 
Max Payne games, the technique makes no sense realistically or in the narrative. 
Instead slow-motion is mainly there for ludic and artistic reasons with the ludic 
reason often being the pre-eminent one.  
However, we should be careful not to generalize here. In the most recent Max Payne 
3 there are at least three important uses of slow-motion and not all forms have equal 
dominant ludic functions. The so called ‘shootdodge’ in which Max performs a 
slow-motion jump and the so called ‘last-man-standing’ in which the game triggers 
a slow-motion sequence that allows the player time to shoot an enemy that critically 
wounded Max, both have clear tactical advantages. In these cases, the time of the 
game world slows down to facilitate the need to urgently dispatch of dangerous 
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enemies. However, the last form of slow-motion called ‘bullet-cam’ has a more 
dominant artistic function. These bullet-cams are automatically triggered when the 
player fires a shot at the last enemy on the scene. The camera then follows the path 
of the bullet in slow-motion until it hits the enemy at which point the player is able 
to keep firing bullets, all of which will be shown to impact the enemy in slow-
motion. Because the bullet-cam is triggered by the last enemy on the scene, it does 
not give us any strategic advantage since we have already successfully made it 
through the sequence. In fact, the bullet-cam even has the potential to give us a 
tactical disadvantage because if we decide to keep shooting we are wasting precious 
bullets that could have been helpful in other situations. Bullet-cam therefore only 
has an artistic motivation. It is there to frame the action as something aesthetically 
pleasing; as a spectacle. In line with King we could then argue that in this case the 
artistic function of the slow pace invites the game player to sit back in a state of 
admiration and contemplation of the spectacular animation, while fast pace creates 
a more explosive ‘ in your face’ type of spectacular impact (King, 2002, pp. 56–
64).   
A similar argument can be found in montage theory in film studies. In her analysis 
of timing in film, Feagin for instance argues that a long continuation of the same 
image enables the viewer to ‘contemplate more subtle aspects of the story and the 
characters and to think about why the shot continues for so long’ (1999, p. 174). On 
the other hand, she argues that ‘fast-paced montage and rapid cross-cutting often 
work directly to create feelings of excitement, so that an effect can be produced 
without requiring the audience to think’ [italics added] (Ibid., pp. 174–175). In 
other words, long static shots, creating a slow pace, leave room for reflections on 
the content, while fast pace leaves little time to dwell upon what is going on. With 
regards to the function of pace in our perception of in-game violence, this leads to 
three important considerations. 
First of all, if players of fast-paced action games have little time to think about their 
violent actions, these actions are likely to leave a less lasting cognitive impression 
than violence that is focused on for a lengthy period of time. In their discussion of 
suspense in games, Frome and Smuts (2004) for instance argue that games with 
fewer action affordances and a slower pace allow players to speculate about the 
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outcomes of the action and reflect on the consequences. This could mean that 
violence that is concentrated on for a lengthy period of time due to slow-motion 
animations, the pace of the violent action, and/or the lack of immediate other threat, 
could leave the player much more disturbed than volatile fast-paced violence. In the 
long interrogation scenes in The Punisher (THQ, 2005) for instance, the player can 
have his character slowly choke an enemy to death with his bare hands, push him 
through a wood chipper, or hang him from the ceiling on a rope. These actions last 
significantly longer than a gunshot and take place in relatively safe places in the 
game world allowing the player the time to reflect on the violent representation. On 
the other hand, games like Quake or Doom, which quickly send us one threatening 
enemy after the other, leave us little time for preparation for or reflection on the 
violence but just have us shoot rapidly and repeatedly. In these cases, the fast pace 
makes the violence volatile; it becomes a quick and painless way of dealing with 
opposing forces in the game so we are ready for the next onslaught.  
Secondly, if a fast game pace contributes directly to our feelings of arousal than 
pace becomes an important variable to consider in studies into the after-effect of 
violence in games. In their reflection on violent game effect research, Adachi and 
Willoughby for instance argue that pace of action is one game characteristic capable 
of influencing the after-effect of violent games because it ‘may be linked to 
physiological arousal, with faster games leading to elevated levels of arousal’ 
(2011, p. 58). Now, because games that contain violence often have a faster pace 
than games that do not contain violence, these games could generally be 
experienced as more arousing. Consequently, with arousal being considered as a 
condition for cueing aggressive after-effects, it could then be that effect research 
has actually been measuring the aggressive after-effects of game pace rather than 
the aggressive after-effects of violence representations. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, game pace also influences the type of 
involvement we have in the game. Feagin (1999) for instance argues that slow pace 
encourages contemplation of story aspects and King argues that slow-paced 
spectacle invites us to marvel at the technologically advanced audiovisual detail 
and has us ‘taken in’ by, and thus ‘taken into’, the fictional world’ (2002, p. 57). 
On the other hand, fast pace will oftentimes encourage a different type of 
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involvement. As soon as pace speeds up, the graphical representations of enemies 
or landscapes and the stories that they tell no longer matter that much. What matters 
more is the immediate threat that the enemies pose to the progress of the player and 
the actions that the environment and our player character afford for a successful 
navigation towards the completion of the game. In other words, slow pace, often 
encourages a consideration of the narrative role of a device or even its artistic or 
transtextual motivation, while fast pace will often encourage more ‘economical’ 
play responses and has us focus mainly on ludic functionality. As elements of 
movement impetus, pace thus delegates our attentional focus towards specific 
functions of other devices rather than having clear functions of its own.  
However, there is a counterargument to consider here. Grodal (2000) for instance 
argues that fast-paced action games bring us closer to our optimal mental and motor 
capacity than slower paced games which leads him to conclude that fast-paced 
games are better at providing a ‘total immersion’ because ‘less capacity is available 
for being conscious about the game being just a game’ (2000, 204). Although 
Grodal does not explain what he means by ‘total immersion’, his argument suggests 
that a faster pace makes players more involved in the fiction of the game and leaves 
them unable to reflect on the ludic properties of the medium. While I believe that 
Grodal makes an interesting point here, it seems to me that his argument falsely 
assumes that acting in the fictional game world distributes our mental and motor 
capacity more economically than playing a game in our real world. In other words, 
when the game requires us to perform a lot of fast-paced action, it is more effective 
to perform that action as a player than to transport ourselves into the fictional game 
world and perform that action as an in-game character.  
The idea that pace directs our attentional focus seems confirmed by an eye-tracking 
study by Seif El-Nasr and Yan (2006). In their study of visual attention in 3D 
videogames, they compared the difference in gaze movement across the screen 
between a first-person-shooter and a third-person-action-adventure game. They 
found that the players’ eye movements during the action-adventure game covert 
much more area of the screen while the players of the first-person-shooter focused 
mostly on the centre of the screen. According to the authors this was due to the fact 
that ‘action-adventure games are relatively slow paced, and most of the time, the 
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avatar is safe so the player does not have to pay attention to them’ (Seif El-Nasr & 
Yan, 2006, p. 6). The faster pace of the game thus requires us to perceive more 
economically so we only look at those elements that could immediately aid our 
progress in the game. Following these findings, we could even hypothesize that 
fast-paced games do not only emphasize ludic functionality of in-game elements 
but that in-game elements portrayed outside of the immediate field of vision, 
meaning outside of the player’s goal oriented visual search pattern is not likely to 
be noticed at all. So a fast-paced first-person shooter may include gory images of 
corpses hanging from the ceiling but as long as the threat remains on the floor we 
probably will not take the time to look up and see them. 
 Rule-Based Devices 
Rules play an important role in structuring our game experiences. Rules limit 
behaviour and create action affordances; rules allow games to be repeatable; rules 
turn play action into something goal oriented by establishing winning conditions; 
and rules allow for competition or collaboration. However, rules are not necessarily 
more important than other devices. In this sense I disagree with Sicart, who argues 
that the ‘representational aspect of games – its visual and narrative elements - is of 
secondary importance when analysing ethics of computer games [which includes 
in-game violence]’ (2009, p. 22).  
The overemphasis on rules stems from a certain understanding of them. As I noted 
above, scholars like Sicart (2009) and, more outspokenly Aarseth (1997), consider 
rules as the underlying algorithms creating and regulating the game’s audiovisual 
output. While this is a valid consideration of rules, it does put rules in a rather 
dominant position compared to other narrative or stylistic devices. In this 
understanding, the game system is considered as a rule system while the audiovisual 
elements are only output of that system, not the system itself. As I argued in chapter 
3, I do not consider the game system as an underlying rule system, but rather as a 
system of interrelating narrative, stylistic, and rule-based devices. This is the game 
system as it manifests itself to the player.  
This consideration of the game system also has consequences for the way rules are 
understood. From a player’s perspective, rules manifest themselves as affordances. 
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Here I follow Tavinor’s approach to rules who indeed argues that, other than in 
many non-digital games, in videogames rules are mostly encoded in affordances 
rather than written into a rule book as declarative linguistic statements (Tavinor, 
2009a, p. 94). As he puts it:  
A game might immediately prompt the player with a declarative objective 
such as “Steal the armored vehicle,” but the subsequent game is not played 
by consulting various declarative rules to see what actions are legal in the 
game, and what counts as an endgame, but by simply exploring he potential 
for action in the fictional world (2009a, p. 94). 
This also means that for Tavinor, the game’s representational output, what he refers 
to as the game’s fiction, is not a ‘mere gloss’ but an essential component for the 
functioning of the game (2009a, p. 95). Here, the game’s narrative, stylistic and 
rule-based devices are inextricably bound together in cueing our play responses. In 
other words, this understanding of rules as affordances puts rules on equal ground 
with narrative and stylistic devices.   
But there is also another important consequence of approaching rules as 
affordances. While rules as algorithms are ‘fixed’ in the sense that they do not 
change during play (see Salen & Zimmerman, 2004, pp. 122–123), rules as encoded 
in affordances are changeable. Following Linderoth (2013) I argued in the previous 
chapter that the choices we make, activate various opportunities for further actions 
such as when we decide to pick up either a grenade or a knife. Again, this does not 
mean that we wholly create new affordances since these affordances were always 
embedded in the system. It only means that we combine the game components in 
various ways to activate an instantiation of the game in which certain other 
affordances are available. For example, while rocket jumping may not have been a 
conscious intention from the designers of Quake, it was always possible within the 
confines of the system. Once players combined the game components to instantiate 
the affordance, rocket jumping became an often used strategy. With this newly 
available information, rocket jumping became an appropriate way to play the game.   
What this example of rocket jumping also shows is that rules as encoded in 
affordances are not always known in advance in the way that the declarative 
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rulebook rules of non-digital games are. This again shows the inherent tie-up 
between rule-based devices and stylistic and narrative devices. As Tavinor puts it: 
the depiction of an initially unknown fictional world allows the videogame 
to set up games the nature of which can be discovered through fictional 
exploration or encounters with fictional characters and events, hence 
guiding a game without the need for explicit declarative rules specified at 
the outset (2009a, p. 97).   
The stylistic and narrative devices thus steer us towards certain actions that are 
afforded by the game’s rules.  
As devices at play during moments of in-game violence, rules will often have 
important ludic motivations in the sense that they confine and facilitate the player’s 
goal-directed play actions. However, they can most certainly have other dominant 
motivations. Rules also create affordances for actions that are more important for 
narrative construction, such as when we can pick up and read or listen to diary 
excerpts of in-game characters in Gone Home (The Fullbright Company, 2013) or 
Bioshock. Similarly, rules can have important realistic motivations such as when 
we can go to a bar and get drunk in GTA IV or when we can take Chop the dog out 
for a walk in GTA V. Rules can even have artistic or transtextual motivations, such 
as when we can get to move the snake around the dreamlike environment in Flow, 
when we get to play with Tim from Braid or when we collect enough bandages in 
Super Meat Boy.  
In the two subsections below I consider two ways in which rule-based devices 
operate in games. First of all, rules limit our action opportunities by providing 
certain points of actions in the game world. This simply means that rules may allow 
the player to perform certain actions in, or on the game world, such as controlling 
our player-character’s movement directly and shooting other in-game characters, or 
issuing orders to a group of military units by selecting and clicking on the game 
world. These afforded actions are always a limited selection of a larger range of 
actions that ‘could have been’. In other words, the existence of certain rules creates 
certain types of action affordances while the lack of other rules denies other actions. 
As I will argue under section 4.4.1, the type of actions the rules make possible can 
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have a significant impact on the way that in-game violence is structured. An internal 
point of action allows us to perform violence through direct control of a virtual body 
such as in first-person or third-person games while an external point of action places 
us outside of the game world where we only have indirect control over the violent 
situation.  
Secondly, rules as encoded in affordances do not only prescribe what must be done 
for ludic success but also what can be done or may be done. In Suits’ terms (1978) 
rules are prohibitive and constructive. In this respect, not all rules are binding in the 
sense that they have to be followed in order to progress in the game. Some rules 
simply state a possibility rather than a binding constraint and it is during these 
moments that other motivations can come to the fore. With regards to game violence 
this means that rules make certain actions ludically obligatory since these actions 
are needed to achieve success. One could argue that ludically obligatory violence 
leaves the player less accountable for his actions because he simply has no choice 
but to perform these actions if he intends to keep playing. On the other hand, certain 
ludically optional actions can still be ludically encouraged or discouraged through 
rewards and punishments. Finally, violence which is optional in a ludic sense can 
of course still have important narrative, transtextual, realistic or artistic functions.  
4.4.1 Points and Levels of Action 
In scholarly articles on media effects, a commonly mentioned characteristic that 
may either aggravate (Polman, Orobio de Castro, & Aken, 2008), or mitigate 
(Goldstein, 1998)43 potential negative after-effects of game violence, is the active 
participation in the violent act. According to this idea, videogames allow us to act 
out the violence ourselves through control over our player-character’s behaviour, 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
43 While this may sound counterintuitive, Goldstein explains, from an arousal equilibrium 
perspective, that our perceived control over the events could also reduce potential stressful effects 
of these events since we are more in charge of the level of arousal that is elicited (1998, p. 60).    
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while non-interactive media like films have us watch someone else commit the 
violent acts. Although this idea may seem intuitively right, it simplifies rather 
complex concepts like ‘active control’ over a character’s actions and the sense of 
being ‘present’ in the game world. After all, not all games allow for the same level 
or type of control over the violent actions and even if there is direct control over a 
character’s actions, that does not necessarily mean we identify with that character 
in other aspects.  
To structure the different action affordances of games, Ryan proposes four different 
types of interactivity based on two binary pairs: internal/external and 
exploratory/ontological (2006, p. 107).44 The distinction between internal and 
external interactivity is a useful one and describes the way in which the player either 
acts on the game world by navigating an interface with the control of a cursor, or 
acts in the game world by directly controlling a player character. In first-person or 
third-person shooters or action-adventure games, the player is generally presented 
with an internal point of action. This point of action maps the player’s motor 
commands (in real time) onto a virtual body inside the game world where the action 
occurs.  
Referring back to Gaut’s (1999) ‘aspectual identification’ we could argue that an 
internal point of action can cue a kind of ‘behavioural identification’ with the virtual 
character where we imagine ourselves to be performing the actions that we have 
our in-game character perform. If this is the case, an internal point of action could 
increase our sense of being present in the game world and puts us in closer 
proximity to the violent actions. If our player-character is the violent perpetrator, 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
44 As acknowledged by Ryan, this categorization comes close to Aarseth’s (1997) categorization of 
different user functions in ergodic texts. However, I’m exploring Ryan’s distinction here since her 
distinction emphasizes the player’s relationship to the game world which means she explores 
affordances from a player’s perspective during an instance of play rather than the way the game’s 
underlying structure facilitates certain player action (see Ryan, 2006, p. 107). 
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we are then imagining to vicariously perform the in-game violence with him or her. 
However, I should stress imagination here, since this still only makes us 
imaginatively violent and not really violent since our own actions still consist of 
fairly neutral keyboard manipulations and mouse movements.  
It could even be argued that the discrepancy between neutral player actions and 
violent character actions stands in the way of a behavioural identification and 
disturbs a sensation of being present in the game world. When a gun affords firing, 
we do not fire it but we click our mouse, and when a car affords driving we do not 
drive it but we press the w-key. For this reason, Gregersen and Grodal (2009) 
distinguish between the primitive actions, or P-actions performed by the player and 
the virtual actions performed by the character. They indeed note that P-actions are 
often highly generic and stylized and do not in any way resemble the actions 
represented on screen. However, they also note that the P-actions, although 
arbitrary, are often natural which means they should be internalized as code and 
should not require much conscious attention.45 If that is the case, then an internal 
point of action can most certainly cue a sense of presence in which our phenomenal 
action space shifts from the actual space in front of the screen where we are engaged 
in arbitrary button pushing to the virtual space on screen where we are engaged in 
fighting or shooting.  
Ryan’s (2006) external point of action is usually found in strategy and simulation 
games like the Command and Conquer series. In these games, we may issue orders 
to one or more character(s) but the point from which we issue these orders is a point 
outside of the world of these characters. This creates a somewhat paradoxical 
situation where in-game characters respond to commands from a cursor that is 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
45 I should add here already that certain game elements like QTEs do not follow this rule of thumb. 
In fact, QTE are made to be particularly unnatural to make the button combination more challenging. 
Also player skills are obviously a determining factor in how natural game controls are (see below).   
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clearly not part of their world.46 Instead, the cursor exists somewhere on an interface 
between our real world and the world of the characters. When actions are 
performed, the player selects a character or a group of characters and orders them 
to attack enemies or an enemy base. Once the order has been issued, the player can 
sit back and watch the battle unfold (intervening with other commands when 
deemed necessary). A similar external point of action is found in classical turn-
based combat in role-playing games. Once it is the player’s turn to act, he or she 
issues one or more commands to the character and watches as the character 
performs the violent actions. More so than in games with internal points of action, 
the violence in these games is dependent on pre-established animations that the 
player cannot influence. External points of action thus make us only indirectly 
accountable for the violence and put us as an external force outside of the world 
where the violence is performed.  
Quick-time-events form an interesting example of a specific game moment with 
external points of action. While a game like Max Payne 3 predominantly presents 
the player with an internal point of action whereby the player directly controls the 
movement of Max in real time, the game also contains QTEs in which the player is 
cued to press a specific sequence of keys in order for a pre-rendered animation to 
reach its desired ending. Although the keys correspond to certain actions of the 
character, they do so indirectly. The game presents the player with an interface in 
which the required keys are shown in sequence and the player performs the actions 
on that interface. Because the key sequence is purposefully counterintuitive, the 
player is cued to focus his attention on performing the appropriate P-actions which 
would then disturb a sense of presence in the game world.  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
46 This transgression of boundaries between clearly separated worlds has been termed ‘metalepsis’ 
in narratology (Genette, 1980, pp. 234–237). In the Command and Conquer games this metaleptic 
shift is enforced when the in-game characters respond to the player’s order by saying things like 
‘Yes sir’ or ‘Affirmative’.  
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Ryan’s distinction between exploratory and ontological interactivity is more 
problematic. This distinction describes the different types of changes the player can 
make to the game world. According to Ryan, exploratory interactivity allows the 
player only to navigate the game world without making any changes to it, while 
ontological interactivity allows the player to make alterations to the world by 
picking up objects or interacting with characters (Ryan 2006, 108).  
Although this distinction might intuitively make sense, it incorrectly distinguishes 
between exploring and altering. As I noted in chapter 3, games are interactive in the 
sense that the player can change the arrangement of the game’s formal components 
through motor actions. However, contrary to what Ryan suggests, the player does 
not change the game’s formal constituents but only activates a different 
arrangement. When a player shoots a character, that character is not somehow 
deleted from the game’s code. Instead, the character is still there but at that 
particular point is simply replaced by a dead version of him- or herself. In other 
words, the player activates a different version of the character similar to how the 
player activates a different perspective on the world by moving through the 
environment.     
This, of course, has consequences for the consideration of interactivity here. While 
I largely agree with Lopes’ understanding of interactivity as being about changing 
the ‘structure’ of the work itself rather than about changing the structure as users 
experience it (2001, p. 68),47 his distinction between ‘strongly interactive’ and 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
47 This, to me seems to be an essential characteristic of interactivity which also means that I disagree 
with Grodal and Frome who argue that interactivity is about changing ‘mental states of the player’ 
(Grodal, 2003, p. 143)  or the structure as ‘audiences experience it’ (Frome, 2009, p. 3). In such an 
understanding, interactivity as a concept becomes so broad that it no longer allows us to distinguish 
between interactive artworks like games and non-interactive artworks like films or paintings (unless 
one is willing to go back to a kind of romantic intentionalism as Frome does). If Grodal and Frome 
were right here, many other phenomena like fine art, literature and films can be included under the 
umbrella of interactivity that are commonly not considered to be interactive at all. 
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‘weakly interactive’ is problematic for the same reasons as Ryan’s distinction 
between ontological and exploratory interactivity is. If we assume that the game’s 
structure consists of the arrangement of its formal properties, there is no reason to 
assume that changing the structure is different from activating a set of formal 
components in a different temporal order, as Lopes suggests.  
However, there may still be some validity to this distinction. Although Lopes’ 
explanation of strongly interactive and weakly interactive works goes awry, it could 
well be that in certain interactive works the user will always encounter the same set 
of formal components, be it in a different order every time, while in other interactive 
works, the user draws from a larger set of components and only instantiates a certain 
selection. This would indeed suggest that in the latter case, the player has many 
more options to choose from which would consequently lead to a greater sense of 
agency. I will just refer to this here as the level of actions a game affords, whereby 
a higher level of actions refers to games with a large set of game components that 
can be instantiated in parts or as a whole in a wide variety of ways, while a lower 
level of actions refers to games that often have a smaller set of components that can 
only be instantiated as a whole in a limited number of ways.  
The level of actions that a game affords can also influence our sense of presence in 
the game world and thereby our proximity to the in-game violence. Games that have 
a higher level of actions will often increase our sense of presence while games that 
have a lower level of actions will decrease it. This is because our experience of 
being in a world comes with the ability to perform a vast range of different actions. 
In our day-to-day world we can pick up items, move items, dig a hole, open doors, 
make fires, talk to people, and do a whole lot of other things. Therefore, the more 
the game world replicates the many action affordances of our real world, the more 
the game world feels like an actual place that we can be in.  
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Aside from influencing our sense of presence in the game world, action affordances 
often have important ludic functions. Games with a high level of action affordances 
and an internal point of action allow the player to walk, run, crawl, jump, shoot, and 
dodge his way to success. These games allow players to overcome a wide range of 
obstacles in the form of enemies, closed doors, blocked paths, or deep pits. On the 
other hand, games with external points of action often afford different, less detailed 
types of actions. A strategy game like Command and Conquer: Red Alert 
(Westwood Studios, 1996) for instance, does not allow the player to perform 
detailed tasks like jumping over cliffs or stacking boxes, but it nevertheless has a 
high level of action affordances since it does allow the player to command various 
army units to do a great variety of different things and even operate the army as a 
whole with a few clicks of the mouse.  
In most cases the rule of thumb is that the higher the level of actions is, the more 
options the player has to overcome challenges and reach the game’s goal. In other 
words, the player is afforded a wider range of different action opportunities, many 
of which can have an important ludic function because they allow for different 
strategies to come to success. However, a higher action level also means that some 
of these actions will not be important for progress in the game at all. In a game like 
GTA IV for instance, the player is provided with an incredible wide range of action 
affordances, many of which will only very rarely (or not at all) have an important 
role to play in the player’s route to success. The fact that the player can go to a 
carwash for instance, is ludically unimportant in all but one mission in the game. 
Nevertheless, the game does afford this action and even provides an extensive 
cutscene every time the player decides to make use of it. Aside from the mission 
Clean Getaway the car wash has a more important realistic or even aesthetic 
function. It references car washes in the real world but also provides a player with 
a clean and shiny vehicle providing aesthetic pleasure for the player.  
The level and points of action have obvious consequences for the type of violence 
performed. Games with different action affordances allow for more and different 
types of violence with various functions. In the Hitman games for instance, which 
have a high level of action affordances and an internal point of action, the player 
can decide to shoot a character, inject the character with a lethal poison, stab a 
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character, strangle a character, push a character down a cliff, or drop a chandelier 
on top of him. Most of these affordances have an important ludic function in the 
sense that they all can play a role in the player’s road to success. On the other hand, 
in a game like Alan Wake (Remedy Entertainment, 2012) there is no option for 
melee combat and the player can only attack oncoming enemies by shooting them. 
This does not only limit the types of violence that can be performed, it also 
contextualizes such violence in a different way. While this limited action affordance 
has an important ludic function and forces the player into certain strategic decisions, 
it can also lead to frustrating moments when the player-character runs out of bullets 
and leaves us completely helpless when more enemies attack. 
In general, games do not just afford one level of actions or one point of action. 
Many shooters or action adventure games include quick-time-events that allow for 
less player input than the regular gameplay, and role-playing games like South 
Park: The Stick of Truth (Obsidian Entertainment, 2014) shift the player’s point of 
action from internal to external as soon as a combat sequence starts. This means 
that also during one particular game, our perceptions and performances of in-game 
violence can shift significantly. Any study looking at the potential impact of in-
game violence should therefore be mindful of the action affordances that frame the 
violence at any one point in the game. After all, even though a game like The 
Walking Dead (Telltale Games, 2012) has similar bloody and gory content as the 
Left 4 Dead games, its point and click interface makes the experience of the 
violence a radically different one. 
4.4.2 Rewards and Punishments 
Games structure our play behaviour through rewards and punishments. As noted 
above, these devices do not only tell the player what he must do but also what would 
be wise or unwise to do without forcing the player to perform one type of action. 
For a study of violence in games, this distinction is extremely important because it 
shows how some violent actions may be more optional than other ones. Frasca 
acknowledges the different functions of rules in this respect and argues for a 
distinction between manipulation rules that ‘state a possibility’ and goal rules that 
are always ‘mandatory’ (2003, p. 232).  Juul (2007b) makes a similar distinction 
with regards to game goals and claims that Scramble (Konami, 1981) is a game 
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with obligatory goals because the player is forced to work towards them, while 
Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas (Rockstar North, 2005) on the other hand, is a game 
with optional goals because the player is free to deviate from them. In other words, 
although the rules in a mission in Hitman: Blood Money, require players to kill 
certain individuals to proceed to the next mission, how they decide to kill these 
individuals and how many more other characters they kill along the way is up to 
them.  
The distinction between optional goals and obligatory goals seems useful when 
looking at the optional or mandatory characteristics of game violence. However, 
the distinction needs to be refined a bit further. After all, even though indiscreetly 
killing other people on the way to our target in Hitman: Blood Money is an optional 
goal, doing so is likely to decrease our chances of success because it would raise 
the alarm and send guards looking for our player-character. Leino (2007) therefore 
accepts this distinction between optional and obligatory but draws it away from 
goals. Instead, Leino proposes a division that incorporates all of the game content 
by connecting it to his gameplay condition (those things we need to do in order to 
keep playing). Leino then talks of undeniable content when it is the crucial content 
that we are forced to take notice of, because denying this content would decrease 
our possibilities to act in the game. On the other hand, deniable content is that which 
can be denied without any immediate or future punishment that would affect the 
ability to keep playing. As I have argued above, Leino links up game content to our 
ludic progress, outlining what is ludically dominant and what is not.  
However, also here the distinction can be refined a little more. While Leino helps 
us focus on a broad range of game content, his distinction remains a rather harsh 
one. His distinction does not focus on different types of rewards that may not have 
an essential role in fulfilling the gameplay condition but may still have a ludic 
benefit. In other words, these elements are not undeniable per se since we can also 
progress through the game if we take no note of them, but they are not ludically 
irrelevant since they may still provide us with a reward. For example, while 
discretely killing innocent characters on the way to your main target in Hitman: 
Blood Money does not give you any set back, the game still rewards us with higher 
scores and special weapons if we manage to only associate the assigned targets. 
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Similarly, you can very happily finish New Super Mario Bros. Wii (Nintendo, 2009) 
and save the princess by denying all the star coins spread around the different levels, 
but the game does encourage you to collect them by rewarding you with unlocked 
levels in a secret world. In these cases, the game does encourage certain actions 
over others but does not discourage these other actions with a punishment that 
would affect the ability to keep playing. Or, to put it differently, in Leino’s terms 
the content is deniable, but the game is not neutral about it since it provides a ludic 
reward.  
In other cases, the game may even punish and reward us at the same time. For 
example, driving over pedestrians with a car in Grand Theft Auto IV is likely to 
trigger a response from police or gang members, which can form a major 
inconvenience when we are trying to successfully finish a mission. However, 
pedestrians also leave behind money when they die which can be picked up to buy 
new weapons and ammunition. In this case, driving over pedestrians should be 
avoided if we want to keep playing the game, yet, paradoxically, we are also 
encouraged to do so if we want to earn money. In Leino’s terms it is undeniable 
content that needs to be avoided, yet it is also ludically encouraged because it 
provides us with an optional ludic incentive which may impact the player’s strategy 
and subsequent actions.  
The game’s rules can of course also be neutral about certain content that is neither 
undeniable because it is not punished with a decreasing ability to keep playing, nor 
encouraged with optional rewards. This content is indeed completely ludically 
deniable and it is only there for other (e.g. narrative, realistic, transtextual or artistic) 
reasons. In a sequence in Bioshock 2 for instance, the player moves his character 
across the ocean floor alongside the underwater structures of the city of Rapture. 
At approximately the halfway point, the player can stop to look through a window 
and observe a violent encounter between a Big Daddy character and a couple of 
Splicers. Watching this scene unfold gives the player a better understanding of his 
own player-character (which is also a Big Daddy) and the narrative of the game. 
However, the fight is completely deniable. The player can simply decide to keep 
walking and not take any notice of it. Doing so will not give the player any 
disadvantage or advantage during further play.  
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The level in which the portrayed or performed violence has a ludic function can 
significantly influence our perceptions and performance of that violence. As a 
necessary element of the game, undeniable violence has a strong ludic justification 
for the player. This means that we do not necessarily have to justify the violence in 
any other way than to state that we wish to continue playing. In this sense 
undeniable violence may lack significant conscious reflection from us about the 
motivations for performing these actions.  
However, this is certainly not always the case. As players we can still experience 
moral dilemmas around our choice to play the game at all. In such cases we struggle 
with the type of actions the game forces us to perform. In Manhunt for instance, the 
player is given the option to perform his executions in three different levels of 
‘gruesomeness’. Although choosing the most gruesome execution level remains 
optional in most of the game, in the level ‘Doing Time’ the player is forced to 
perform the highest level gruesome kill with a hammer and a baseball bat. In this 
case, the violence is required in order to proceed to the next level. But although the 
game justifies the violence ludically, the gruesomeness of the act will likely leave 
us to question the validity of this justification. As Sicart (2009) argues, it is exactly 
because of this tension between the values of the player and the justification 
provided by the game, that Manhunt can be such a rich ethical experience. Or, to 
put it differently, the fact that we are forced to perform morally dubious actions in 
the game raises the question of when something ceases to be ‘just a game’ and starts 
to become morally inappropriate behaviour.48  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
48 Here a brief note is in order. As I argued in the introduction, the focus in this thesis is on physical 
violence and not on sexual violence for instance. This is important to keep in mind because the 
extent to which the ludic justification can either be perceived as sufficient or perceived as valid 
enough to (at least) create a struggle with our own value system may differ greatly when we are 
talking about sexual abuse or rape. In such a case, our own value system will likely make any ludic 
justification obsolete.   
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The ludic justification can also be found in optional violence that is encouraged 
through reward. The gruesome execution level in Manhunt for instance, although 
optional in most of the game, is still encouraged with more points. In this case, the 
player may wish to take this reward as a justification for the violent actions, but 
since these points are part of a completely separate reward system that plays no 
further role in the game, it could well be that this violence is preceded by a more 
careful process of conscious decision-making. In these cases, the moral dilemma 
does not revolve around the decision to play the game at all but rather around the 
actions the player decides to perform in that game. As Zagal wonders in reflecting 
on exactly this issue: ‘how far would you go for a few points more?’ (2010b, p. 
242).  
A similar point can be made for violence that is completely undeniable and 
therefore does not receive a ludic justification at all. This type of violence will only 
be justified within the narrative of the game, or by the player drawing on 
connections with the real world or other artworks. Also here, any moral dilemma 
concerns the player’s active decision to perform the violent act or not. In the famous 
No Russian mission in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 (Infinity Ward, 2009) for 
instance, the player is completely free to participate in the killing of innocent 
civilians in an airport. Because the game does not ludically enforce us to perform 
the violence, our decision to partake in the killings are based on other game devices. 
The game’s narrative devices for example specifically frame the actions as 
something evil, explaining that your character is undercover in a terrorist 
organisation. This may thus provide us with a nudge to refrain from shooting. 
However, the decision to partake in the shooting is still our own since the game 
does not enforce us in any way. In other words, any moral dilemma revolves around 
shooting or not shooting rather than around playing or not playing the game.  
 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of various devices making up and 
surrounding moments of game violence. However, rather than quantifying these 
components as many previous formal content analyses have done, the neoformalist 
approach applied here considers the functions that those formal components can 
have in encouraging our immediate play responses. Furthermore, by considering 
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the game from a player’s perspective as a set of interrelating components rather 
than an underlying rule system, the approach also distinguishes itself from a 
ludological approach and allows for a more balanced consideration of the different 
components. In this approach, rules are not considered as the underlying algorithms 
but rather as the affordances manifested to the player which puts them on an equal 
footing with narrative and stylistic devices. Consequently, this chapter has put some 
effort into thoroughly and equally exploring these three categories of devices. 
Finally, the focus on a wide variety of functions has allowed this chapter to move 
away from a focus on just the ludically important, just the narratively important, or 
even just the semantically important (which is where the proceduralist focus lies). 
Instead, the neoformalist approach allows us to focus on a range of five different 
roles that devices can play in cueing our responses, all of which can be present on 
their own or in combination with other ones in a specific device.  
As narrative devices, a game’s opening cutscene can for instance have a clear ludic 
motivation when it encourages strategy building, thereby playing an important role 
in the player’s goal-directed, rule-bound behaviour. As I noted, many of the 
cutscenes in the Hitman series have such a function since they give us information 
about our objective to kill a certain target, the whereabouts of that target and any 
potential dangers to take into account if we are to achieve that goal. However, these 
cutscenes also provide important narrative context for actions thus having clear 
compositional motivations. The cutscenes in the Hitman games usually frame the 
targets as inherently bad people who have been involved in all kinds of illegal 
activities from drug smuggling to corruption, and from biological warfare to child 
abuse. This compositional functioning also provides certain moral justifications to 
the violent actions which in turn can influence our moral concerns about engaging 
in these actions. Here the cutscenes may also draw on our knowledge of the real 
world or other cultural artefacts. The cutscenes in World War II games often have 
important realistic motivations in the sense that they refer to our historical 
knowledge, and the cutscenes in Batman games or Lord of the Rings games have 
important transtextual motivations since they refer to our knowledge of the larger 
media franchise. Finally, cutscenes can even have important artistic motivations for 
being there such as in the use of colour and character representation in the opening 
cutscene of Call of Duty: Ghosts.   
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Also in-game characters can have a wide range of motivations. In line with the 
neoformalist approach, such game characters should be considered as a cluster of 
different characteristics, some of which will have an important role to play in our 
ludic progress while other characteristics may be more important for narrative 
development or realistic references. So, while Max Payne’s battered and run down 
facial features play an important compositional role, his ability to enter bullet-time 
mode (which can also be considered as an important stylistic device) is ludically 
important because it helps our shooting accuracy. This bullet-time mode also has 
important artistic motivations since it aestheticizes the path of the bullet and its 
impact on the enemy’s body. Other characteristics making up an in-game character 
can also have important transtextual and realistic motivations. Batman’s Batmobile 
or the clothes that John Marston in Red Dead Redemption wears, clearly reference 
our knowledge of the Batman franchise or wild western films. Niko Bellic’s accent 
refers to our knowledge of real Eastern European languages and accents, and the 
facial tattoo of John Sinamoi in Dead Island references tattoo practices in Polynesia 
such as the Maori tā moko.     
Other stylistic devices such as mise-en-scène elements, sounds and points-of-view 
can also have a wide range of functions. As I noted, the third-person perspective 
has an important ludic function because it gives us a good idea of our character’s 
position in its environment. This means that these perspectives help us in games in 
which the player has to manoeuvre the character between platforms or move the 
character out of sight from the enemy. On the other hand, a first-person perspective 
eliminates the hassle of having an on-screen body that needs to be directed over 
obstacles, and instead allows us to more exclusively focus on aiming and firing. 
However, a first-person point of view can also have an important compositional 
motivation since it limits our vision on the game world, thereby withholding 
information of for instance a nearby monster which can then help to trigger a startle 
response once that monster suddenly jumps upon us. In fact, a first-person point of 
view can also be considered for its realistic function in the sense that it presents us 
with a perspective on the game world that is similar to our perspective in our 
everyday lives. In that case, we may be encouraged to identify with the character 
perceptually which brings us perceptually closer to any violent act.  
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Mise-en-scène elements and sounds can have important ludic functions when they 
draw our attention to oncoming danger, or even just to content that is important for 
our ludic progress such as good weapons or health packs. In fact, these weapons 
and health packs also have important ludic functions in themselves as elements of 
mise-en-scène. However, mise-en-scène elements and sounds can also have 
important compositional functions when they for instance create a certain 
atmosphere for actions. In these cases, the dimly lit, blood and gravity spattered 
hallways in the underwater city of Rapture in Bioshock  put our actions into a very 
different narrative context than the warm sandy beaches in Dead Island. Similarly, 
the eerie sounds in the dungeon levels in Super Mario Bros. create a very different 
context for actions than the more joyful above ground levels. Finally, mise-en-scène 
elements and sounds can also have very clear realistic motivations. Mise-en-scène 
elements can be realistically motivated when they correspond to things we perceive 
to be real, or when their audiovisual quality corresponds to our norms for 
audiovisual realism. For example, Liberty city in GTA IV can be considered 
realistically motivated because it referentially references New York City but also 
because its lighting, colour, texture, and sound are of a certain detailed quality we 
hold to be realistic. Similarly, the 3-dimensional sound effects in the audio-only 
game Papa Sangre manage to create a relatively realistic sound ecology that we can 
move in, but also the sounds of the weapons in America’s Army 3 can contribute to 
the perceptual realism of the game when they are conceived as more or less faithful 
to real gun sounds.  
Lastly, the game’s rule-based devices in the form of affordances for actions can 
have important ludic reasons for being there. A game with an internal point of action 
gives us different ways to get out of a sticky situation and progress through the 
game than a game with an external point of action. Similarly, a game with a high 
level of action affordances will allow us to device a range of different strategies to 
achieve the game’s goal while a game with only a few action possibilities only give 
us a few options for ludic progress. However, the higher the level of action 
affordances, the more likely it becomes that some of these affordances do not serve 
a ludic purpose at all. In such cases, these action affordances can also serve an 
important compositional or realistic function, such as the audio diaries in Bioshock 
or the ability to get drunk in GTA IV. In fact, these action affordances can even have 
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transtextual or artistic motivations such as our ability to play with characters from 
other games in Super Meat Boy or our manipulation of the squares in The Marriage.  
This finally brings me to the dominance of all these various functions. If any device 
can have a variety of different functions, as I have argued in this chapter, we still 
need to be able to determine which ones those are and which ones are the most 
important. After all, without a clear a priori focus on the ludic, the narrative, or even 
the semantic, the neoformalist approach risks becoming overly broad. As I have 
argued in this chapter, the ludically important elements are discernible by looking 
at the way the game frames certain content as undeniable, encouraged by additional 
rewards, or deniable. The undeniable content that is essential to take note of if we 
wish to keep playing the game has an obvious ludic dominance. The encouraged 
content has an important, yet not essential ludic function. And finally, deniable 
content yields no ludic benefit whatsoever.  
It would seem that the neoformalist approach here is being drawn more towards a 
ludological emphasis on the ludic. As I have noted in the previous chapter by 
drawing from Aarseth (1997) and Leino (2010), games can enforce certain play 
responses by presenting us with the possibility of a fail state. This means that the 
truly ludically undeniable content is actually encoded in the system as long as the 
player is willing to keep playing, and thereby independent of historical context. On 
the other hand, the dominance of narrative, realistic, transtextual, or artistic devices 
cannot be enforced but only encouraged and is more dependent on the player’s 
historical context. This means that any undeniable ludic function will always take 
precedence over other functions since we are simply forced to acknowledge the 
importance of this function in order to keep playing. It is only when the ludic 
function is either deniable or encouraged that other dominant motivations can start 
to surface. 
These other dominant motivations can be compositional when the device is more 
crucial to the progression of the narrative. In neoformalist terms I have called this 
bound motifs which exist in dualistic relationship with free motifs which digress 
from the main plot line. Important compositional motivations can most certainly be 
found in undeniable ludic content but will always come second to the ludic 
motivation due to its enforced nature. However, a compositional motivation can 
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itself also start dominating other types of motivations. In these cases, any ludic 
function of a device, even when it may gain us a better score, starts playing second 
fiddle to the fact that the device is more crucial for plot development. In fact, 
references to the real world or other cultural artefacts will often just function in 
support of the narrative chain of cause and effect. A reference to a larger super hero 
universe, or the use of appropriate historical clothing, only help to strengthen the 
game’s narrative. As Thompson herself has argued for Hollywood cinema, the 
realistic motivations (but I would argue the same can be said for transtextual 
motivations) then become a ‘secondary motivating force (…) to the main 
compositional justification’ and a flaw in the realism or transtextual reference 
would divert our attention away from the narrative (1988, p. 54). 
These realistic and transtextual motivations can also come to the fore once the ludic 
and compositional motivations are less important. In such cases, the realistic 
motivation may be specifically there for realistic spectacle such as in many racing 
games, and the transtextual motivations are there as clever homages to other media 
such as in Super Meat Boy.  
Finally, the artistic motivations really only come to the fore when other motivations 
are lacking. These motivations are particularly hard to find in the larger blockbuster 
AAA games and also only rarely pop up in individually developed titles. While for 
instance, the opening cutscene of Call of Duty: Ghosts has a clear artistic 
motivation, that motivation is still overshadowed by its compositional motivation 
since it provides the essential narrative backdrop for the rest of the story to unfold. 
All this means that, in spite of the basic premise that we should not presume any 
motivation as dominant a priori, certain motivations more easily force themselves 
to the foreground than others. Nevertheless, this premise remains important to 
highlight the various combinations of devices and functions at work during our 
game play experience. First of all, the more dominant motivations are only 
highlighted after a careful analysis of the various ways the devices function. While 
such a neutral stance brings with it some methodological challenges (as I will 
discuss in the next chapter), it remains important to let the game rather than the 
approach determine the analytical focus. Secondly, in spite of a certain dominant 
motivation, the other motivations during a particular moment of play can still leave 
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their mark on our play experiences. The next chapter of this thesis will therefore 
further explore methodological strategies to get to the more dominant devices and 
functions and also explore the perceptual, cognitive, and emotional responses that 
these various functions can cue. 
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Chapter 5 
The Role of the Player 
 
 Introduction 
The previous chapter further explored the neoformalist approach to outline the 
different devices during moments of play and discussed these devices with regards 
to the functions they have in cueing our responses. Such an analysis is useful 
because it shows how different videogames and different moments in games 
structure the content in different ways, all of which encourage different types of 
behaviours and perceptions. However, the interactive nature of games also brings 
with it certain challenges for such a system oriented approach. As I argued in 
chapter 3, games can be considered as multiples that can be instantiated in different 
ways which raises methodological questions about how to gain intersubjective 
access to the game’s formal components. How do we know if our instance of play 
is one of the appropriate instances with regards to the functioning of the game 
multiple?      
As I will show in section 5.2, this question ties into the discussion of the dominant 
on a more holistic game level. As I argued in chapter 3, the dominant refers to the 
more important content of the game in all five motivational categories. This means 
that certain decisions we make are more important for ludic progress than others, 
just as certain decision are more or less important for narrative development, 
realistic quality, transtextual references, or overall artistic shape. Consequently, the 
more appropriate instances of play are those instances that include this dominant 
content. However, this still leaves us with the important methodological issue of 
how to play to instantiate that dominant content.  
Here a careful consideration of the role of the player becomes highly important. 
Although I have argued that the game is a system that enforces and encourages 
certain use through rules, rewards, and what Tavinor (2009a) calls subtle 
psychological nudges, players are still required to actively work with those cues 
and will do so in a wide variety of ways. As Smith (2006) has noted, those scholars 
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interested in players and play performances tend to emphasize the active role of the 
player by oftentimes focussing on the more creative and subversive play 
performances. In doing so, these scholars also problematize more system oriented 
approaches that depend on play performances to gain intersubjective access to the 
functioning of the system (as also evidenced by Juul’s (2015) brief history of anti-
formalism in game studies discussed in the introduction of this thesis). However, 
this problem is more grounded in different interests than that it truly lays bare an 
epistemological issue. While these scholars are right in emphasizing an active role 
of the player, we can most certainly still try to gain intersubjective access to the 
game’s formal components as long as we can acknowledge that there is an 
independently existent game system encouraging more and less appropriate play 
responses. By employing a playing strategy that discloses the more appropriate play 
responses we can start analysing the way the formal elements function in cueing 
these responses. In this case, play becomes a methodological challenge, not an 
interest in itself. 
In section 5.3 I will discuss this playing strategy as a strategy in which we let our 
responses be guided by these formal components and do not actively subvert them. 
This is the methodological playing strategy I have already briefly mentioned as 
‘cooperative play’ in chapter 3.3. During cooperative play, we do not only do what 
the game ludically enforces us to do, we also do what the game encourages us to 
do. Furthermore, this cooperative playing strategy does not only concern the 
behavioural choices we make but also includes our perceptual cognitive responses 
to the ludically, compositionally, realistically, transtextually and artistically 
motivated devices. In other words, the player applies the skills and background 
knowledge implied by the formal devices.  
Here however, we should be careful not to erect a kind of ideal player that is 
somehow able to activate the one ‘correct’ instance of the game. Such an ideal 
player cannot exist because he or she would exist independent of a historical 
context, and, perhaps more problematic, would require the assumption that a game 
has one correct way of playing it. Instead, the cooperative playing strategy comes 
closer to Aarseth’s (2007) implied player in the sense that the player still only 
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instantiates the game in one or more of these various appropriate ways and then 
deduces the functioning of the formal devices from that instance. 
In section 5.4 I delve deeper into how the game’s devices cue different types of 
player roles in the form of agent and spectator. I argue that in our role as agents our 
cognitive, perceptual and emotional responses are mostly cued by (and thereby 
concerned with) ludically motivated devices, which means we focus our resources 
on perceiving, preparing for, and executing actions that are relevant for our success 
in the game. On the other hand, our role as spectator is encouraged by more 
dominant compositionally, realistically, transtextually and artistically motivated 
devices which have us focus our resources on narrative construction and aesthetic 
evaluation.  
In section, 5.5 I show how these different player roles lead to different experiences 
of the game violence. Here I discuss how a predominant role as agent means that 
we focus our attention on that violence that is relevant for our play success and 
cognitively frame the violence as a ludically functional game component. On the 
other hand, I discuss how a more dominant role as spectator means that we focus 
our attention on a larger array of violent imagery and perceive the violence for its 
representational significance and aesthetic quality. Consequently, our emotions 
towards the violence differ with regards to the focal object.  
In the end, this chapter does two things. It first reiterates the methodological 
challenges that neoformalism faces in the form of player choice. By elaborating on 
the idea of appropriate play and the way we can gain access to it through a 
cooperative playing strategy, I hope to strengthen the system-centric claims of the 
neoformalist approach. Secondly this chapter builds out of the previous chapter to 
further explore the different ways in which different combinations of devices and 
functions encourage our perceptual, emotional, cognitive, and behavioural 
responses. By also specifically emphasizing the player’s role as spectator, the 
neoformalist approach is able to explore a wider range of functions and thereby also 
explore many different ways in which our experience of violence is cued by the 
game system. 
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 Appropriately Playing the Dominant Devices 
As I argued in chapter 3, games can be considered as multiples allowing for a wide 
variety of different instances. In game studies, this idea that players indeed have 
choices that allow them to instantiate different sets of formal devices is universally 
adopted although the analytical ramifications of this idea differ amongst scholars. 
On one end of the scholarly spectrum, there are those with an interest in the formal 
characteristics of games, like the ludologists and the proceduralists, who are trying 
to figure out a way around the complicated matter of different instantiations and 
still make claims about the workings of an intersubjective game object. As I will 
argue more thoroughly below, these scholars generally argue that player choices 
are still confined by some core structure which we can come to know through a 
certain analytical playing strategy. On the other end of the spectrum however, there 
are those scholars who more fully submit to the inherent selectivity of one’s play 
and argue that a game is therefore better understood in the form of its selective 
instantiations. In their handbook on videogame studies, Egenfeldt-Nielsen et al. 
term this group of scholars ‘situationists’ and argue that these scholars not only 
argue for a more play-oriented approach to games, but that they also show ‘a clear 
discomfort with the formalist approach’ (2013, p. 12).  
Following on from Juul’s (2015) eight different anti-formalisms in game studies it 
seems to me that the latter approach is currently the most prevailing one. Ermi and 
Mäyrä famously argued that the interactive nature of games means that ‘if we want 
to understand what a game is, we need to understand what happens in the act of 
playing, and we need to understand the player and the experience of gameplay’ 
(2005, pp. 15–16). Sicart specifically argues against the more formalist 
proceduralism by emphasizing the creative and performative characteristics of play. 
Focussing specifically on meaning, he states that ‘the meaning of a game, its 
essence, is not determined by the rules, but by the way players engage with those 
rules, by the way players play’ (2011). Malaby follows a similar train of thought 
and adds ontological consequences to. He argues that ‘every game is an ongoing 
process’ that has ‘the potential for generating new practices and new meanings, 
possibly refiguring the game itself’ (2007, p.102). In other words, a game can 
change as players notice (intentionally or unintentionally) new ways of playing it, 
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or as it generates new meanings in a different cultural context (2007, p. 106). 
Consequently we should focus our analysis on experience and not on formal 
categories (2007, p. 110).  
As I have noted before, it seems to me that oftentimes the difference between these 
situationists and formalists lies in a difference of interest and not in a disagreement 
on an epistemological or an ontological level. Bogost for instance, who is the 
subject of much of Sicart’s (2011) criticism, does not claim that meanings are solely 
determined by the game’s rules. In fact, Bogost is very clear about the fact that 
meanings are generated in the gap between the rule-based representation and the 
player’s subjectivity (see for instance Bogost, 2006, p. 107). However, he is 
interested in how games express meanings through their various (im)possibilities 
for play actions (its instantiations), not how players empirically interpret them. Also 
ludologists do not ascribe such a determining role to the game object. Aarseth even 
specifically argues that the selective nature of our play instances make the game 
object cueing our responses a lot richer than what we encounter during a play 
instance and should therefore be considered as an ‘implied game object’ (2011, pp. 
65–66). Nevertheless, Aarseth is interested in how to study the rules of that game 
object that structure our play instances, not in how players actually instantiate the 
game. Also in this thesis I have been careful not to suggest that play responses are 
solely determined by the game’s formal devices but are instead the result of the 
interaction between game devices and the player’s historically determined 
backgrounds and skills. But also my interest in play responses only provides a set 
of assumptions about the more appropriate processes that players must go through 
in order to instantiate a game from which we can deduce the form and functions of 
the game’s devices.  
Of course a difference does arise once the play-oriented arguments lead to claims 
about a presumed unstable game object (e.g. Malaby). Such claims undermine any 
approach interested in form and functioning of formal game components or, as 
Leino puts it, would ‘discount and undermine a body of knowledge to be gained by 
studying the material game artefact as it exists’ (2010, p. 109). However, I would 
argue, similar to Leino (2010), that Malaby’s ideas about the processual nature of 
games (2007) do not hold up when it comes to the single player digital games under 
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investigation in this thesis. Malaby’s arguments are mostly derived from non-
digital, multi-player game examples where the material structure of the game is 
indeed more open to social negotiations. However, digital single-player games have 
a much more definitive material structure confining our play responses. Tavinor 
(2011) for instance argues that the variability of the instances of play is still 
significantly bounded by the game’s algorithm which can be considered as part of 
the unchanging artefactual basis of these games. This also links up to Aarseth’s 
(1997) and Leino’s (2010) arguments that these games show their materiality in 
their ability to change their material features in response to player input to 
distinguish between successful and unsuccessful use. 
However, Tavinor also argues that the regulating artefact does not only consist of 
the game’s algorithm but also of the way that that algorithm manifests itself in a set 
of representational aspects. As he puts it, ‘algorithms (…) are neutral in relation to 
their material instantiation’ (2011). This means that even though different games 
can have the same algorithm (i.e. mods), they are still different games with their 
own various play instantiations on the basis of their representational differences. 
These representational aspects consist of ‘polygonal 3D models, animations, virtual 
cameras, physics, environmental sounds and music, dialogue, 2D elements, and 
graphical artefacts like shaders’ (Tavinor, 2011). In other words, these 
representational aspects make the rules into affordances and give us the narrative 
and stylistic devices all of which make up the materiality of the game system. These 
devices can be considered to exist independently of the player and during play the 
player does not change anything about these devices but just activates various 
combinations of them. 
This also means that the player is not only enforced by the algorithm to instantiate 
the game in a certain way because not doing so would (eventually) lead to a 
termination of the game session (the ludically undeniable), but the player is also 
encouraged or discouraged to perform certain actions through secondary rewards 
or punishments, or through subtle nudges in the game’s stylistic or narrative 
devices. This brings us back to the different devices discussed in the previous 
chapter. Here, an opening cutscene can become a motivator for certain types of 
actions when it presents a certain character as a notable threat. A certain point of 
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view can encourage more reckless or stealthier behaviour. A certain sound or music 
change may cue a sense of urgency to keep moving quickly, or a certain mise-en-
scène element may slow us down to prepare for danger. Once we acknowledge that 
not just the game’s rules but also its narrative and stylistic devices, are capable of 
encouraging our decisions in the game, we can see that the game multiple 
encourages instantiations of itself that are more appropriate than other ones.  
Even in a mission like No Russian in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, where the 
rule-based devices are neutral about whether the player participates in the killing of 
civilians in the airport or not, the appropriate choice is encouraged by other devices. 
For example, the opening cutscene of the game and the missions before No Russian 
already clearly establish the Russians as the enemy and our player character as the 
hero. Furthermore, in the briefing leading up to the mission, you are told that you 
are going undercover in a group of terrorists led by a guy called Makarov. A guy, 
who, as the briefing explains: ‘doesn’t flinch at torture, human trafficking or 
genocide’. Finally, the people in the airport are clearly depicted as innocent 
travellers who are not fighting back but are only trying to save themselves once the 
terrorists open fire. This means that the game system still encourages not shooting 
the civilians through compositionally motivated devices that structure our player 
character as the good guy and the terrorists as the bad guys, and realistically 
motivated devices that draw on our knowledge of real innocent travellers in an 
airport. Arguing that No Russian is about an undercover agent who goes bad and 
starts shooting innocent civilians in an airport would simply be incorrect if we take 
all the game’s important cues into account.  
This example also shows that the encouraged instantiation does not have to be 
beneficial to ludic progress. In this case, not shooting is encouraged to achieve 
narrative consistency. So, because the different devices can have different 
motivations for being there, an appropriate instantiation of the game should also 
account for those various motivations. Our play decisions can be encouraged 
because they are important for ludic success, because they are important for the 
game’s narrative to progress, because they are important for the game to make its 
references to the real world or other artworks, or because they are important for the 
game to show its overall artistic shape. In other words, an appropriate instantiation 
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of the game should contain the more dominant devices and functions of the game 
because these dominant devices help us say something about how the game works 
in its different motivational categories. For example, if we want to study the ludic 
and narrative functions of GTA IV, we should appropriately focus on the missions 
that push our progress, and not on the ability to go to bars or get our cars cleaned. 
An appropriate instantiation thus points us to the dominant on a holistic level and 
gives us a focus for analysis.  
Performing the play responses to instantiate the game appropriately should of 
course not be understood as only pushing the right buttons to activate an appropriate 
screen output. All of our perceptual cognitive responses to the game’s devices play 
a role in the decisions we make to instantiate a particular set of formal game devices. 
This means that our appropriate play responses consist of a continuous loop of 
perceiving the various cues that the game foregrounds, fulfilling the cognitive 
processes of constructing a strategy, constructing a narrative, drawing on 
knowledge of the real world and/or other artefacts, noticing the game’s artistic 
shape, and then acting on those cognitive findings appropriately to bring about the 
next set of game devices. In this sense, our play responses are appropriate when we 
device a strategy and perform those actions that are beneficial towards achieving 
the game’s goals. Our play responses are appropriate when we perform those 
actions that are important for the progression of the game’s narrative and 
simultaneously perceive them correctly by organizing them into chronological, 
causally linked events, and supplementing them with broader contextual 
information. Our play responses are appropriate when we activate those devices 
that are important for the game’s realistic and transtextual references or its overall 
artistic shape and at the same time draw on the available background information 
to successfully fulfil these effects.  
All this does not mean that a game encourages just one set of correct play responses. 
First of all, neoformalism has helped to see that the appropriate actions and 
perceptions may change over time due to new available information, such as in the 
case of rocket-jumping or the realistic quality of the first Mortal Combat. Secondly, 
games will always have a variety of mutually exclusive ludically motivated devices, 
all of which afford appropriate play responses and that force the player to choose. 
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In a relatively linear first-person shooter like Battlefield 3 we can switch between 
weapons, take cover in different spots, or generally move around the environment 
in different ways. Even a digitized single player game of tic-tact-toe which has a 
clear perfect strategy (see Juul, 2005, pp. 38–39) still allows for a variety of 
different game states that are all appropriate within that perfect strategy. A similar 
thing can be argued for compositionally motivated devices in games with a sandbox 
structure or branching storylines. In GTA IV we can play the missions in a different 
order, and in Bioshock we may decide to save the Little Sisters or not. All of these 
decisions are appropriate but we have to choose. This still shuffles up the narrative 
in different ways.  
Games sometimes even have appropriate play responses that contradict one another. 
Drawing back on the Max Payne 3 example from section 4.3.2, we can see how 
Max’s voice-over, as well as his friend Raoul, often cue us to avoid exploration and 
keep moving forward. An appropriate response would be to listen to these cues and 
uphold a fast pace of action. However, the game also includes golden gun parts 
hidden in the environment which clearly encourages exploratory behaviour. Here 
the soundscape contradicts these additional rewards, leaving us with two 
contradicting appropriate play responses. This however, is only the case because 
there is no reason to assume that one cue is clearly more dominant than the other. 
If the golden gun parts would have played an essential part in our ability to progress 
towards the game’s goal, the story would of course have been different, since then 
the golden gun parts would have been ludically undeniable.  
The point here is that games can and will encourage a variety of different 
appropriate behaviours, but those appropriate behaviours are still relatively limited 
as long as we are willing to take all of the game’s dominant cues into account and 
apply the appropriate skillset and background information. So, although we can 
have many different appropriate play responses in GTA IV, stopping for red lights 
is not one of them, nor is completely ignoring all the missions and living out a 
peaceful existence in the New World (see below). Similarly, Battlefield 3’s 
narrative is not about a criminal being interrogated, and if you continue to loose tic-
tac-toe by not placing your first piece in a corner or in the centre, you are lacking 
the appropriate skills. In all these cases, games still encourage and enforce a limited 
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set of appropriate play instances and it then becomes the neoformalist’s task to 
distill the functioning of the game’s devices from one or more of those instances.  
 The Cooperative Playing Strategy 
Once we can acknowledge that there is an independently existent game system 
encouraging a limited set of appropriate responses, we can go in to find the cues on 
the basis of those appropriate responses. However, this still leaves us with an 
important methodological question: what playing strategy should we adopt in order 
to come to an appropriate instantiation of the game? After all, outside of the 
specifically enforced behaviour, we can and often will make different choices in the 
game. So how do we know whether our choices are appropriate?  
Here, it seems, there are two possible (though not equally workable) 
methodological solutions. According to the proceduralists, an appropriate 
instantiation can be found by an exhaustive playing strategy. Proceduralists aim to 
interpret the game’s meaning, which means that an appropriate play response 
consists of all those actions and perceptions that make up this interpretation. 
Because the devil may be in the detail when one tries to come to a holistic ‘reading’ 
of a game, a proceduralist will aim to make as many different choices (successful 
and unsuccessful) and test as many different interpretations as possible. As Treanor 
puts it:  
Just like any argument, a meaning derivation will not be considered strong 
if it ignores evidence that goes against its claim. This is particularly difficult 
for games, as there are so many types of evidence. Despite this, a 
proceduralist reading strives to account for as many of the observations 
about code, dynamics, aesthetics, representation, etc. and how they relate to 
the culture of the interpreter as possible (2013, p. 134).     
While this is indeed a very valid and thorough playing strategy to come to an 
appropriate play response, there are two problems with it. First of all, it seems that 
this deductive strategy is only workable for games with a rather limited array of 
player choices and perceptual cues such as the persuasive games that Bogost (2007) 
studies. However, once we start to analyse a game like GTA IV, it becomes a sheer 
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impossible task to perform all possible actions and encounter all possible 
combinations of perceptual cues.  
Secondly, as I have argued before, the proceduralists argue that the player’s 
perceptual and behavioural activities cannot escape ‘the grasp of subjectivity’ 
(Bogost, 2006, p. 99). This is because the actions taken and the meanings ‘read’ 
arise from an interplay between the game and the player’s personal background 
(what Bogost (2006, p. 107) refers to as simulation). Consequently, the 
proceduralists argue that this playing strategy, however thorough, can only come to 
a play response that is reasonably appropriate to a rather limited group of people 
who share similar but never the same backgrounds. The play response thus remains 
highly subjective and while the analyst can claim that his response is a more 
generally appropriate one, he has no shared reference points to fall back on. From 
a neoformalist perspective the subjectivity of background information is 
problematic because it is only through the application of background information 
that we are able to instantiate the game and gain access to it. In order for this access 
to be intersubjective, neoformalism must rely on a set of shared norms during a 
specific moment in time.  
The second playing strategy seems more workable. This strategy is proposed 
(though not particularly advocated) by Aarseth (2007) who argues that if we want 
to study the expectations laid down by the game for the player, we need to take on 
the role of the implied player and follow the game’s course. While Aarseth remains 
somewhat unclear about the finer details of this implied playing strategy, we can 
develop it further by again linking it back to his idea of a game as a self-regulating 
system (Aarseth, 1997, p. 179). With this in mind, it seems that the implied playing 
strategy is the strategy that leads to success in the game. However, success is a 
rather ambiguous term. Are we successful when we reach a high score, when we 
finish the game, or even when we are applying the appropriate background 
information to find the game’s transtextual references? As I noted in chapter 3, 
Leino (2010) therefore further elaborates on Aarseth’s ideas and argues that on the 
basis of the game’s materiality, success can only be defined as the ability to keep 
playing because it is only through the ability to terminate the play session, that a 
game is able to enforce an explicit boundary on the player. In other words, while 
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different players may define success in different, sometimes personal ways, and 
perform different action to achieve that success, they can only achieve that success 
if they perform those actions that the game requires as necessary to continue the 
play session. In this sense, these required successful actions, which Leino terms the 
gameplay condition, can be considered as the intersubjective appropriate play 
response that all players necessarily need to adhere to. The only strategy to come to 
this appropriate response is then simply to hold the desire to keep playing.  
While Leino’s gameplay condition provides a useful strategy to lay bare the wide 
variety of possible play actions that do not lead to an eventual fail state, it is clearly 
both too broad and too narrow to disclose the appropriate play responses I outlined 
above. It is too narrow because it only focusses on what is ludically important and 
not what is important in the other motivational categories. And it is too broad 
because it only considers something ludically important when it is enforced, and 
does not acknowledge that game devices can also encourage actions that are not 
essential to keep playing such as in games with more optional goals. This means 
that if we were to follow Leino’s strategy we end up with an incredibly wide range 
of appropriate play responses. In GTA IV for instance, we may choose to play the 
different missions and let our character get caught up in a life of crime, or we can 
choose to let him live out a more peaceful and somewhat mundane existence 
visiting pool halls and bowling alleys and watching in-game television. In both 
cases, the player is able to keep playing the game. In fact, if all we want, is to keep 
playing, we are better off choosing the latter, less dangerous option. But while the 
game strictly allows for this behaviour, it would be silly to suggest that GTA IV is 
a game about a man living out his peaceful existence in a big city watching TV and 
playing pool. This is because the game encourages different kinds of play responses 
through a variety of rule-based, narrative and stylistic devices; play responses 
where our character does get entangled in a world of crime. This means that even 
though we are able to respond peacefully, we have to do so by consciously rejecting 
the many different cues in the game that encourage us in a different direction. 
So, to first help narrow down the playing strategy and come to a more limited set 
of ludically appropriate play behaviours that are also encouraged and not just 
enforced, I first borrow from Smith (2006). By drawing on economic game theory, 
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Smith argues that a game’s objective goals (those positively valued game states that 
the player is meant to strive for) can encourage a more limited set of in-game 
behaviour by shaping preferences and, in consequence, actions. In this case, the 
game does not necessarily force the player into a certain behaviour but strongly 
encourages him or her. As Smith puts it: 
the game strongly urges the player towards accepting a particular utility 
function but does not of course ultimately decide how the actual player 
behaves. We may compare this to the way a house with a kitchen “urges” 
inhabitants to cook food in the kitchen but does not ultimately restrict them 
from cooking in the living room (2006, p. 71). 
Because the player is still free to ignore the game’s objective goals and seek his 
own subjective ones, this appropriate play can only be found if we adopt what Smith 
calls a rational playing strategy. According to Smith (2006), a rational player is 
someone who is trying to optimize his or her chances to achieve the objective goals 
in the game. By adopting the role of a rational player, we are able to rule out a range 
of inappropriate play actions and focus our attention on those actions that the game 
encourages for ludic progress. In other words, by trying to optimize our chances to 
achieve the game’s goals, we will automatically instantiate the more dominant 
ludically motivated devices. Although Smith’s economic game theory only allows 
him to focus on rule-based encouragements - arguing that if the game’s rules are 
neutral about what actions we take to get to the game’s goal, all those possible 
actions are equally encouraged - I would argue that his rational player strategy can 
also disclose other narrative or stylistic devices with important ludic functions. In 
that case, also an opening cutscene denoting a character as a particular threat or the 
sounds of loud footsteps heading our way, encourage us to switch to a heavier 
weapon because it will increase our chances of achieving the game’s goal.    
However, if we also want our playing strategy to disclose the devices that play an 
important role in the other motivational categories, we need to do more than just try 
to optimize our chances of ludic success. Referring back to Aarseth’s (2007) 
implied player and Iser’s implied reader, we need to embody all ‘those 
predispositions necessary for a (…) work to exercise its effects – predispositions 
laid down, not by an empirical outside reality, but by the text itself’ (Iser, 1978, p. 
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34). In that case we need to adopt a playing strategy that also has the basic 
predisposition, skillset and appropriate background knowledge to thoroughly but 
effectively construct a narrative by organizing the game’s cues into a chronological 
narrative chain of cause and effect and filling in the gaps with additional context 
such as events in-between or prior to what the game shows us. In doing so 
effectively, we start to disclose those devices that are more crucial to the plot 
development (bound motifs) and can quickly bypass the less crucial ones (free 
motifs). Furthermore, this playing strategy needs to include the predisposition and 
skillset to draw from that appropriate historically available background information 
to fulfil the game’s references to the real world or other cultural artefacts. And 
finally, that playing strategy needs to include the basic predisposition to appreciate 
the game and its devices for their overall artistic shape. Having the basic 
predispositions to fulfil the game’s effects in all the motivational categories is what 
I call the cooperative playing strategy. 
The cooperative playing strategy requires us to be reasonably well informed of the 
world around us and the canon of games, films and other artworks in it, so that we 
can draw on that information when the game requires it. Furthermore, the 
cooperative playing strategy requires us to have a reasonable skill level to play the 
game under investigation in which we experience an appropriate amount of 
challenge but do not die all the time. This way we are able to focus our resources 
on those cues that the game foregrounds (also see below). Finally, the cooperative 
playing strategy of course requires us to have a general desire to cooperate with 
what the game encourages. This means noticing which devices the game 
foregrounds, perceiving those devices with the appropriate background information 
in mind, and acting on those cues cooperatively which in turn helps to foreground 
the next set of devices.  
The cooperative playing strategy is a more heuristic approach than the exhaustive 
playing strategy argued for by the proceduralists. It helps to find an appropriate 
instantiation of the game through a bottom-up process of testing different actions 
and perceptual hypotheses, and taking the route of least resistance. In doing so, it is 
important to remain a neutral stance in which all of the predispositions occur on an 
equal level. It is only then, that we are able to disclose an appropriate play instance 
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in which devices with all five of the different dominant motivations can come to 
play a role. This of course does not guarantee that they also will surface. As I 
already argued in the previous chapter, ludically undeniable devices will always 
force themselves to the foreground and subordinate other devices and other 
motivations. Similarly, realistic and transtextual motivations often function in 
support of a more dominant compositional motivation. And artistically motivated 
devices will often only play a minor role. However, as long as we assume all five 
predispositions with equal intensity, we can let the analysis be guided by the game’s 
devices and not the other way around. Only then can we let ourselves be drawn to 
the realism of a sun shining through the treetops in Skyrim, or be encouraged not to 
shoot the innocent travellers in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2. Only then can we 
start analysing a broader range of devices and functions.  
Finally, I should emphasize again that the cooperative playing strategy still only 
instantiates the game in one of many ways and the game multiple is more than any 
of its individual realizations. This again links up to Iser’s arguments about the 
implied reader (Iser, 1974, p. 280, 1978, p. 37). However, where Iser keeps 
emphasizing the selectiveness of the reader’s realization of the text in order to focus 
on the reading process, I would again emphasize that the cooperative playing 
strategy still comes to an instantiation that is more appropriate than other ones 
according to the functioning of the game’s formal devices. This allows us to focus 
our analytical focus back onto the form and functions of the game system.   
At this point, critics may again argue that this cooperative playing strategy does not 
reflect the way that real players play games. Real players may consciously work 
against the game’s cues in the form of cheating (Consalvo, 2007), they may not 
properly understand the game’s cues (Schott, Vught, & Marczak, 2013), or simply 
lack the motor-action skill to perform the appropriate actions (Canossa & Cheong, 
2011). In all these cases, the critics make fair points. However, the focus of this 
thesis is simply not on these empirical play responses but on the form of the game 
system cueing responses. To gain access to this form, we need to cooperate with 
the game’s cues and play the game appropriately. While this does not tell us 
anything about how real players may or may not play the game appropriately, it is 
a useful way of getting access to the game system.   
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 Appropriate Play as Agent and Spectator 
In responding appropriately to the game’s cues, I argued in chapter 3 that players 
should be considered as both spectators of audiovisual output and as agents engaged 
in planning for and execution of motor-action to bring that output to the screen. 
Borrowing from Thompson’s (1988, pp. 8–9) arguments for film spectatorship, I 
argued that in our role as spectator we employ our perceptual cognitive resources 
for comprehension and interpretation of narrative and stylistic elements and in our 
role as agent we employ resources for action execution to achieve the game’s goal. 
This double player role has seen different arguments in game studies in relationship 
to immersion (McMahan, 2003), emotion (Frome, 2006, 2007), and formalist 
characteristics of games (Juul, 2005; Newman, 2002). In fact, some scholars used 
the distinction to argue for the uniqueness of games in comparison to films, thus 
emphasizing player agency over spectatorship (Eskelinen, 2001; Linderoth, 2013). 
In the distinction that I proposed in chapter 3, there is no such inherent dominance 
of one player role, although I have argued that we can see agency and spectatorship 
as two polar extremes on a continuum of different forms of player engagements. In 
that case, players are cued to employ their resources more towards one end of the 
continuum than towards the other, depending on the structure of the game. As 
briefly discussed in chapter 3, our role as spectator is predominantly cued by 
compositionally, realistically, artistically and transtextually motivated devices 
which means that our activities as spectator are mostly concerned with narrative 
construction, making references to the real world and other artworks, and 
experience of the game’s artistic shape. On the other hand, our role as agent is 
predominantly cued by ludically motivated devices which means that our activities 
as agent are mostly concerned with the activation and identification of action 
affordances and the various ways in which game devices can play an important role 
for our progression towards the game’s goal. It is now time to explore those player 
responses a little further by drawing on the devices discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
The obvious reason that games cue the player to adopt the role of agent is because 
games afford actions. Because games allow us to act on, or in their game worlds by 
mapping our motor commands onto audiovisual representations of in-game actions, 
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we get to engage in detailed cognitive planning of subsequent motor actions and 
then execute those actions by pressing buttons and moving joysticks. Because all 
games will afford at least some sort of actions, this role as agent can be experienced 
in any game; from relatively fast-paced action packed first-person shooters like 
Quake III: Arena, to slow-paced point-and-click adventure games like Myst (Cyan, 
1993) and Riven (Cyan, 1997). However, given the fact that these games still afford 
very different levels- and points of action, we may wonder whether certain action 
affordances are more prone to cueing our activities as an agent than other. Grodal 
for instance, explains that his experience of Myst is different from ‘shoot-‘em-up 
games’ like Quake because Myst does not allow for ‘active control of the type 
exerted in dynamic interpersonal and inter-agency relations’ (2003, p. 151). In fact, 
he argues that, because the action affordances are more limited, that ‘the pleasure 
of such Myst-type adventure and mystery games is partly a series of associative and 
contemplative situations and feelings, in which the associative processing of the 
perceptual input is just as important as the motor output’ (2003, p. 151). In other 
words, Myst cues us to ascribe more of our resources towards our activities as a 
spectator than Quake, due to its limited action affordances.  
On the basis of Grodal’s experience one could be tempted to conclude that more 
action affordances will automatically cue us to employ our resources towards those 
action affordances and thus predominantly adopt the role of an agent. However, 
such a conclusion would be too imprecise. For example, a game like Skyrim affords 
much more actions than a game like Quake, yet Quake cues us to attribute much 
more resources towards its limited set of action affordances than Skyrim. This is 
because in Quake the action affordances also continuously require our attention for 
us to progress in the game. Or, to put it differently, almost all Quake’s action 
affordances have an undeniable ludic function which forces us to distribute our 
perceptual-cognitive resources towards them. On the other hand, a fair amount of 
Skyrim’s action affordances is only optional or just mildly encouraged for 
progression through the game. In this sense, it is not the quantity of action 
affordances that may cue us to primarily adopt the role of the agent, but rather the 
extent to which the affordances are important for us to progress in the game. In 
other words, it is the dominance of the ludic functionality that cues our agent role. 
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The consequence of this is that a predominant role as agent does not just entail a 
greater focus on the activation, identification and execution of action affordances 
in general, but more specifically on the action affordances that are important for 
achieving the game’s goal. In other words, our role as agent includes a recognition 
of what is important to achieve the game’s goals and a focus on game elements for 
how they can potentially impact that achievement.   
For example, in Dead Island the player can pick one of four characters to play. All 
four characters belong to a certain class with a certain fighting expertise (firearms 
expert, sharp weapons expert, throwing weapons expert, and blunt weapons expert), 
all are presented with a short biography that the player can read before making his 
or her final decision, and all are shown to have physical characteristics that fit their 
background stories (a Chinese female, an African-American male etc.). At this 
point in the game, certain character characteristics are thus motivated ludically, 
certain characteristics are motivated compositionally, and certain characteristics are 
motivated realistically. While the player is technically free to choose his or her 
character on the basis of its biography or physical appearance, only the ludically 
motivated characteristics are suggested to impact our ability to attain the game’s 
goals. In other words, while we are technically free to focus more of our cognitive 
and perceptual resources towards the construction of the game’s narrative or 
interpreting the meanings of the game’s racial stereotypes (the black male is a 
rapper with a troubled past and the Chinese female is a martial art expert), the game 
encourages us to assign more of our resources towards the action affordances of the 
characters since these will help us to achieve the game’s goals. This of course does 
not mean that our activities as a spectator do not occur. It simply means that during 
this particular moment, the character choice menu has a more dominant ludic 
motivation which encourages us to be an agent first, and a spectator second.  
Our role as agent is usually not only cued by ludic motivations. In fact, in most 
cases, other motivations will play a supportive role in our plan to achieve the game’s 
goals. Our understanding of what the game’s goals are is usually framed through 
compositionally motivated devices. If we are trying to outrun the police after an 
assassination, our understanding of a getaway car as a drivable object is triggered 
by references to what real cars look like. And if we see that our health bar has 
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diminished in size, we understand that we need to start looking for health packs 
from our knowledge of game conventions. In fact, one could even argue that artistic 
motivations also function in support of our ludic progress (as well as other types of 
responses) since, as Thompson (1988, p. 19) argues, other motivations cannot exist 
independent of an artistic motivation because all of the devices inherently 
contribute to the game’s overall shape. In that case, any design choice is also an 
aesthetic choice. The aesthetic choice of red and white colours in Mirror’s Edge 
also shows us where to go to achieve the game’s goals. All this shows that our role 
as agent is often complemented with our role as spectator. However, in these cases 
we draw on knowledge of the real world or game conventions, or we construct a 
narrative and perceive artistic choices to increase our chances of success in the 
game.  
A final remark to make about our role as agent is that it does not necessarily involve 
motor-actions, at least not immediately. Instead, as I noted in chapter 3, we only 
need to have the promise of motor control over the situation from which we can 
start forming our detailed plans for the execution of the appropriate actions towards 
game success. The construction of such strategies or tactics form a large part of our 
role as spectator. This of course connects up to the idea that all kinds of game 
devices including those devices that do not afford any motor actions, can still have 
important ludic functions. The music in Serious Sam 3: BFE indicates nearby 
enemies, and the brief cutscenes that show when we enter a new area in Prince of 
Persia: The Sands of Time (Ubisoft Montreal, 2003), point out the different enemies 
on the scene and the direction that we are supposed to go in. In these cases, the 
devices themselves cannot be acted upon, but they still encourage a predominant 
role as agent by letting us anticipate upcoming ludically significant actions first and 
perceive for narrative, artistic, realistic or transtextual significance second.  
Once a device becomes less important for our progression through the game, other 
functions may come to the foreground and cue us to assign more of our resources 
towards the construction of a narrative, call upon our notions of the real world and 
other games and films, or appreciate an artistic quality of the device. In these cases, 
dominant compositionally, realistically, artistically and transtextually motivated 
devices cue a more intrinsically motivated perception. In other words, our 
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perception of narrative, realistic and transtextual references, or artistic shape does 
not serve another ludic purpose but becomes purposeful in itself. We then adopt a 
more dominant role of spectator.  
This role as spectator often occurs during the more ‘passive’ game moments in 
which we have no immediate action opportunities nor the suggestion of action 
opportunities in the near future. In many cutscenes we are often neither forced nor 
encouraged to devise a strategy for future actions. Instead we are encouraged to 
construct the narrative of the game, or appreciate the artistic shape of the cutscene 
as it finally rewards our ludic efforts. In the many cutscenes in Battlefield 3 for 
instance, we are presented with footage of an interrogation scene between one of 
our player-characters and his military superiors. During the interrogation we get the 
necessary narrative information that frames the next mission which encourages us 
to understand our mission actions in the context of the narrative. However, other 
than that the cutscenes have no ludic purpose. They do not show us how a certain 
character is particularly dangerous which could have cued a careful playing strategy 
once we encountered that character during gameplay. They do not show the 
geographic outline of the game space which could have encouraged us to plan an 
attacking strategy moving from cover to cover. They do not even really tell us much 
about the skills of our character or the skills of our enemies at all which could have 
helped to devise a plan of attack. Instead, these cutscenes mostly encourage us to 
perceive for the sake of perception alone. We draw on our knowledge of story 
formats to organize causality and time of the game whose missions and cutscenes 
are presented out of chronological order. We draw on our notions of security 
camera-like imagery from the real world or other cultural artefacts to make sense 
of the grainy black and white imagery. And we may even appreciate the artistic 
shape of the animation with its use of lens flares and the use of hard, low-key 
lighting. Similar to our viewing responses to films, our role as spectator in games 
make our perceptions non-practical, leaving us to more freely perceive for the 
purpose comprehension and interpretation.  
However, other than our viewing responses to films, our spectator role in games 
can also occur during moments in which we can act. But while the game affords 
actions, those actions do not serve an important ludic purpose which still allows us 
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to engage in more spectator activities. In fact, during these moments we can even 
employ our ability to act for the purpose of perceiving. While free roaming through 
the forests of Skyrim for instance, we may look up at the tree canopy and appreciate 
its realistic appearance. Although we are performing actions during these moments, 
the actions do not serve an immediate ludic purpose. Instead we may use our actions 
for our perception of the tree-canopy by steering our character to the more beautiful 
parts of the forest and directing the in-game camera upwards to get the better view. 
Here, the game encourages us to compare its tree canopy to the norm for 
realistically looking tree canopies we have gained from experience with real tree 
canopies and tree canopies in other artworks. This means that during these moments 
a realistic and perhaps artistic motivation takes priority over any immediately 
necessary ludic function and we are encouraged to indulge in the realistic and 
artistic spectacle that is the animated representation of tree canopy. 
This example also shows how our actions as spectator are often slower and more 
contemplative than our actions as agent. In this sense, pace can play an important 
role in cueing us to distribute more of our perceptual cognitive resources towards 
our activities as agent or our activities as spectator. As argued in the previous 
chapter, a fast pace forces us to be more economical with our resources while a 
slower pace encourages us to distribute our attention more freely. Because game 
pace often consists of movement impetus where certain devices enforce a time limit 
on the player’s actions or otherwise encourage or discourage fast decision making, 
a fast pace if often combined with action affordances that have important ludic 
functions. In this sense, a fast pace generally encourages our activities as an agent, 
while a slower pace allows us the time to engage in narrative comprehension or 
meaning construction.49  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
49 There may be some exceptions to this rule. In games like Fahrenheit or The Walking Dead for 
instance, the conversation system forces the player to choose a conversation topic or a question or 
answer within a limited time. In these cases, the game forces a fast pace on the player’s choices, but 
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If we take Thompson’s (1988, pp. 8–9) claim to mean that not just our mental 
processes but in extension also our perceptual attention is focused down in our role 
as agent, then the eye tracking study by Seif El-Nasr and Yan (2006) discussed in 
the previous chapter, confirms this point. After all, these authors note a larger range 
of eye movement in the third-person action-adventure game Blood Omen 2 (Crystal 
Dynamics, 2002) than in the first-person shooter Halo II (Bungie, 2004) and they 
attribute these results to the slower pace and the relative safety of the player-
character in Blood Omen 2. Here, the safety and in extension the slower pace of 
Blood Omen 2 allow us to scan the environment and take in information that is not 
immediately relevant for our chance of survival, while the fast pace and continuous 
danger in Halo II require a more economical use of perceptual resources. In other 
words, to reiterate a part of Thompson’s quote from chapter 2: ‘If we noticed every 
perceptual item within our ken, we would have no time to make decisions 
concerning our most pressing needs, like not stepping out in front of a bus’ (1988, 
p. 8). 
At this point, I should again note what I argued in chapter 3, that also our skill level 
can influence to what end we mostly assign our cognitive and perceptual resources. 
If we have not sufficiently incorporated the controls of a game, we will have to 
spend a significant amount of resources towards performing the actions 
appropriately. On the other hand, an expert player will be able to perform more 
actions ‘automatically’ without directing much conscious attention towards them. 
In this sense, the player’s skills level can overrule any cues embedded in the game 
to encourage a certain player role and thereby invalidate any claims based on those 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
the choices are not strategic choices of an agent but rather narrative choices of a spectator. Here the 
player perceives the different options and quickly forms hypotheses about how the narrative will 
turn out with every option. Our cognitive perceptual resources are therefore not assigned to strategic 
planning and executing the appropriate action, but rather to forming the most desired narrative. 
While action execution is still a part of this and will require at least some resources, the conversation 
system as a whole encourages more perception for story construction.      
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cues. In order to still make claims on the basis of the game’s structure, we should 
thus try to keep this subject variable as constant as possible. For this very reason, 
the neoformalist approach that I propose here argues for a cooperative playing 
strategy where a player has the skills level that is implied by the game (see previous 
section). By offering different difficulty levels, the game encourages us to pick the 
level that fits our skills level so that we find the appropriate amount of challenge in 
the game.  
 The Player as Agent and Spectator of Violence 
If we consider that the agent role has us focus our cognitive perceptual resources 
on the preparation for and performances of ludically important actions, and our role 
as spectator focuses our cognitive perceptual resources on comprehension and 
interpretation of narrative, realism, transtextual references, and artistic quality, then 
it will come as no surprise that also game violence can be perceived very differently 
depending on what role the game encourages more. Here I consider two arguments. 
5.5.1 The Argument Concerning our Perceptual Cognitive Focus 
The first argument concerns our perceptual and cognitive focus. If Thompson is 
right in claiming that our mental processes as agents are focussed down whereby 
we ignore a myriad of sights and sounds in order to effectively proceed towards our 
goal (1988, p. 8), then one could argue that during moments of violence in which 
we are cued to be more agent than spectator, our perceptual experience of that 
violence is focused on those things that are important for our ludic progress. This 
could mean two things. First of all, it could mean that our perceptual attention is 
focussed on those devices that are beneficial to ludic progress and that other devices 
are kept peripheral. Secondly, it could mean that of the many different functions 
that a device can have, we focus on the ludic functions and start ignoring the other 
ones. This is of course an iterative process whereby important ludically motivated 
devices first cue our role as agent, which in turn focusses our attention further on 
the ludic functions. When we ourselves perform a violent action, our resources are 
thus mostly focused on the successful execution of a set of motor-actions and on 
the activation of new action opportunities, all of which constitute the planning and 
execution of a larger play strategy. Similarly, when we see someone else in the 
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game perform a violent act, that action is mostly of interest to us to the extent that 
it activates certain action affordances that help us in achieving the game’s goals.  
In drawing on Gibson’s theory of ecological perception, Linderoth (2013) makes a 
similar point and argues that for an agent, perceptions are intrinsically connected to 
actions in the sense that we perceive action affordances that we act on, which in 
turn activate new action affordances that we can perceive and then act on, and so 
forth. While I am reluctant to ascribe the role of agent to an ecological theory of 
perception since we still identify action affordances with the help of (transtextual 
and realistic) background information,50 Linderoth does effectively show how a 
predominant role as agent has us perceive actions as both the execution of available 
action affordances and the activation of new ones that may benefit our ludic 
progress, rather than for the things that the actions represent narratively, realistically 
or even artistically or transtextually. This means that violent imagery is perceived 
both as the appropriate feedback to our ludically important motor actions and as the 
means to achieving the game’s goals. In our role as agent, we see the gunfire less 
as gunfire and more as the feedback to pressing our mouse button and for the new 
action affordances that the gunfire activates (e.g. killing a prison guard activates the 
opportunity to escape). Here we perceive the gory and gruesome trauma in a game 
like Mortal Kombat less as realistic representation of blood and broken bones and 
more as the feedback that confirms our visuo-motor engagement with the game 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
50 An ecological theory of perception denies the occurrence of any cognitive processes necessary for 
us to recognize the thing as something that we know to afford certain actions. For example, how can 
we see that a gun affords shooting if we have no previous knowledge of guns? In their extensive 
argument against direct perception, Fodor and Pylshyn (1981) call this the difference between seeing 
something, which indeed depends on what the thing you see is (as the ecologists would argue), and 
seeing something as, which depends on what you know about the thing. To take their example, we 
cannot see that the Pole Star affords navigation, unless we see the Pole Star as the Pole Star rather 
than a dot of light in the sky. And to see the Pole Star as the Pole Star you need some sort of mental 
representations of and about the Pole Star.  
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system which activates new opportunities towards achieving game success. 
Gregersen (2014) even argues that some of the more extravagant/vivid 
representations of violence in games is a result of the medium’s inability to simulate 
bodily feedback to our executed actions. In this sense, the audiovisual feedback is 
turned up to compensate for the lack of bodily feedback to still give the player a 
sense of agency. While this does not mean that we do not also see the violence for 
its realistically looking details, or even for the purpose it has in the story, it just 
means that, when we are cued to adopt a more dominant agent role, our resources 
are more attuned to picking up the audiovisual feedback as the confirmation of our 
action execution and the activation of new action opportunities.  
There are of course limits to the validity of these claims. Once the violence gets too 
disturbing, our moral objections will likely start to play a more prominent role and 
problematize such abstractions of the representation into ludically significant visuo-
motor action loops. If the overarching goal of the game was to rape as many people 
as possible, it is not very likely that we perceive the actions mostly for their ludic 
functionality. This is also why this thesis focusses on physical ‘blood and guts’ 
violence which is what many games rely on for substance. As I noted before, the 
mechanisms of conflict in games are easily represented as physical violence. For 
this reason, the link between ludic progress and physical violence is a well-
established staple of most videogames which likely makes our perceptions of this 
violence as ludic mechanisms easier. However, we should keep in mind that this 
cannot be said about all other types of violence.  
So, while the argument may not hold for a game like Rapelay, it does explain Juul’s 
observation that Quake III Arena players turn down the game’s graphical settings 
in favour of faster input-output processes (see chapter 3). This makes sense since 
these games predominantly encourage our role as agents by encouraging us to 
quickly execute a wide range of action affordances that have undeniable ludic 
functions. In turning down the game’s graphical settings, players adhere to these 
cues and focus their resources towards the successful execution of the motor 
actions. For them, the graphics of the violence are only important to the extent that 
they provide sufficient feedback to player input and can show the action affordances 
necessary to keep engaging with the system towards success. While the graphics of 
-206- 
the game could also cue a sense of perceptual realism, that function is now even 
purposefully ‘switched off’ to focus on the game’s more dominant ludic functions.  
In other games or game moments our resources may be more focused on a narrative, 
realistic, transtextual or artistic comprehension of the violence. In the discussed 
bullet-cam mode in Max Payne 3, the player is encouraged to take on the role of 
spectator and witness the artistic qualities of the visual spectacle. In a game like 
Soldier of Fortune (Raven Software, 2000), where we are able to keep shooting at 
the bodies of dead enemies, removing every single limb, there is no ludic purpose 
to our action anymore since the enemy is already dead. Instead we are given the 
time to reflect on the realism and artistic detail of the dismemberment. While the 
player may still be cued to focus some of his perceptual cognitive resources towards 
aiming and firing the gun, the action is framed by more dominant realistic and 
artistic motivations encouraging a more prominent role as spectator. Similarly, 
when we decide to gun down a random pedestrian on the streets in GTA IV, our 
actions are not encouraged by an undeniable ludic function nor are we forced or 
encouraged to adopt a certain fast pace since the player is not in any real danger. 
This means that during these moments, the game cues us to allocate our cognitive 
perceptual resources towards perceiving the violence for its realistic or artistic 
quality or for its role in the narrative. On the other hand, if we are engaged in a 
shoot-out in an abandoned warehouse in the mission Russian Revolution, our 
violent actions have an undeniable ludic function since the enemies need to be shot 
to progress through the game and we are also forced into a relatively fast pace since 
taking it slowly will likely get our character killed. In this case, we are more 
encouraged to distribute our resources towards the appropriate execution of the 
actions that the game affords, and factor out the narrative, realistic and artistic 
functions of these actions. Although the mission as a whole has an important 
compositional purpose, presenting a twist in the narrative of the game, the violent 
actions themselves encourage very little narrative construction and encourage us to 
perceive the action more as the appropriate actions towards the game’s ludic goal.  
5.5.2 The Argument Concerning our Emotional Responses 
The second argument to consider here concerns our emotional responses to the in-
game violence and follows from the first. If, during a predominant role as agent, 
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our mental processes are focussed on goal-directed visuo-motor action loops 
factoring out other stimuli such as those contributing to a broader narrative 
construction or the realistic, transtextual or artistic evaluation of the violence, our 
emotional responses to the in-game violence may also be related less to the narrative 
meanings and realistic, transtextual or artistic quality of the violent events and more 
to their ludic purpose and our execution of the proper visuo-motor action loops. 
This argument aligns with theories by Perron (2005) and Frome (2006), who 
distinguishes between three different types of emotions that differ with regards to 
the focal object of the emotion. Drawing from Tan’s (1996) theory of emotions in 
films51, both scholars first divide between the emotions towards the represented 
world (R-emotions) and the emotions towards the artefact (A-emotions). The A-
emotions are emotions of aesthetic evaluation and consist of emotions like the 
enjoyment of hearing good voice-acting, the desire to encounter human-like AI 
behaviour, the admiration of a certain graphical style, the astonishment of a certain 
special effect, or the displeasure of flimsy controls. In our A-emotions we recognize 
the operation of an intelligent creator in the game and we appreciate or do not 
appreciate that creator’s work for its aesthetic ingenuity and its transtextual 
familiarity (see also Tan, 1996, pp. 64–65). This means that our A-emotions are 
mostly triggered by dominant artistically and transtextually motivated devices since 
those are the devices that refer to the game as an aesthetic artefact.  
The R-emotions, on the other hand, are emotions in response to the characters and 
events in the fictional world of the game. These emotions consist of the emotions 
we feel with or for Max Payne when he loses his wife and child, or the fear we feel 
when his life is threatened by a couple of bandits. We principally experience these 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
51 Tan adheres to a functional theory of emotions (see Frijda, 1986) where emotions include 
cognitive processes that mediate between the emotional stimulus and the emotional response as well 
as action tendencies. In other words, emotions include a cognitive appraisal dimension and an action 
dimension. 
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emotions along with or for a character in the game (Tan (1996) calls this ‘empathic 
emotions’) because during the encounter of bandits it is not our life that is in danger 
but the character’s. However, there are instances where we may experience 
emotions directly in response to the events without imagining the situation of the 
character. As Tan explains with regards to films, during a torture scene we can still 
experience disgust or revulsion for the visual details directly while at the same time 
feeling pity for the tortured and loathing for the torturer (1996, p. 83). Similarly, we 
can directly feel awe for a beautiful landscape or amazement at the realism of a 
shooting scene. In all cases though, our emotions are triggered for the game’s 
fictional events and not for the game as an aesthetic artefact. This means that R-
emotions are mostly cued by dominant compositionally and realistically motivated 
devices since these devices make up the realistic quality of the fictional world and 
the narrative events in that world.52  
These two emotion-types are also predominantly cued during moments where we 
are encouraged to adopt the role as spectator in games. In our role as spectator, we 
are encouraged to focus our perceptual cognitive resources towards comprehension 
and interpretation of the game’s fictional events and evaluation of the game’s 
aesthetic qualities. Consequently, as a spectator we are likely to experience 
emotions in response to the realism and narrative structure of the represented world, 
and the transtextual and artistic quality of the game artefact. However, as both 
Frome (2006) and Perron (2005) rightfully argue, these two emotion-types do not 
cover the full spectrum of emotions in response to games. Therefore, they introduce 
a third type of emotion which they term game emotions (G-emotions).53 These G-
                                                 
 
 
 
 
52 While transtextual motivations can also play an important role in cueing R-emotions, they often 
do so in support of more dominant compositional or realistic motivations. See for instance, the 
example of the character Alma discussed below who indeed has clear transtextual references to the 
film Ring (Ichise, et al. & Nakata, 1998). 
53 Perron actually talks of gameplay emotions rather than game emotions in order to emphasize the 
personal experience of the gamer since these emotions arise from our motor-actions in the game. 
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emotions are emotions related to the ludic goals of the game. As Frome puts it, 
‘game emotions are emotions of competition, the emotions generated due to 
winning, losing, accomplishment, and frustration (2006, p. 19).54 These are the 
emotions related to the preparation and performance of certain tasks towards 
accomplishing the game’s goal. In a similar distinction Tan and Jansz in fact refer 
to these type of emotions as ‘task-related’ and describe them as ‘emotions relating 
to progress vs. blockage in arriving at valued goal states and obtaining preferred 
outcomes’ (2008, p. 546).  
These G-emotions fit well with our role as agent as I have described it here. During 
a predominant role as agent, we feel fear of losing and hope of winning. We feel 
frustration about our own inability when we are unable to deal with a difficult 
situation or anger at the game for its unreasonable difficulty level. Similarly, we 
feel joy when we have accomplished a difficult task, and sadness when we have 
failed. In all these cases, our emotions are directed towards the game’s ludic goals 
and our efforts towards achieving them rather than towards the character’s goals 
and the character’s efforts of achieving them. While our desire to achieve the 
game’s goal is often irreversibly linked to our desire to have our player-character 
survive a zombie attack, there is still a difference between wanting to succeed in 
the game Dead Island and wanting our character to escape a zombie infested island. 
Although success in the game is represented as our character fleeing the island, our 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
However, as I argued, our motor-actions in the game are still very much structured by the game 
which means I hold to the game rather than gameplay as the focal object of the emotions.    
54 Frome argues that these game emotions can also be social emotions such as regret when we have 
failed to protect a fellow player or schadenfreude. However, since I focus on single-player violent 
videogames here, I leave the social components aside.  
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emotional concern during a predominant role as agent is less for the safety of the 
character and more for our own play success.55   
Let’s take an example. The first-person action horror game F.E.A.R. has an 
abundance of action scenes in which the player has to dispense of a range of 
different enemies in a typical first-person shooter style. These moments have a 
considerably fast pace and the actions have undeniable ludic purposes. Because of 
this, I would argue that these moments encourage us to assign more of our 
perceptual cognitive resources to the action affordances in the game environment 
and to the appropriate execution of actions that help our progression in the game. 
During these moments, we do not predominantly relate the threat of the enemies to 
our character’s goals of survival since that would require us to assign a considerable 
part of our resources to constructing the narrative goals of the character and 
imagining them as our own. Such activity is simply not supported by dominant 
compositionally motivated devices. Instead, our mental processes are more 
economically focused on what is immediately relevant for our desire to progress 
through the game and achieve the game’s goals. In this case, our emotions are thus 
mostly based on ludic goals which are higher in priority due to the dominance of 
ludically motivated devices.  
During these moments of violence in F.E.A.R. the dominant emotions are thus 
likely to be G-emotions on the basis of the game’s structure. This means that the 
fear we experience for the enemies is predominantly a fear that they may block our 
progression through the game and the excitement we experience when we end up 
killing these enemies is an excitement for removing the blockage and progressing 
successfully. These G-emotions occur no matter what the representational 
significance of the audiovisual feedback is (assuming that we are sticking to the 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
55 Here I assume, in line with the functional theory of emotion, that goals occur in hierarchies 
(Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). This means that the primary appraisal is not based on all our possible 
goals at once but on those goals that are high in priority at a particular moment in time. 
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physical violence we generally encounter in games). We can feel this fear and 
excitement even if the enemies are represented as squares firing little triangles 
towards us, and killing them is simply represented as an explosion of those squares. 
While we may also experience A-emotions or R-emotions in response to these 
violent sequences, these emotions are subordinate to the G-emotions due to the 
undeniable ludic function of the action affordances and the game’s fast pace.  
Very often however, F.E.A.R. also has us traversing dark and eerie rooms and 
hallways in abandoned industrial buildings without encountering any enemies to 
combat. During these moments, the background story, the sound effects, the music, 
the low-key lighting, and the appearance of scary shadows on the wall all have 
dominant compositional, realistic and even artistic and transtextual motivations. 
They encourage us to assign more of our perceptual cognitive resources towards 
evaluating the aesthetic quality of the game artefact and constructing the story of a 
Special Forces unit encountering scary paranormal activities. For example, the use 
of sound in F.E.A.R. seems to be motivated transtextually and compositionally in 
the sense that it shows similarities to the use of sound in Japanese horror cinema 
and creates the creepy setting for the horror narrative to unfold. This means that 
during these moments the sound encourages us to assign our resources towards 
narrative construction and aesthetic evaluation and our emotions consequently 
consist of R-emotions for the creepiness of the narrative setting, and A-emotions 
when we appreciate the sound as a clever designer’s reference to Japanese horror 
cinema.  
Similarly, we soon learn that if we encounter the ghostly figure Alma during these 
slow-paced atmospheric moments in the game, she does not really pose a threat to 
our progression since she appears to be just a hallucination and cannot be acted on. 
Instead, it seems that Alma only poses a threat in the fiction of the game. During 
these many hallucinations, Alma, who resembles a younger version of the demonic 
girl from the horror film Ring, is seen roaming around hallways covered in blood 
and killing whole teams of soldiers with her supernatural powers. This suggests 
that, even though she does not form a blockage to our progression in the game, she 
does pose a threat to the characters in the fiction since she is seen fictionally killing 
other soldiers. In line with Carroll we could then argue that our emotional response 
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to Alma is one of ‘art-horror’ where we both fear her for the threat she poses to the 
wellbeing of the characters in the fiction and directly feel revulsion at the sight of 
her since she crosses the boundaries of our conception of children being innocent 
and sweet (1990, pp. 27–35). In this sense, the fear that we feel for Alma is a fear 
in relationship to the narrative goals of the fictional characters and Alma’s impure 
looks and behaviour as a creepy child. During these moments our emotions are R-
emotions cued by dominant compositional and realistic motivations and not G-
emotions that would require Alma to be perceived as a threat to our own ludic goals. 
In other words, these moments cue us to adopt a more dominant role as spectator 
and have us evaluate the visual stimulus in relationship to the goals of the in-game 
characters and our conceptual categories of what a natural young girl is like.  
In Gaut’s (1999) terms, our R-emotions thus partly come from a motivational 
identification with our player-character in the sense that we imagine wanting what 
the character wants fictionally rather than just wanting what we want ludically. At 
this point, Alma does not just pose a threat to the character’s goal of survival but 
vicariously to our own imagined goal of survival. Consequently, Alma cues in us a 
physiological response that we label as fear for our survival. This emotion can be 
considered a form of empathic identification (Gaut, 1999) in which we imagine 
ourselves to be in the situation of the character (we want what he wants) and we 
come to actually feel what we imagine the character to be fictionally feeling.56 In 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
56 One could argue, as Carroll (1990, p. 91) does, that we cannot feel the exact same emotion as the 
character because for the character the emotion is rooted in the believe that the ghostly figure poses 
a real threat to his survival while for us this threat is not real. To put it in Walton’s terms, one could 
say that from the character’s perspective, fictional truths are actual truths and our fictional fear is 
his actual fear. However, this, I believe, misconstrues the notion of empathy. As Neill (1996) 
convincingly argues, empathy is namely always an imaginative matter in the sense that we can come 
to feel what we imagine a character to feel not what we know someone to feel. And since our 
empathy is inextricably linked to our imagination of what a character feels rather than what we know 
a character feels or what the character actually feels, the character’s feelings are equally rooted in 
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this case, however, what we imagine the character to be fictionally feeling is not 
cued by any portrayal of emotion by the character since game characters do not 
generally show their feelings outside of the game’s cutscenes (see section 4.3.3). 
Instead, the emotions that we imagine the character to be feeling are induced from 
what we imagine that the character fictionally wants. In other words, our affective 
identification is inextricably linked to our motivational identification. This could 
mean that, even if the character appears emotionally neutral, affective identification 
and empathic identification are still possible as long as we are able to adopt some 
of the character’s basic needs during our activities as spectator. 
I should note here that our R-emotion of fear in a predominant role as spectator 
during games is still not likely to be the same as our R-emotion of fear as spectator 
of films. This is because, as Grodal (2000) adequately notes, our emotions in games 
are generally labelled according to our own coping abilities rather than our 
judgement of the coping abilities of the character. Here, Grodal focuses on what 
Lazarus (1991) calls the secondary appraisal component of our emotions. 
According to the emotion theory that Grodal adheres to, emotions do not just 
include a primary cognitive appraisal of the significance of the event to our concern 
(ludic, fictional, or aesthetic), but also a secondary cognitive appraisal of our ability 
to deal with the emotion eliciting event. To take Grodal’s (2000) example, if we 
meet a lion in the savannah, our emotions are not just labelled according to the 
evaluation that the lion threatens our survival (primary appraisal), but also 
according to how we are able to deal with that threat (secondary appraisal). If we 
are unarmed and do not think we can run from the lion we may feel despair. If we 
are big game hunting, we may feel excitement. And if we are unarmed but think we 
have a chance of escape we may feel fear and make a run for it. During moments 
of interactive gameplay, our emotions are then labelled according to how we 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
what is true in the fiction. To put it differently, we can only empathize with what we can imagine a 
character to feel, and what we can imagine a character to feel is only true in the fiction of the game.     
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ourselves are able to deal with the emotion eliciting event because we are the ones 
controlling our character’s actions, while during non-interactive cutscenes or during 
film spectatorship our emotions are labelled according to our judgement of the 
coping abilities of the character.  
That our G-emotions during a predominant role as agent are labelled according to 
our own coping abilities seems self-evident since we also judge the event to how 
they affect our own ludic goals. In these cases, an enemy forms a threat to our own 
goals of winning and our emotion is further labelled according to how we as players 
are able to deal with that threat. However, if we are cued to adopt a predominant 
role as spectator during moments of interactive gameplay, our R-emotional 
responses are somewhat more paradoxical. During such a moment, we are cued to 
evaluate the threat in relationship to our character’s concern of survival but our 
emotion is further determined by our own abilities to deal with that threat. I would 
argue however, that during these moments this paradox in our emotional experience 
is resolved by our motivational and behavioural identification with the character. 
At that point we imagine the threat to the character’s survival to be a threat to our 
own survival because we imagine wanting what the character wants, and we are 
also encouraged to imagine the character’s actions as our own actions by the fact 
that we actually control the character’s actions through our internalized P-actions 
(see section 4.4.1). In this case then, our R-emotions are rooted in two forms of 
identification with our player-character which would mean that during a 
predominant role as spectator we are more inclined to experience emotions to the 
violence as if we ourselves are performing it fictionally. 
I should emphasize here however, that R-emotions in response to performing 
violence fictionally are not the same as emotions in response to performing violence 
actually. Here I follow Walton (1990) and argue that these emotions based on make-
believe rather than actual believe are ‘quasi emotions’. Although these emotions 
are still genuine in the sense that they contain similar - though less intense - 
physiological sensations to ‘real world emotions’, our labelling of an emotion as 
fear for our survival is only true in the fiction of the game which makes it fictional 
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that we experience that fear (Walton, 1990, pp. 241–249).57 This means that when 
we think we experience fear or anger towards an enemy in the game, that fear or 
anger is only fictional since it is only fictional that the enemy concerns our goals of 
survival or saving the world. Although it is not fictional that we experience affective 
responses that show similarities with real fear or anger when someone really 
concerns our survival or goal of saving the world, these affective responses are 
significantly less intense and should be seen as only quasi-fear and quasi-anger. 
This explains why we often still desire to experience these emotions again and why 
we do not run away from the screen when we fictionally fear our survival is in 
danger. Although the enemy may also concern our actual goals of winning the 
game, such concerns are ludic concerns that trigger G-emotions in relationship to 
blockage and progression in the game.  
This finally also points out an interesting difference between R-emotions and the 
other two emotion types that we can have in response to game violence. While R-
emotions are based on something imagined, G-emotions and A-emotions are based 
on something real. When we feel G-emotions in response to game violence we feel 
emotions in relationship to winning and losing a real game system with its 
positively and negatively valued game objectives. Similarly, when we experience 
A-emotions in response to game violence, we experience emotions for the artistic 
quality or transtextual references of a real designed game artefact. However, when 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
57 Walton’s theory of fiction has been criticized by Carroll (1990) who argues that Walton’s 
argument for a fictional fear does not match the phenomenology of the actual fears we can 
experience in response to fictions. While it goes beyond the purpose of this thesis to delve deeper 
into this debate, it is worth noting that also Carroll would likely support the main point that I’m 
making here: that our emotions in response to the represented world are different from our emotions 
to the real world. After all, even according to Carroll’s ‘thought theory’ (that also Tan (1996) 
subscribes to) where we would feel fear at the thought of a ghost, our emotions do not have the same 
form as emotions to something real where our emotions are grounded in a believe (Carroll, 1990, 
pp. 79–86).   
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we feel R-emotions in response to game violence we do not feel emotions in 
response to the game as an aesthetic artefact or the game as a system of narrative, 
stylistic and rule-based devices that we can really win or lose. Instead, we feel 
emotions in response to fictional events involving fictional characters that we do 
not believe to be real. Although this could lead one to argue that R-emotions are 
less intense emotions than G-emotions or even A-emotions, I would be reluctant to 
draw that conclusion since the objects of the different emotions do not just differ in 
their realism but also in their intrinsic values and relevance. In other words, it could 
also be argued that if something concerns our survival or the fate of the world, even 
if that is only fictional, the value and relevance is greater than if something concerns 
our goal of winning a game or our desire to find transtextual references or artistic 
ingenuity.  
In conclusion of this section I should emphasize that these three types of emotions 
are not mutually exclusive but will often occur simultaneously. We could for 
instance simultaneously experience a dangerous enemy with fear for how that 
character can negatively impact our game progress, fear for how that character 
could negatively impact our survival fictionally, and aesthetic appreciation for how 
the audiovisual characteristics of the character have involved great craftsmanship. 
What I am saying here, however, is that the dominance of certain motivations will 
likely cue one type of emotion more than the other just like they steer our perceptual 
cognitive resources. In that case, more dominant narrative and realistic motivations 
cue us to get more emotionally invested in the fiction of the game in a predominant 
role as spectator. More dominant artistic and transtextual motivated devices will 
cue us to focus on the game as an aesthetic artefact and evaluate it in relation to 
other artworks and for its overall abstract shape. And more dominant ludically 
motivated devices encourage us to become emotionally invested in achieving the 
game’s ludic goal.   
 Conclusion  
After the previous chapter focussed on game devices surrounding moments of game 
violence, this chapter took a look at the important role that the player plays in 
actualizing the immediate effects of these devices. This focus is important because 
it is through these responses that we can try to gain access to the game’s form which 
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requires us to address methodological challenges since games are interactive media 
that can be instantiated in different ways. Furthermore, with neoformalism’s focus 
on the way devices function to cue our play responses, a further exploration of those 
responses is needed to expand our understanding of that functioning. All in all, this 
chapter draws back on some of the more complex issues surrounding active player 
participation discussed in chapter 3, and elaborates on these issues to explore and 
finally strengthen the usefulness of neoformalism as an approach to games.  
First of all, I argued that if we acknowledge the independent existence of a set of 
rule-based, stylistic and narrative game devices cueing our responses, then we can 
try to gain access to these devices by playing appropriately according to the 
functioning of these devices. This is not a normative claim but a methodological 
necessity. After all, using cheat codes, lacking the required skills, and being 
unaware of any referential significance does not tell us much about the game but 
more about the players and their (mis)understandings of the game. If we mean to 
study the rules, we need to abide by them and not subvert them. And if we mean to 
study the narrative and stylistic devices, we need to apply the background 
information that these devices cue and not draw on irrelevant information. It is only 
through such appropriate play that we can gain access to the functioning of the 
game’s devices.  
These appropriate play responses are still not singular nor are they fixed in time. 
Instead, there is often a wide variety of different decisions that we can make all of 
which are equally beneficial to attaining the game’s goals; in games with branching 
storylines all storylines are equally encouraged; game devices sometimes encourage 
us to perform contradictory actions; and since backgrounds are historically 
determined the appropriate responses often shift over time. But in spite of this 
variety, the appropriate play responses are not infinite. As long as we take note of 
narrative, stylistic and rule-based devices that are important in cuing our ludic 
progress, narrative construction, realistic and transtextual references, and 
appreciation of artistic shape, then our play responses are narrowed down to a 
workable set on the basis of which we can start to claim intersubjective access to 
form and function of the game’s devices. This is because these different functions 
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also play a role in the behavioural decisions that are encouraged which means that 
the appropriate decision in No Russian becomes not to shoot the innocent tourists. 
Our play responses are thus appropriate when we instantiate a set of game devices 
that are important for our holistic game experience in all of the motivational 
categories and we then respond to them by taking note of their more dominant 
functions and apply the implied background information and skills available during 
that moment in time. However, this still leaves us with a question of how to play in 
order to come to these appropriate play responses. Here I have argued for a 
cooperative playing strategy in which we take on the predispositions to fulfil the 
game’s effects in all of its motivational categories by being reasonably well 
informed of the world around us and other cultural artefacts, having the skills to 
play the game with an appropriate amount of challenge, and having the basic desire 
to cooperate with the game’s cues. This cooperative playing strategy takes a neutral 
stance towards the game’s cues so that we can heuristically come to appropriate 
play responses whereby the game and not the approach guides the analysis. While 
the cooperative playing strategy still instantiates the game in one of various ways, 
we nevertheless perform according to the game’s devices which allows us say 
something about (one of the ways) the game functions.  
The second part of this chapter further elaborated on the roles of the player as both 
agent and spectator in connection to the various functions that game devices have. 
I first argued that our role of agent is mostly cued by dominant ludically motivated 
devices which means that it is mostly concerned with successfully performing those 
actions that are beneficial to achieving the game’s goals, not performing actions per 
se. This agent role also includes the construction of strategies and tactics to come 
to the game’s goals which means that the role can also be cued by non-interactive 
game devices as long as they have a dominant ludic motivation (e.g. cutscenes). 
This of course does not mean that other motivations play no role in encouraging our 
role as agent. In fact, goals are usually communicated through narrative context, 
our understanding of in-game affordances is usually aided by references to objects 
in the real world or other cultural artefacts, and even aesthetic colour choices can 
help our ludic progress. In all these cases however, these motivations are 
subordinated by a more dominant ludic motivation.  
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However, the contribution of the neoformalist approach lies more evidently in the 
discussion of our role as spectator. By also acknowledging that our play responses 
include more spectator-like activities, our understanding of the game play 
experience becomes much broader which helps to account for a broader range of 
devices and functions. Our role as spectator is generally triggered by devices with 
dominant compositional, realistic, transtextual and artistic motivations. This means 
that our spectator role is often cued during non-interactive cutscenes, but it can most 
certainly also occur during interactive game moments. During such cases, the pace 
of the game is often slow because there is no immediate need for important ludic 
actions. Instead, actions are performed in support of story construction, realistic or 
transtextual references, or even to appreciate the game as an aesthetic artefact.  
Because our roles as spectator and agent concern different perceptual, cognitive and 
emotional focus points, our experience of in-game violence also significantly 
changes according to the role that is more encouraged. As predominantly agent we 
are cued to focus our perceptual attention on those parts of the screen that are 
immediately relevant for our progression towards the game’s goal. This means that 
any violent imagery that does not serve a ludic purpose is likely to be glanced over 
or ignored. Furthermore, our mental processes are also focused on the ludic purpose 
of the violence rather than the narrative meanings or artistic values, and 
consequently, our emotions towards that violence are cued to be emotions towards 
the way the violence affects our game progress. For further effect research this 
could lead to some different hypotheses. One could either hypothesise that 
perceiving the violence as a ludically purposeful component removes any linkage 
with real world violence thereby inhibiting potential copycat behaviour or 
desensitization to real world violence. On the other hand, one could also 
hypothesise that the ludic purpose of the violence does in fact remove some barriers 
for potential copycat behaviour and does potentially desensitize us to real world 
violence by showing us that violence is just part of a game of winning and losing. 
As predominantly spectator of violence, we are more cued to disperse our attention 
across the screen and take in a larger array of perceptual cues that do not necessarily 
benefit the player in his quest for the game’s goal. Likewise, our mental processes 
are cued to construct the narrative context of the violence or the realistic references. 
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We may even be encouraged to evaluate the artistic quality of the violence or any 
transtextual references. Consequently, our emotions during a predominant role as 
spectator are derived from aesthetic evaluations of the violence as part of a crafted 
game artefact, or the way that the violence impacts the concerns of the characters 
in the game’s fiction. Also this can lead to some further after-effect hypotheses. 
One could for instance hypothesise that perceiving game violence for its aesthetic 
quality inhibits social learning after-effects since the violence is clearly perceived 
as part of a crafted game artefact and does not translate to real world violence. 
Similarly, one could argue that if we perceive the violence as part of the game’s 
fiction there is no need for moral concern since we know the violence is merely 
fictional. On the other hand, one could also argue that we are still encouraged to 
identify with the character (behaviourally and motivationally) and perform a violent 
act that represents (more or less realistically) a real kind of violent act. While we 
then know that the act itself is fictional the fact that it represents a real kind of thing 
could be ground for social learning or desensitization. Similarly, seeing the artistic 
beauty in game violence could hold after-effects for the way we perceive real world 
violence. While it is not the purpose of this thesis to deal with these kinds of 
questions, taking into account the different types of perceptual, cognitive, and 
emotional responses to game violence can certainly help to focus any further studies 
into media effects.    
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Perspectives 
 
 Summary  
Over the previous chapters, this thesis has positioned itself within two main 
scholarly debates. First of all, it addressed the debate around game violence which, 
to this date, is mostly dominated by those with social concerns over the potential 
correlations between game violence and aggression. However, this thesis had no 
interest in studying the after-effects of game violence but instead asked about the 
formal components of game violence and the way they function in relationship to 
one another to cue our experiences. In doing so, this thesis took a more game-
oriented angle in this debate and further explored the often glanced over questions 
concerning the forms of game violence and their functions during moments of play.  
In order to focus on the formal components of game violence, this thesis suggested 
and explored a formalistic approach and in doing so also positioned itself in a 
second debate: a methodological debate about studying games as objects. As argued 
in the previous chapters, there are two prevailing ‘formalisms’ in game studies that 
could have helped to focus our attention on the formal components of game 
violence (ludology and proceduralism). However, since game violence is made up 
of important audiovisual cues as well as rule-based processes, ludology was found 
to be unsuitable for a study of game violence because it gives a clear preference to 
a game’s rule-based devices at the expense of the game’s narrative or stylistic ones. 
Similarly, proceduralism’s focus on games as tools for meaning expression risks 
glancing over any ludic functions of violence-related devices, thereby also ignoring 
the contribution that these functions can have in prompting an experience of that 
violence. For these reasons, I found that there was room and need for a new 
formalism in game studies, positioned in between ludology and proceduralism, that 
allowed for a more balanced and inclusive consideration of game violence 
elements. After drawing from the neoformalist approach in film studies and 
adapting and expanding this approach to suit the study of games, I eventually coined 
the so called neoformalist approach to games.  
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Over the course of this thesis, this neoformalism has proven useful for a number of 
reasons. First of all, the approach helped to create a more balanced consideration of 
rule-based devices, narrative devices but also stylistic devices. By focussing on 
games from a player’s perspective as a set of interrelating components rather than 
an underlying system regulating output, no single set of devices are presumed more 
important from the onset. Instead, the approach presumes rules (in the form of 
affordances), narrative and stylistic devices as equally important in potentially 
triggering our play responses, which has allowed me to ask questions about the 
narrative justification of the violence or the characters involved in the violent act, 
the use of ‘mise-en-scène’ elements, sound, pace, or point of view during moments 
of game violence, the point of action afforded by the rules and the way violence is 
either rewarded or punished. Which devices end up being the more important ones 
depends on the game itself, not on some normative a priori framework. As long as 
we assume the different predispositions for the game to achieve its effects in all five 
of its motivational categories (see below), certain devices and motivations will 
automatically surface as the more dominant devices which then form the focus 
points of our analyses.  
Secondly, the neoformalist approach to games has proven useful in answering this 
thesis’ question because it first and foremost is a functionalist approach. This means 
that the interest is not so much in the formal devices themselves, but rather in the 
way that these different devices function in cuing our violent game actions, our 
perceptions of that violence, our cognitive evaluation of that violence, and even our 
emotional responses to that violence. Here, the approach helps to identify these 
functions by considering the reasons for the presence of a device, or what the 
neoformalists have called ‘motivations’. In chapter 3 I argued for five different 
types of motivations. First of all, we can consider a game device’s ludic motivation, 
which means that the device is there to facilitate the competitive, rule-bound, and 
goal-directed process of play. Secondly, we can consider a device’s compositional 
motivation, which means that the device is there to help the construction of the 
game’s narrative. Thirdly and fourthly, we can consider a device’s realistic and 
transtextual motivations, which means the device is there to appeal to our notions 
of the real world (realistic) or our knowledge of other works (transtextual). And 
finally, we can also consider a device’s artistic motivation when it is there to 
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contribute to the overall abstract shape of the game. As I have argued, any device 
(narrative, rule-based, or stylistic) can have a plethora of different motivations and, 
as I will reiterate shortly hereafter, we will be triggered to have very different 
experiences of the game violence depending on what devices and motivations are 
most dominant during any one moment of play.  
A third way in which the neoformalist approach to games has proven useful in this 
thesis is the fact that it has helped us answer epistemological and methodological 
questions about how we can know and study an object (the game or the game 
violence) when any knowledge of that object is always acquired by an individual 
subject (the player) with its own will, skills, and background. In game studies these 
questions have found additional relevance due to the interactive nature of games 
which means that games can be considered as multiples that can be instantiated in 
multiple different ways. I have shown that, as long as we assume the independent 
existence of a set of formal (rule-based, stylistic, and narrative) game devices 
cueing our responses, then neoformalism offers some clear assumptions about the 
methodological roles of the player allowing us to focus on those devices in spite of 
these challenges.  
As a poetics, the approach first assumes the play instance as the basic premise for 
undertaking the analysis. Since the interest is in the way that devices function to 
prompt our play responses, these play responses are taken as a starting point after 
which we can go in and find the devices responsible for cueing them While this 
gives an important role to the player and his/her experience, this does not make this 
new game formalism a ‘player approach’ interested in individual perceptions and 
behaviours during play. Instead, I argued that we can still focus on the work as long 
as we are willing to let ourselves be guided by the dominant cues in the work. This 
means that we adopt a cooperative playing strategy, applying both the background 
information and the skills implied in the game in order to come to more appropriate 
actions and perceptions according to the game’s cues. It is thus from an implied 
play performance that we can focus back on the game and see which formal 
elements are functioning to trigger this experience. Here, the player becomes a 
construct suggested by the game’s cues rather than an individual entity prone to 
diverge from the suggested path.  
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It is of course in this assumption of a cooperative player that the neoformalist game 
approach will undoubtedly encounter its main criticism. However, as I will reiterate 
more elaborately below, this cooperative play is justified because it allows for 
focus. A focus on form simply cannot account for a wide range of different 
‘playings’. This is not to argue that these ‘playings’ do not exist, nor to preserve 
some objectivity about the effects that a game prompts. It is simply a way of 
focussing on the form of the game by assuming there is more and less appropriate 
play on the basis of the functioning of the game’s devices.  
A final way that the approach has proven to be particularly useful, is the fact that 
the approach also helps to emphasize the player’s viewing activity alongside the 
more commonly emphasized configurative activity. This means that play activity is 
conceptualized as existing on a continuum between pure agency and pure 
spectatorship, thereby linking up with other ‘dual process approaches’ (Newman 
2002; Ryan 2006) in game studies. In this case however, the interest is not so much 
in these play activities per se, but rather in the way that the formal devices work in 
cuing these activities. As I argued in chapter 5, devices with an important ludic 
function encourage our role as agent while devices with more important other 
functions encourage us to engage with the game in a role that is more similar to the 
spectator of films. This means that game violence that is made up of, or surrounded 
by, predominantly ludically motivated devices cues us to distribute our perceptual 
attention and cognitive resources towards the way these devices afford further 
progression through the game. The effect is that our perceptual cognitive resources 
are focused down on those elements that are of immediate concern to our successful 
actions. Consequently, also our emotional responses will be connected to the ludic 
goals of the game. These emotions are what Frome (2005) and Perron (2006) have 
called G-emotions. Any fear, anger, joy, or sadness we experience during these 
moments of game violence will most likely be for the way that the violence-related 
devices impact upon our own progression through the game. 
On the other hand, violence that is made up of, or surrounded by dominant 
compositionally or realistically motivated devices, triggers us to disperse our 
perceptual attention more freely across the screen and construct the narrative and 
the realistic quality of the game world. In this case, the violence is comprehended 
-225- 
for the role it plays in the fiction of the game, for instance for the way it helps to 
establish a character as brutal and ruthless, or the way it denotes a resolution in a 
conflict between good and evil. Following Tan (1996), Frome (2005), and Perron 
(2006), the emotions in response to these moments of violence are so called R-
emotions. In these cases, the violence is experienced for how it affects a character 
in the game rather than for how it affects our own game success 
Finally, dominant artistically and transtextually motivated devices encourage us to 
appreciate the violence for its aesthetic quality or transtextual ingenuity. In these 
cases, similar to the predominantly compositionally or realistically motivated 
violence, we do not focus our perceptual and cognitive attention down on the 
affordances and actions influencing our game success. Instead, we employ our 
resources more freely for aesthetic appreciation of for instance the graphics, the 
original score, or even the derivative plot twist. In these cases, we experience what 
Tan (1996), Perron (2006) and Frome (2005) call A-emotions, where we recognize 
the violent encounter to be part of a human created game artefact and experience 
for instance enjoyment, admiration, displeasure, or surprise for the craftsmanship 
that went into creating the violent scene.  
 Answering the question  
Throughout this thesis I have often outlined the different motivations and player 
engagements separately from one another for the sake of clarity. However, it should 
be emphasized that any moment of in-game violence can consist of a multitude of 
formal devices which all can have different motivations for being there. This brings 
me back to the main question of this thesis. At the beginning of this thesis I asked 
how violence in single-player videogames works. While this is a broad question, I 
believe I have been able to narrow it down by exploring a neoformalist approach to 
games that specifically focuses on the way that formal elements function in cueing 
certain responses. By applying this approach to a wide variety of R-rated (16+ and 
18+) games, I was able to show that violence in single-player games works 
according to the different functions of a range of narrative, stylistic and rule-based 
devices that make up and contextualize the violence. These functions can frame the 
violence as important ludic component for a successful playing of the game; as 
contributing to the realism and narrative of the game; as referencing other works 
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(e.g., games or films); and even as contributing to the overall artistic form of the 
game. Depending on what functions are more important during a particular moment 
of in-game violence, we will be triggered to have very different perceptual, 
cognitive and emotional responses to the game violence. Studying how violence in 
games works therefore requires a close look at all the devices and all their functions 
during a particular moment of play.  
 Limitations   
With a focus on the game’s formal components, this thesis is of course limited in 
its scope. The neoformalist approach to games does not allow for a thorough 
analysis of different play styles, nor for an analysis of different socio-cultural player 
backgrounds. The approach does also not allow for a thorough analysis of design 
intentions, nor for measuring usability. I should emphasize again that these 
limitations are not because I believe that the formal components are somehow more 
important than these other focus points, or that different play experiences do not 
exist. As I noted in the introduction, formalisms (in one form or another) have 
received a lot of criticism in game studies for being too much focused on rules to 
the exclusion of story; being too much focused on form to the exclusion of players; 
or being too much focused on essential properties of what games are rather than on 
the many different experiences that games can facilitate. By focussing on rules, 
narrative and stylistic components equally and by having analytical rather than 
essentialist aims, the approach argued for in this thesis goes some way towards 
addressing these concerns. However, some of these criticisms will remain since the 
approach is still focussed on form rather than context or idiosyncratic play 
experiences. Such a focus is of course a limitation but it also serves important 
purposes. Just like any approach, also the neoformalist approach directs our 
attention to a manageable set of issues because we simply cannot study everything 
at once from all different angles. We cannot be, what the Germans so aptly call an 
‘Eierlegende Wollmillchsau’ (egg-laying-wool-milk-pig) that makes everyone 
happy. And even if we could, making everyone happy may not be most beneficial 
to our understanding of the objects of study or the further development of the 
academic field. Different perspectives provide different, sometimes opposing 
answers about an object of study and it is through academic discourse that answers 
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are tested and refined. Furthermore, as Bogost notes aptly in a recent blogpost: ‘part 
of the reason for a field of discourse to exist is to reproduce itself via controversy 
and dispute,’ and making everyone happy by focussing on everything at once 
‘would give us all nothing to do’ (Bogost, 2015).    
A focus on one thing does of course require certain assumptions about other things. 
In this particular case, there are two broad assumptions that allow for this focus. 
First of all, the neoformalist approach assumes that all devices have a reason for 
being there because it is only by assuming this that we can study the way that game 
devices function on the basis of the different motivational categories. However, 
such an assumption does in principle not leave room for design flaws. This may be 
considered particularly problematic in games since the scale and interactive nature 
of these objects mean that not all design flaws are usually identified and fixed before 
release. Aside from the fact that this makes neoformalism a rather ineffective 
approach when testing for bugs, it could also be problematic when the analysis of 
the game is based on some of these design flaws. While this appears to be a clear 
limitation of the approach, I would, in this case, vouch for the common sense of the 
analyst. When all of a sudden game characters start summersaulting in mid-air 
while the rest of the game adheres to recognizable gravity physics, we are probably 
dealing with a flaw and should not include it as an important device in our analysis. 
In other words, if certain game devices are completely out of tune with the rest of 
the game’s devices, we ignore them in our analysis.  
Furthermore, a focus on the formal characteristics of game violence requires an 
assumption of a cooperative player who applies the skills and has the backgrounds 
implied by the game’s cues and consequently performs the appropriate actions and 
perceptions. The assumption of a cooperative player is susceptible to critique from 
scholars with a more player oriented approach. These scholars may emphasize that 
players are not always cooperative, that they cheat, lack skills, and come from 
different socio-cultural backgrounds. I would say that all this is true. However, as I 
have argued extensively in chapter 5, while focussing on all these things may tell 
us a lot about how players (mis)perceive, (mis)understand and (mis)play the game 
violence, it does not tell us anything about the game violence itself. Once we 
acknowledge that the material of the game exists outside of the play experience and 
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it is able to structure that experience, then a cooperative playing strategy is the most 
appropriate analytical strategy of getting to that material and the way it cues us to 
respond. Or, put differently: then the neoformalist approach to games is the most 
effective.  
 Future research   
Since the scholarly debate around videogame violence has been dominated by 
psychological effect research, the study into the formal aspects of violent games is 
still relatively underdeveloped. In much of the effect research, the games are often 
taken to be either violent or non-violent since the interest is in fact in its after-effects 
rather than in the game violence itself. On the other hand, those studies that do focus 
on exploring the variations of game violence often do so in order to quantitatively 
outline different violent content categories rather than to explore the way that the 
various components function in triggering our responses. While this thesis has 
attempted to fill some of this gap in the research, many questions about the formal 
components surrounding game violence and the connection between formal 
components and play experiences remain unanswered or are only tentatively 
explored. Are certain combinations of devices for instance more likely to cue 
certain perceptions of game violence? Or even more specifically, can we generalize 
about the differences between violence portrayed from a first-person or third-person 
perspective and violence in a 2D or 3D environment? Could we then categorize 
types of game violence, and by extension games, on the basis of certain dominant 
user functions?  
I have of course argued that every moment of game violence requires independent 
scrutiny because even a first-person perspective can have differing dominant 
functions and different related devices with different functions. However, the above 
questions are nevertheless worth exploring since an answer would allow us to create 
a taxonomy of violent games and thereby contribute to a better-informed public 
perception of game violence. In fact, if we were able to generalize about certain 
combinations of devices and functions, answering these kinds of questions could 
advice the public policy around game violence, for example by using content 
descriptors based on dominant motivations.  
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Of course, in such a case, we would also need to address more empirical questions 
about how players actually deal with the formal cues presented to them. For 
instance, how do players negotiate between different equally important functions 
of a device? Are certain players more likely to focus on ludic motivations, 
compositional motivations or even realistic, transtextual, or artistic motivations in 
spite of the dominant motivations that the game puts forward? Or, put differently, 
to what extent are players actually of the cooperative kind argued for in this thesis?  
If we are able to answer these questions we would be able to strengthen and refine 
the relationships between game forms and play experiences. We can then start to 
make more evidence based claims about how players with different skillsets and 
different socio-cultural backgrounds actually perform and perceive the violence on 
the basis of the game’s cues. This means we can also start to build bridges between 
game studies and player studies. While those studying players and those studying 
games differ in their methodologies, objects of study, and purpose of study, there 
are still clear connections to be made as long as we can acknowledge that games 
exist as material objects (not just as something that players do) that can affect our 
play. Once we acknowledge this, then player studies can become a testing ground 
for game studies and any deviant behaviours or perceptions that do not fit with the 
dominant cues in the game can then come to further refine the claims about game 
form and function and/or be explained by referring to different player models (see 
Smith 2006).    
All this will ultimately also help to further refine psychological studies into the 
after-effects of game violence. Instead of focussing on violent versus non-violent 
game content, scholars can then zoom in on more specific combinations of devices 
and functions to see when arousal levels spike, when players deliver more intense 
white noise blasts, or when more aggressive thoughts and feelings are listed. While 
it will still remain difficult to draw generalizable conclusions about aggressive 
after-effects due to difficulties with measuring aggression and ruling out other 
influencing factors, at least the game violence variable can now be conceptualized 
more precisely.  
Finally, the neoformalist approach to games argued for in this thesis could also be 
used to study other elements in games. It could be used to study the functions of 
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devices related to other matters of social concern such as sexism in games or the 
unequal representations of race or sexual orientations. However, it could also be 
used more broadly to look at the functions of game sound for the overall game 
experience, the role of game pace in prompting a sense of suspense, or the ludic 
effectiveness of a certain point of view. We can also start to revisit certain 
(ludological) claims about the importance of ludic functions in specific games, such 
as Aarseth’s account of playing a Tomb Raider game (Aarseth, 2004), and see 
whether we can make sense of this on a micro level when taking all the different 
devices and their functions into account.  
All in all, this thesis has left plenty of stones unturned. Nevertheless, I hope that the 
careful outlining of devices and functions making up game violence and the 
exploration of a neoformalist approach in game studies has raised further interesting 
questions and will thereby inspire further research. I for one, am eager to start 
turning some of those stones. 
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